University of Pennsylvania

ScholarlyCommons
Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations
2022

Strategic Response In Regional Comprehensive Universities: The
Influence Of The Environment In Higher Education
Irina Eremenko
University of Pennsylvania

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons, Higher Education
Administration Commons, Higher Education and Teaching Commons, and the Management Sciences and
Quantitative Methods Commons

Recommended Citation
Eremenko, Irina, "Strategic Response In Regional Comprehensive Universities: The Influence Of The
Environment In Higher Education" (2022). Publicly Accessible Penn Dissertations. 5580.
https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5580

This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5580
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.

Strategic Response In Regional Comprehensive Universities: The Influence Of
The Environment In Higher Education
Abstract
U.S. higher education (HE) faces a multitude of challenges brought on by shifts in demography, the
economy, technology, and global competition. The disconnect between these realities and HEIs'
perception of and response to their organizational environment may have negative implications for
national educational attainment and the knowledge economy. While environmental analysis contributes
to successful strategic response, many postsecondary leaders struggle to clearly understand their
respective organizational environments. This multiple-case study examined how regional comprehensive
universities leaders’ understanding of the external environment influenced the strategic response of their
institutions. Research findings revealed that environmental scanning and analysis tools influenced
leaders’ sensemaking during the strategic planning and, in turn, modulated their institutions’ strategic
response. Macro- contextual and prospective sensemaking conditioned a future-focused strategy,
relevant to the external organizational environment. In contrast, micro-contextual and retrospective ways
of thinking produced an internally-oriented strategic response. This study provides evidence that
universities’ leaders routinely make sense of their internal organizational environment, but only
occasionally engage in sensemaking of the external surroundings. While the study confirms that
university presidents played a crucial role in the strategy creation process, it also reveals that their
average tenure might not be long enough to produce a successful strategic response. Findings illustrates
how internal organizational challenges might lead to a deviated use of the strategic planning process, as
compared to the processes suggested by extant literature. This research enhances extant theory via
evidence that a developed definition of “strategy” separate from “planning” is crucial for producing an
externally relevant organizational strategy. These findings could help HE practitioners to better
understand their organizational environments and to enact strategic decision-making which allows for
effective strategic response by their entire institutions. Understanding the relationships between the type
of sensemaking and organizational environment as well as using macro-contextual, prospective, and
routine scanning and analysis tools could produce an externally relevant strategic response.

Degree Type
Dissertation

Degree Name
Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Graduate Group
Education

First Advisor
John M. Hartley

Keywords
educational leadership, external organizational environment, higher education management, higher
education strategy, regional comprehensive university, sensemaking

Subject Categories
Business Administration, Management, and Operations | Educational Administration and Supervision |
Higher Education Administration | Higher Education and Teaching | Management Sciences and
Quantitative Methods
This dissertation is available at ScholarlyCommons: https://repository.upenn.edu/edissertations/5580

STRATEGIC RESPONSE IN REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSITIES: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Irina Eremenko
A DISSERTATION
in
Education
Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania
in
Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Doctor of Philosophy
2022
Supervisor of Dissertation
______________________
J. Matthew Hartley, Professor and Board of Advisors Chair of Education
Graduate Group Chairperson
______________________
J. Matthew Hartley, Professor and Board of Advisors Chair of Education

Dissertation Committee:
J. Matthew Hartley, Professor and Board of Advisors Chair of Education
Laura W. Perna, GSE Centennial Presidential Professor of Education
Peter Eckel, Senior Fellow

STRATEGIC RESPONSE IN REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSITIES: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
COPYRIGHT
2022
Irina Eremenko

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
The opportunity and challenge of pursuing a doctoral degree is an exercise in
endurance and self-discipline of thinking and writing in isolation. Ironically, it could not
be done by anyone alone. First and foremost, I would like to thank my loving family and
my husband in believing and supporting me in all humanly possible ways during this
journey. Hours of long-distance calls, words of encouragement, and editing work were
necessary for me to stay motivated through these years.
I wish to extend my sincere thanks to my dissertation adviser and committee
chair, Dr. Matthew Hartley for his continuous endorsement, patience, and commitment
to help me to complete my dissertation. I want to extend my appreciation for my
dissertation committee members, Dr. Laura Perna for providing excellent
methodological and practice-oriented content support for my dissertation and Dr. Peter
Eckel for all the rich subject area knowledge he shared with me.
In addition, I would like to express a special thank you for the rest of the
University of Pennsylvania GSE Higher Education division members, without whom my
dissertation would not have been possible: Alan Ruby, Joni Finney, Diane Eynon, Ross
Aikins, Noel Lipki, and many others at GSE whom it is difficult to list in this short
format. A very special thank you I would like to extend to my peers at Penn who guided,
supported, and shared the difficulties of this work with me: Jeremy Wright-Kim, Ji Yeon
Bae, Sarah Gudenkauf, and Elizabeth Dunens.
Lastly, none of my dissertation work would be possible without my colleagues
around the world, with whom I have stepped on the path of becoming a higher education
enthusiast and expert. A special thank you is here for my colleagues at Northern Arctic
Federal University, Skolkovo School of Management, and many others with whom we
discussed the pressing issues of strategy in higher education.

iii

ABSTRACT
STRATEGIC RESPONSE IN REGIONAL COMPREHENSIVE UNIVERSITIES: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN HIGHER EDUCATION
Irina Eremenko
J. Matthew Hartley

U.S. higher education (HE) faces a multitude of challenges brought on by shifts in
demography, the economy, technology, and global competition. The disconnect between
these realities and HEIs' perception of and response to their organizational environment
may have negative implications for national educational attainment and the knowledge
economy. While environmental analysis contributes to successful strategic response,
many postsecondary leaders struggle to clearly understand their respective
organizational environments. This multiple-case study examined how regional
comprehensive universities leaders’ understanding of the external environment
influenced the strategic response of their institutions. Research findings revealed that
environmental scanning and analysis tools influenced leaders’ sensemaking during the
strategic planning and, in turn, modulated their institutions’ strategic response. Macrocontextual and prospective sensemaking conditioned a future-focused strategy, relevant
to the external organizational environment. In contrast, micro-contextual and
retrospective ways of thinking produced an internally-oriented strategic response. This
study provides evidence that universities’ leaders routinely make sense of their internal
organizational environment, but only occasionally engage in sensemaking of the external
surroundings. While the study confirms that university presidents played a crucial role in
the strategy creation process, it also reveals that their average tenure might not be long
enough to produce a successful strategic response. Findings illustrates how internal
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organizational challenges might lead to a deviated use of the strategic planning process,
as compared to the processes suggested by extant literature. This research enhances
extant theory via evidence that a developed definition of “strategy” separate from
“planning” is crucial for producing an externally relevant organizational strategy. These
findings could help HE practitioners to better understand their organizational
environments and to enact strategic decision-making which allows for effective strategic
response by their entire institutions. Understanding the relationships between the type
of sensemaking and organizational environment as well as using macro-contextual,
prospective, and routine scanning and analysis tools could produce an externally
relevant strategic response.
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Chapter 1. Introduction
Monitoring, analyzing, and responding to the external environment is of critical
strategic importance for US higher educational institutions (HEIs). As any other
organization, HEIs must respond to the external environment (EE) in order to survive
and achieve their goals (Oliver, 1991). This study defined EE as a composition of external
factors and other organizations and institutions with which organizational leaders must
interact and which have the potential to influence organizational operations, resources,
and performance (Daft, 1997; Wandling, 2018). HEI leaders navigate their large
organizations that have multiple and sometimes conflicting purposes of teaching,
research, and entrepreneurship by acting in dynamic external environments of changing
socio-economic conditions (Birnbaum, 1988). Leaders are challenged by shifts in
demography, the economy, technology, and increased global competition. The existing
challenges in these conditions were exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic and made
the EE more turbulent (McNichol & Leachman, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2020b;
Rudowitz & Hinton, 2020). While analyzing the EE is challenging, the more information
university leaders possess about it, the more capably the university can respond towards
the external environment (Peterson et al., 1997).
Among different types of responses towards the EE, such as emergency and
tactical, strategic response is of particular importance. For this study, “strategic
response” was defined as organizational actions pursued in order to maintain strategic fit
between an organization and its environment, and was characterized by at least one of
the following: it represented a long-term action towards external pressure/s, which
shaped the operation of the HEI for the foreseeable future (Kotler & Murphy, 1981;
Peterson et al., 1997). Or, it involved a noticeable allocation of resources, which
demonstrated organizational priorities and effort (Bower & Gilbert, 2006). Finally, it was
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ratified, and therefore enabled by the governing body of the university (M. Hartley,
personal communication, October 28,2020).
At the national scale, strategic responses of US HEIs demonstrate that the
country’s higher education (HE) as a whole is not fully successful in attending to the
pressing issues of the EE. HE in the US was already falling short of producing enough
degrees to support the growing knowledge economy, even before the pandemic due to
the continuous lack of affordability (Zumeta et al., 2012). COVID-19 has exacerbated the
already alarming HE affordability problem. The pandemic has diminished people’s
ability to pay for their or their children’s education due to the economic downturn,
unemployment growth, and income decrease across the nation (Kochhar, 2020; Parker
et al., 2020). It has also negatively affected states’ ability to invest in HE as their budgets
are projected to experience the greatest deficits on record in 2021 due to growing
healthcare expenditures (Rudowitz & Hinton, 2020).
The major share of the national strategic response is represented by the regional
comprehensive universities (RCUs), because they serve more than 40 % of all
undergraduate students in the nation and are considered the “workhorse” of US HE (de
Alva, 2019). While there is no single agreed upon definition of the RCU, for the purposes
of the study I defined them as follows: 4-year institutions with a broad spectrum of
educational programs, serving predominantly in-state students (for details see de Alva,
2019; Henderson, 2009; Miller, 2020; Orphan, 2015).
While RCUs’ strategic response plays a crucial part in US HE’s ability to attend to
the socio-economic conditions, we don’t see a systemic move towards the most pressing
external factors of the environment: demography and the economy of the US.
Literature shows the lack of the systemic emergence of new educational products
to accommodate the needs of changing student demographics (Selingo, 2016). First,
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more students than ever are coming from ethnic minorities populations, of whom RCU’s
enroll more than other public schools (de Alva, 2019; Zumeta et al., 2012). These
students tend to have less financial means to pay for their education (Zumeta et al.,
2012). Among them, Hispanics, who constitute the fastest growing ethnic group of
students that is projected to quintuple by 2050, are also more loan-averse (Boatman et
al., 2017; Hussar & Bailey, 2019). Second, the non-traditionally aged students are
becoming a larger group and require different design of the degrees and educational
experiences offered (Selingo, 2016).
Literature also reveals little evidence that institutions themselves contribute to
the reduction of the cost of attending college by lowering tuition in response to the
current economic conditions (Immerwahr et al., 2008; Ma et al., 2019; Zumeta et al.,
2012). Many 4-year public schools await the return of local and state appropriations
(which constitute up to 41% of their revenue) to prerecession levels (Doyle & Zumeta,
2014; Ma et al., 2019). Under the current circumstances, this might not happen, as state
budget shortfalls were projected to be the highest in 2021 and so far were the highest on
record (McNichol & Leachman, 2020). They continue to offset the lack of funding by
raising costs, while the main financial aid mechanism, Pell grants, has not been able to
keep up with tuition increases (Ma et al., 2019; Zumeta et al., 2012). RCUs serve 44% of
Pell recipients on average, which is higher than other 4-years public schools (de Alva,
2019). And now the source of Pell grant, the federal budget, faces the largest deficit in the
last 80 years due to the pandemic (Pew Research Center, 2020b).
A way to understand more about strategic response of the RCUs was to look at
the long-term decision-making processes, which shaped their respective strategies and,
therefore, strategic responses towards the environments. The analysis of these processes
could illustrate the way in which the understanding and acknowledgment of the EE by
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the RCU leaders influenced the decisions that are made to move the organizations
forward.
There may be several processes through which RCU leaders engage with strategic
decision-making. A way to look at these processes is to identify formalized and nonformalized ones. Among others, the following processes could be identified as
formalized. At the governing board level, decisions are made within the board of trustees’
meetings. University-wide level processes could be represented by strategic planning or
decision-making within the shared governance structures, such as a faculty council. At
the administrative units level, long-term planning processes, such as campus, financial,
and academic planning are in place. In addition, leaders can engage with EE that
supports strategic decision-making within non-formalized processes, such as educational
programs they pursue or through the university faculty course offerings. All these
processes might include some variation of environmental scanning and analysis, but it is
not their primary focus with one exception – strategic planning (SP).
SP is the only long-term decision-making process described in literature, which
combines characteristics essential for understanding the role of the EE in strategic
response (Capon, 1996; Keller, 1983; Kotler & Murphy, 1981). SP is primarily designed to
shape strategy and, therefore strategic response (Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Morrison et al.,
1984). It is geared towards anticipating the future state of the environment and its
potential influence on the organization, instead of planning for the known present
(Kotler & Murphy, 1981). Most importantly, SP has a dedicated initial step of engaging
with the environment: environmental scanning (Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Morrison et al.,
1984).
While we know that the use of SP is positively correlated with increased
organizational survival and performance, prior research provides the evidence that in
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many cases it is used in a way that does not deliver actionable knowledge about the
external environment to the leaders of universities (Camillus, 1986; Eckel & Trower,
2019; George et al., 2019; Ginsberg, 2011; Kearney & Morris, 2015; Seltzer, 2018).
Literature describes factors that diminish the ability of leaders to engage with the
external environments through SP. HEIs’ leaders have less time to engage with strategy
as presidential tenure continues to shorten (Gagliardi et al., 2017). The latest ACE study
shows the decrease in average tenure duration from 8.5 to 6.5 (24%) years during 20062016 (Gagliardi et al., 2017). On the everyday basis, universities’ leaders, from presidents
to division chairs, are overloaded with the amount of work (Birnbaum & Eckel, 2005;
Bolton, 1996; Bourgeois, 2016; Gagliardi et al., 2017; Montez et al., 2002; Sayler et al.,
2019; Selingo et al., 2017). Within this workload, presidents spend most of their time
dealing with fiscal issues: financial management and fundraising (Gagliardi et al., 2017).
In addition to the lack of time, less that 20% of presidents consider strategic planning
important in their practice (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Finally, the majority of HEIs leaders,
who are involved in SP do not consult with experts on the subject (Moss et al., 2015).
Cumulatively, prior research illustrates that due to the lack of time and dominant focus
on financial issues, university leaders struggle to fully understand their external
environments and enact a successful strategic response.
While literature on SP in HE is extensive, we lack comprehensive research
studies on successful SP examples and its essential part: environmental scanning (Dooris
et al., 2004; Howes, 2018).
Extant research poorly describes who is involved in universities’ SP. While
literature suggests that presidents must own the strategic plan and lead the SP, this is
not always the case and we do not have a clear understanding of who leads the process
instead (Seltzer, 2018). Fragmented evidence exists on the involvement of senior
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leadership and all organizational units, but systematic knowledge is absent (Dooris,
2003).
Evidence is scarce on how environmental scanning and analysis happen within
SP and other long-term decision-making processes. The study used management theory
developments on strategic planning models as a first guiding perspective (for details see
Hearn & Heydinger, 1985; Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Mecca & Morrison, 1988; Morrison et
al., 1984; Peterson et al., 1997). It helped to shed light on environmental scanning and
analysis within SP in RCUs.
Prior research also lacks studies that explore what constitutes EE as the result of
environmental scanning and analysis in HEIs. In other words, we do not know what kind
of dataset represents the EE and how these data are used in the long-term decisionmaking processes. Hence the study used institutional theory developments on
organizational fields as a second guiding perspective to frame and understand what RCU
leaders comprehend as their respective EE (for details see Meyer & Rowan, 2006; Meyer,
2010; Meyer & Rowan, 1977; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Wooten & Hoffman, 2017).
Extant literature suggests that SP should be exercised routinely, prospectively,
and contextually among other characteristics (Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Morrison et al.,
1984). It needs to happen on a regular basis instead of being used exclusively during
crises (Kotler & Murphy, 1981). It must engage with the desired future state of the
university and extrapolate existing EE trends into the future (Ackoff et al., 2006;
Peterson et al., 1997). Additionally, SP should describe organization as a part of the
larger context, i.e., being influenced by the outside world. In contrast, sensemaking
theory demonstrates that the way SP is designed to work contradicts how universities’
leaders make sense of their surroundings (Smerek, 2013; Weick, 1976). Sensemaking
process is episodic in nature and literature usually describes how it happens during
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crises or major changes in organization instead of looking at it as everyday routine
(Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). Leaders understand surroundings retrospectively, i.e. they
make sense of the past events (Weick, 1995). Most studies look at the past reforms and
transformations, conducting analysis after the event (Eckel & Kezar, 2003a; Savage,
2013). Researchers claim that creating tools for prospective sensemaking is needed and
possible through further research (Brown et al., 2015; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015;
Smerek, 2013). Finally, sensemaking process is grounded in identity, which is dependent
more on personal experiences than on macro organizational context (Smerek, 2013;
Weick, 1976). While research moved forward in seeing organizational identity as a lens
for individual sensemaking, we lack evidence on how broader organizational EE
influences leaders’ sensemaking (Brown et al., 2015; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Weber
& Glynn, 2006). Cumulatively, prior research does not illustrate how university leaders
make ongoing, prospective, contextual sense about the external environments of their
respective institutions. Sensemaking theory was used as a third guiding perspective to
learn about the processes of making sense about the EE within RCUs’ long-term
decision-making processes.
The purpose of this study was to learn more about RCUs’ strategic responses
towards their external organizational environments, strategic decision-making processes
leading to those responses, and the influence of the leadership’s understanding of the
organizational external environment over the RCUs’ strategic responses. To do so, the
study had the following primary research question and five supporting research subquestions:
How do regional comprehensive universities strategically respond to the
economic challenges in their external organizational environment and which decisionmaking processes, if any, have they implemented to do so?
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-

Are regional comprehensive universities undertaking environmental scanning
and analysis?

-

How do leaders make routine, prospective, and contextual sense about external
organizational environments?

-

Who leads strategic decision-making processes?

-

What characterizes the decision-making processes that lead to the strategic
response?

-

How do leaders evaluate the success of their institution’s strategic response?
The study aimed to answer those questions by interviewing senior leaders and

analyzing the strategic documentation from two RCUs. The findings from the two cases
revealed significant differences in how RCUs strategically responded to their respective
EE. This research illustrated that the environmental scanning and analysis tools and
techniques university leaders used during the SP process partially conditioned the way
they made sense of their respective organizational environments, which, in turn,
modulated the scope and direction of their institutions’ strategic responses. The study
also revealed that the universities employed similar two-stage SP processes, but designed
different tools and mechanisms within the process to carry out strategy creation. The
influence of the Presidents’ knowledge, their tenure duration, and the relationships
between administrators and their respective campus communities were crucial factors in
RCUs’ ability to produce an effective strategic response. It is important to mention,
however, that the COVID-19 pandemic significantly influenced my study’s data collection
process and, eventually, constrained the final sample of universities. Particularly, the
data from one case (RCU1) in the final sample revealed that this institution did not
engage in the behavior my study was initially interested in learning about – how senior
leaders’ sensemaking of the external organizational environment influenced their
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universities’ strategic responses. I created the study’s theoretical framework and
performed data analysis based on what extant literature suggests organizations should
do to produce a successful strategic response, in particular to be committed to a routine,
future-focused scanning of the larger environment. Due to internal organizational
circumstances RCU1 did not engage in such work and because of its leaders’ focus on
internal issues, this university produced a strategy irrelevant to the external
environment. Despite that, it is important to acknowledge that the RCU1 President made
a wise strategic choice. First of all, they were a new President, who had to introduce
themselves and earn trust from the campus community in order to be able to execute
strategy creation in the future. In addition, as RCU1 is a public institution funded mostly
by state appropriations, it did not have an immediate financial risk of closure, even if it
did not effectively respond to the challenges presented by the external environment.
Finally, the President inherited an institution in a challenging situation of a decade long
dysfunctional relationships between the senior administrators and faculty.
The study contributed to the HE academic community by learning more about
the ways in which university leaders’ understanding of their organizational EE influences
the universities’ strategic response. The study’s findings expanded knowledge on leaders’
analysis of the EE within long-term decision-making processes–which shape strategy–
contributing to the development of a theoretical evolution of the management-born
strategic planning tools designed specifically for HEIs. Having better understanding of
the tools and processes to engage with the EE, can help US HEIs to improve their
strategic responses toward the environment. Most importantly, through more effective,
environmentally informed strategic response, more institutions will be able to adapt and
survive in the current conditions and, therefore, increase educational attainment and HE
will better contribute to societal development.
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The following dissertation is organized in several chapters. Chapter Two provides
a literature review to lay out extant literature and existing gaps in knowledge on the
topics of organizational environments, decision-making processes university leaders use
to engage with their respective surroundings, and leaders’ sensemaking. The research
methods I used to execute the study are described in Chapter Three. Chapters Four and
Five are dedicated to the description of the findings from the two cases included in this
study. Chapter Six provides analysis of the findings from the two cases and places them
within extant literature. Chapter Seven concludes the study with a summary of the
findings, implications for practice, and potential for the future research.
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Chapter 2. Literature Review
The Importance of Knowing About and Reacting to the Organization’s
External Environment.
In this moment of significant changes in demography, economy, and technology, it
is vital that HEI leaders have a detailed picture of their surroundings. This study built on
prior research, that describes president as the owner and the leader of the long-term
decision-making processes, which shape the strategy of the university, and whose personal
commitment and championship is crucial to the successful strategic response (Ginsberg,
2011; Hearn et al., 1993; Seltzer, 2018). Literature suggests that this is not always the
case, but we do not have a clear understanding of who leads the process instead (Seltzer,
2018). Since this is the case, the literature review section employs available literature to
discuss presidential involvement in strategic planning.
Understanding the external environment allows HEIs leaders to make timely and
effective changes to the successful operation of their respective institutions, and in some
extreme cases to avoid organizational collapse (George et al., 2019; Hinton, 2012).
Misreading or ignoring the external environment may result in a multitude of failures
(Camera, 2019; Hearn & Heydinger, 1985). Not knowing one’s rivalries and offering noncompetitive educational products might result in losing market share. This will be a mostly
internal drama of the particular institution, the damage of which can be mitigated by
measures in-house.
However, ignoring the external environment can lead to more serious
consequences, as evidenced by recent closures of HEIs in the US, which affected many
stakeholders in and beyond the institutions, a serious national concern (Camera, 2019).
Mount Ida College in Newton, MA, abruptly announced its bankruptcy and decision to
close in 30 days, a sign of crisis response (Camera, 2019). The administration’s apparent
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lack of attention to environmental analysis abandoned thousands of students to figure out
their future without institutional support. As enrollment numbers continue to decline—
60% of public and private institutions did not meet their goals in fall semester of 2020—
and HEIs operations costs remain the same or rise, some schools cannot remain open
(Carlson, 2020). They face a crisis of institutional capacity versus available demand
(Camera, 2019).
To effectively respond to the current situation, HEIs need to clearly understand
their external environments, particularly demographic change. This is not a simple
function of the declining quantity of traditionally-aged students, but the result of
prospective students being a qualitatively different demographic group: older and with less
financial means to pay for college, and less time to attend it. Without addressing this trend
by changing enrollment strategy and educational opportunities to serve older and/or parttime students by adding shorter programs and opportunities for skills- and competencybased instruction, many HEIs run the risk of unsustainable financial deficit or closure.
Experts from Harvard University predict potential institutional closures of 25 to 50%
during the next two decades due to demographic change (CBS News, 2019; Hess, 2018).
The HE system in the US is not currently set up to produce enough graduates to
address the needs of the knowledge economy, which already experiences a shortage of
skilled employees (United States Department of Labor, 2020; Zumeta et al., 2012). The
number of degree-granting institutions decreased by 682 in the last five years (IPEDS
Data Center, 2018). Of those, 336 HEIs closed, leaving a total of 4,042 HEIs in the US
(IPEDS Data Center, 2018). While one might argue that the number of closures is not
critical, existing HEIs do not produce enough degrees. This makes ignoring demographic
change in HEI environments an unforgivable mistake if the US is to remain a leading
economy.
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As HE itself is strategically positioned in regard to the nation’s wellbeing, HEI
leaders should be the first to understand and respond to environmental changes, because
the mistakes of HEIs manifest in many other aspects of life. Not educating enough people
to work in and develop the knowledge economy will stifle economic growth. In turn, the
decline in economic growth will deliver fewer financial means to support HE programs. It
is especially important for RCUs to strategically respond to their respective external
environments as this institutional type supplies almost a half of all the bachelor’s degrees
in the nation.
What Constitutes the Higher Educational Institution Environment?
There is no single way to see the environment; all leaders must carve out what and
who is included in their milieu (Ganey, 1981). To effectively lead their respective
institutions, presidents have to define and understand their external environments. In fact,
they may operate in multiple environments due to the complexity of HEIs, which serve
multiple purposes simultaneously (Birnbaum, 1988). Historically, an institution was
thought to have little or no influence over its environment; now HEI leaders’ agency in
malleable surroundings is increasingly important (Peterson, 1997; Scott & Kirst, 2017).
By using HE and organizational theory research, this section aims to define the HE
environment in terms of its challenges, issues, and constituents. These literature areas
reveal the large amount of data presidents need to strategically lead their institutions. At
the same time, data-informed decision making is not a dominant approach on campuses;
we know that only 12% of US HEI presidents consider using institutional research in the
future (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Data-informed decision-making, while being initially alien
to HEIs, is now a common societal expectation and crucial practice for organizational
performance. Even though institutional research is usually concerned with the internal
organizational environment (tracking, for instance, students’ demography, graduation and
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retention rates, degrees conferred, and faculty and staff characteristics) its data indicates
how well a given HEI has performed its mission. In turn, an HEI’s mission is usually
concerned with benefitting society as a whole, therefore its locus lies in the external
environment. This is why the small number of presidents interested in data-informed
decisions, based on the internal environment, raises concerns about their access to and use
of datasets regarding the external world.
While the internal organizational environment is also of crucial importance, the
study specifically looked at the external environment (further in the chapter environment), for which I will use the following definition. Environment is a composition
of external factors and other organizations and institutions with which presidents must
interact and which have the potential to influence organizational operations, resources,
and performance (Daft, 1997; Wandling, 2018). Leaders also need to pay attention to the
market environment (Peterson et al., 1997).
External Factors as an Element of the Environment
External factors are trends and issues that originate in different aspects of social
life, of which HEI leaders need to be aware. Sometimes external factors are referred to as
the ‘macroenvironment’ (Peterson et al., 1997). This underlines the scale of the factors,
which is not limited by particular region, industry, or market sector. Over time the number
and interconnectedness of external factors and underlying trends has increased. Now, to
effectively lead their institutions, US HEIs presidents must be aware of the global
competition for resources, in addition to social, economic, political, and technological
factors.
Literature in HE theory and practice provides a general understanding of the
external factors, stating that it’s a combination of political, social, economic, information,
physical characteristics (Birnbaum, 1988). Current HE research confirms that the most
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concerning trends that HEIs should be paying attention to and their underlying conditions
are rooted in several different aspects of life (for details see Berman & Paradeise, 2016;
Eckel & Kezar, 2003; Rupp, 2015). As this literature review is being written, the COVID-19
pandemic is still developing, and we already see evidence of it exacerbating the existing
challenges brought to the RCUs by the external factors.
Probably the most pressing issue of the last decade in US HE is affordability, which
is a function of both social and economic conditions. The role of RCUs in solving this
problem is particularly important because they serve a major share of students in the
country, many of whom are low income: the number of Pell grant recipients in RCUs is 44
% on average, which is higher than in other 4-year public HEIs (de Alva, 2019). Although
middle-income families were gaining more over the last three decades, the rise of college
costs for in-state students in public 4-year institutions consumed up to 53% of this income
growth (Ma et al., 2019). While the pandemic is still taking place and we still have yet to
learn how tuition will change in the next academic year, 42% of adults in the middleincome bracket had lost their jobs or had to take a cut in pay by April 2020 (Parker et al.,
2020). It is already evident from the data that RCUs have a greater chance than wealthier
public schools to be affected by the socio-economic conditions exacerbated by COVID-19.
Social conditions are dominated by the changing demography of the US. It manifests for
RCUs’ presidents in declining enrollments (Hussar & Bailey, 2019). The danger of this
decline for RCUs is hard to overestimate: up to 50% of the revenue in these schools come
from tuition and fees (Ma et al., 2019) On the surface, this trend might appear as a call for
a more aggressive enrollment strategy, but the underlying trends are more complicated
than a simple decline in the number of students.
The national growth of minority populations (Asian, Hispanic, and Multiracial
demographic groups) leads to the increase of prospective students coming from families
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with modest financial means, which diminishes their ability to participate in HE (Frey,
2014; Zumeta et al., 2012). This trend is particularly important for the RCUs' leadership to
pay close attention to as these institutions enroll higher concentrations of minority and
low-income students compared to other public schools, such as flagship and research
universities (de Alva, 2019). Further, research shows that Hispanic high-school graduates,
a group projected to quintuple by 2050, are becoming increasingly loan-averse, which
means that they are less likely to attend college at all due to their resistance to take on
educational loans, compared to the previous generations (Boatman et al., 2017; Frey,
2014). COVID-19 has exacerbated their situation further: 61% of adults in Hispanic
households reported either losing their jobs or had to take a cut in pay, which makes them
the most affected demographic group (Parker et al., 2020).
In addition to addressing racial/ethnic demographic shifts, RCUs also have to
attend to the increase in numbers of non-traditional students, whom they educate more
than other public 4-year institutions (de Alva, 2019) Those students are older than twenty
four, and demand different educational experiences, such as remediation, change of
profession, or skill-based education (Hussar & Bailey, 2019; Selingo, 2016). Becoming a
more diverse group and likely to be older, married, in need of remedial courses, to attend
part-time, and live off-campus, HEIs still offer these students “one-size-fits-all”
educational programs (Selingo, 2016). In addition to already rising numbers of nontraditionally aged students before the pandemic, the unemployment rate grew across all
ages, from 4% to 13.1 % and from 3% to 9.8% for the groups of 24-34 and 35-44 years old
correspondingly during the first three months of the COVID-19 spread in the US (Kochhar,
2020). This trend might increase the number of older students coming back to HEIs in a
search of an educational solution for the post-COVID economy.
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Importantly, these trends surface differently by US regions or states. As RCUs are
designed to predominantly serve local students, their presidents have to be well-versed in
the local demographic projections. For instance, the expansive growth in high-school
graduates coming from families with modest financial means will happen in the South
(Hussar & Bailey, 2019). Texas will encounter a 49% increase in high school graduates of
Hispanic origin, the minority group hit the hardest by the pandemic (Finney, 2014; Parker
et al., 2020). On the contrary, the Northeast is projected to have fewer high-school
graduates due to its overall trend of an aging and decreasing population in states like
Maine (Frey, 2014; Hussar & Bailey, 2019). Both national and local demographic
characteristics must affect strategic decisions on educational and financial aid products
made by RCUs to address affordability. Changing enrollment strategy without
understanding the underlying demography may not be effective.
Economic conditions bring a set of pressures that exacerbate affordability
problems. For RCUs’ presidents, economic constraint manifests in the decrease of state
funding, upon which public 4-year schools heavily rely (up to 41 % of revenue) (Ma et al.,
2019). Some public HEIs chose to wait for appropriations to come back to the prerecession
level (Doyle & Zumeta, 2014). Unfortunately, the larger context of national budget deficit
indicates this might not occur in the foreseeable future (Finney, 2014). The current state
budget shortfall is projected to be the highest in 2021 and so far is the highest on the
historic record (McNichol & Leachman, 2020). Before the pandemic, Medicare expenses
were expected to almost double by 2030 and the national debt is expected to grow as well.
Currently, most states expect Medicare enrollment to exceed the pre-pandemic projections
for 2020 and continue into 2021 (Rudowitz & Hinton, 2020) This worsens an already
existed “significant threat to the ability of states to invest in higher education” (Finney,
2014, p.5).
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As with demographic trends economic conditions vary by physical location. The
potential to invest in HE will decrease across states as the state revenues are projected to
decline due to COVID-19, but it will be influenced the most in the states that previously
have had less tax revenue (Ohio, Florida) or big pension obligations (Illinois) (National
Conference of State Legislatures, 2020; Pew Research Center, 2020a). RCUs’ leaders
need to take into account that state appropriations might not come back and in some
states, may start to decrease.
While public 4-year institutions continue to offset the lack of funding by raising
costs, the main financial aid mechanism, Pell grants, has not been able to keep up with
tuition increases (Zumeta et al., 2012). This illustrates the inability of existing financial
tools to address the affordability problem within current socio-economic conditions
(Zumeta et al., 2012). RCUs must be ready to serve more students from demographic
groups with fewer financial means while receiving less financial support from states; as of
now, there is no evidence of tuition decreases or changes in enrollment strategies to
accommodate this trend (Ma et al., 2019)
Technological advancement is represented by expanding computerization, which
leads to automation of production and knowledge (Gleason, 2018). Research
acknowledges the unfolding of a new industrial revolution, though related discussions
remain partially speculative, not providing enough clarity of the long-term phenomenon
(Gleason, 2018). Nevertheless, automation continues to decrease the number of job
offerings available for those with no degree from 21% in 2018 to 17% in 2027 (Blumenstyk,
2020). The majority of the population with no postsecondary degree comes from Hispanic
and Black ethnic groups with less income than others (NCES, 2018; Social Explorer,
2019). This will increase the share of non-traditional prospective students, who will need
less costly, shorter-term, and skill-based educational products than typical 2- or 4-year
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degrees. As RCUs serve more non-traditional students than other public institutions, they
may need to improve existing online courses or introduce new forms, such as microcredentials or badges to address this demand (Selingo, 2016).
Globalization is another external factor which leads to competition for resources
(Berman & Paradeise, 2016). For many US HEIs it manifests in the decreasing enrollments
of international students. The rate of international enrollment peaked in 2015, showing an
increase of 10% compared to the previous year. In 2019 the increase was only 0.05%
compared to the previous year (The Institute of International Education, 2019). Experts
refer to “visa application issues or delays/denials, the social and political environment, and
the costs of U.S. higher education” as the main reasons for this decline (Sanger & Baer,
2019). Although serving international students is not a primary purpose of RCUs, many of
them have a considerable share of students from around the world. Students from Asia,
especially from China and India, have significant impact of North American universities,
and even the small decrease in the enrollments can unbalance US HEIs’ operations,
particularly, compound existing financial pressures on RCUs (Berman & Paradeise, 2016;
The Institute of International Education, 2019). As we still do not know how exactly the
COVID-19 pandemic will change the number of international students in the US by the time
it is over, the data show that more than 50% of surveyed US HEIs experienced the decline
in enrollment (Martel, 2020).
Further, RCUs, whose prospective students are mostly domestic high-school
graduates must compete for the growing number who choose to study abroad (Sanger &
Baer, 2019). In 2019, 2.7% more students chose to do so due both to the cost of US
education and the rise of educational quality in many countries, in part, due to the
development of world class universities, especially in Asia (Marginson, 2013; Salmi, 2009;
Sanger & Baer, 2019).
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The trends and underlying issues presented here have, even separately, the
potential to significantly affect RCUs and their influence have been rapidly mounting over
a matter of just several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Simultaneously, these data
are just the tip of the iceberg of the knowledge presidents need to have in order to
understand their environments. Presidents must also know their peers and competitors to
fully assess the organizational environment.
Other Organizations and Institutions as Elements of the Environment
Organizational theory research is concerned with environment-organization
relationships. Earlier theoretical developments, such as resource dependence theory, state
that resource flow defines the organization – environment interrelationship, but this was
proven insufficient for evaluating the HE environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Tolbert,
1985; Zucker, 1987). Institutional theory became the most comprehensive way to describe
the reciprocal organization – environment relationship. In doing so it introduces the
theoretical concepts of the organizational field and its pressures, which this section
employs to inform the understanding of the environment. These constructs provide the
most insight on the constituents in the environment, i.e. the large variety of other
organizations and institutions that HEI leaders must consider (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991).
Institutional Theory: External Organizational Environment as an
Organizational Field. Two branches of institutional theory, so called new and old
institutionalism, contributed to the development of the organizational field concept,
which became the major unit of analysis in HE research (Hsu et al., 2018; Powell &
DiMaggio, 1991).
Both old and new institutionalism are rooted in sociology; the former is attributed
to Philipp Selznick and his contemporaries; the three major works on the latter are by
Meyer and Rowan (1977), Powell and DiMaggio (1991), and Zucker (1977). Due to their
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origins in sociology, the theories treat environments as socially constructed realities (Dill,
1981). The use of both approaches in research is extensive, with the new institutionalism
(NI) taking over after the seminal work of Meyer and Rowan. Some researchers moved
further by combining the two perspectives (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).
Both traditions agree that organizations do not act rationally, and both emphasize
the importance of the relationship between organizations and their environments (Powell
& DiMaggio, 1991). Nevertheless, their definitions of environments differ, as the old
institutionalism focuses on the embeddedness of organizations in local communities, “to
which they are tied by the multiple loyalties of personnel and by interorganizational
treaties” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1991, p.13). On the contrary, the NI understands it as a
“nonlocal environments, either organizational sectors or fields, roughly coterminous with
the boundaries of industries, professions, or national societies” (p.13). Environments “are
more subtle in their influence; rather than being co-opted by the organizations, they
penetrate the organization, creating the lenses through which actors view the world and
the very categories of structure, action, and thought” (p.13).
There are two generally accepted definitions of the organizational environment
within NI, presented by the two major works (Zucker, 1987). The first definition was
developed by Meyer and Rowan (1977) in order to explain organizational homogeneity.
The authors claim that, by ceremonially adopting institutional rules which constitute the
external environment (“positions, policies, programs, and procedures of modern
organization” ( p.343) and function as rationalized myths, organizations increase their
legitimacy within society and therefore raise the chances of organizational survival (Meyer
& Rowan, 1977). Adopting myths existing in the field make organizations increasingly
similar and constitute isomorphism.
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Based on Meyer and Rowan’s (1997) work, DiMaggio and Powell (1991) introduce
the definition of the environments as organizational fields which initially was described as
“those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional
life” (p.148). Scott (1995) adds that, the field is “a community of organizations that
partakes of a common meaning system and whose participants interact more frequently
and fatefully with one another than with actors outside the field” (p. 56). The
organizational field is understood as a socially constructed, ever changing intersection of
participants like “governments, critical exchange partners, sources of funding, professional
and trade associations, special interest groups, and the general public – any constituent
that imposes a coercive, normative or mimetic influence on the organization” (Wooten &
Hoffman, 2017, p. 3).
Later definitions shifted from seeing the field as a synonym for industries,
professions, or other recognized areas of institutional life, bringing together participants
based on their relations to those entities, towards understandings of the field as being
shaped by temporary configuring events (Wooten & Hoffman, 2017). Lampel and Meyer
(2008) call for more attention towards the field inception, that might start during the
field-configuring event, for instance an academic conference: “that fields begin as
agglomerations of individuals, groups, and organizations that meet sporadically at first,
and then come into contact with increasing frequency ” (p. 1027). Field-configuring events
provide the possibility for a field to be comprised out of totally different actors that are not
necessarily in the same industry or profession (Lampel & Meyer, 2008). Another recent
development in NI literature is to use community as a unit of analysis. For instance,
Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007) claim that community is a strong player in the
organizational environment as it puts real institutional pressures on corporations. The HE
academic field has extensive literature on university-community partnerships, although
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studies that use institutional theory to look at the communities are rare. Researchers
suggest that this theoretical perspective is useful to study communities and needs further
exploration (Duff, 2006; Kecskes, 2008).
Overall, NI, by looking at the higher-order context of institutional systems, tries to
understand how a “wider set of rules and beliefs fundamentally constitute actors, and how
cognitive, normative, and regulative pressures lead to a legitimacy imperative” (Lounsbury
& Zhao, 2013, p. 3; Meyer, 2010). As environments become more complex, HEI presidents
are challenged to gain sufficient information about them.
At the same time, HEI leaders’ knowledge about their surroundings becomes
increasingly important. While developing our understanding of the actors present in the
field, institutional theory contributed to the articulation of the increasing power of leaders
over their environments.
Before the NI introduction of the environment as a socially constructed entity,
theorists saw organizational response as reactive, triggered by some technical
development in the external surrounding (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991). For instance, in the
1960-70s, population ecology theory used biological mechanisms of natural selection to
explain that, first, organizations have very little or no agency and ability to influence on
their environments; second, they are not capable of change (Geertz, 1973). While still
seeing organizational behavior as a reaction, the first developments of the NI understood
that organizations successfully adapt and change by adopting institutional myths (Powell
& DiMaggio, 1991). Nonetheless this theory still saw organization as a passive participant
in the field, as they succumbed to the normative, coercive, or mimetic pressures. It was not
until the later developments of the NI, when theory started to treat organizational leaders
as proactive agents, able to shape their environment (Peterson, 1997; Scott & Kirst, 2017).
As Scott (1995, as cited in Wooten & Hoffman, 2017, p.2) explains, organizational action
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came to be understood as a reaction to environmental pressures and as a “a reflection of
the perspectives defined by the group of members that comprise the institutional
environment; out of which emerge the regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive
systems that provide meaning for organizations”. This development got expanded in the
literature on strategic response and action, discussing strategies that organizations use to
be effective in the environment: from acquiescence to manipulation (Oliver, 1991).
Institutional Theory: External Environment as Shaped by the
Organizational Field Pressures. Institutional theory provides us with opposing
pressures, isomorphic and competitive, which help to understand which actors are
present in the organizational field of HE. Isomorphic pressures are theoretical concepts
described in the older developments of NI. They include coercive, normative, and
mimetic pressures, which lead to homogeneity of the constituents of the environment,
i.e. HEIs become increasingly similar when influenced by isomorphic pressures (Meyer
& Rowan, 1977).
Coercive pressures are most likely to come from power relations. For instance, a
new governmental policy or law can coerce an organization to follow a particular set of
rules and practices, such as the European Bologna process (Reinalda & Kulesza, 2006).
Coercive pressures can also be consequential to resource flow, such as in Russian,
Kazakh, and Chinese excellence initiatives, with the introduction of government policy to
concentrate resources on specific areas of research. (5-100 – Russian Academic
Excellence Project, 2019; Hartley et al., 2016; Kang, 2015).
Normative pressures are triggered by professionalization (DiMaggio & Powell,
1983). They are driven by a notion of practice adoption, which represents a good moral
choice and is “associated with professions, because the similar education and training
instill similar professional values of what is considered appropriate for professionals to
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carry into organizations, a process that tends to favor the adoption of similar practices and
structures across organizations” (Boxenbaum & Jonsson, 2017, p. 3). HE is a special case
in this regard as it both trains and employs its graduates, which reinforces the same ideas
and practices (Berman & Paradeise, 2016). In addition, both academics and HE leaders
have particular views on how HEIs should be, which leads to adoption of similar practices
and more homogenized organizational field (Berman et al., 2016). This high level of
professionalization results in a cultural-cognitive system of ingrained beliefs and
established models of curriculum, research, administration, that are highly difficult to
question or change (Scott et al., 2017). The normative system includes meta-organizations
such as The Association of American Universities, The American Association of American
Colleges and Universities, and The American Council on Education. Other examples of the
normative system are disciplinary organizations, faculty unions and staff associations, and
accreditation systems (Scott et al., 2017).
Mimetic pressures are triggered by uncertainty. When organizations face an
ambiguous environment, they tend to copy successful tools or models that proved
increased rates of survival in their peers (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Contemporary
research shows that even though universities around the world might not copy a single
model, they tend to mimic different models dependent on the segment of the global HE
organizational field in which they operate (Berman et al., 2016). For instance, universities
that participate in the global rankings competition tend to copy the US research university
model as well as universities embedded in national fields copy best national practices, like
Grande Ecole in France (Berman et al., 2016). Another study shows that disparate HEIs
use similar business-like imagery to communicate their identities to prospective students
online (Atkinson, 2008).
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While coercive and normative pressures imply less decisiveness from the
organization, with mimetic pressures, we can best observe the agency of presidents. A
study of 109 research-intensive universities in the US found that HEIs tend to mimic
strategic initiatives that were popular at the national or state level, not the ones that have
been adopted by their peer institutions (Fay & Zavattaro, 2016). This could be evidence of
decoupling to gain legitimacy, or the fact that HEI leaders (in our case, presidents) do not
know much about their competitive environment and peer institutions’ actions, despite the
fact that this knowledge becomes increasingly important as competition for students and
resources intensifies.
Reflecting on societal development, NI theory accompanies isomorphic pressures
with the opposing force: competitive pressures, which highlight the proactivity of
organizational leaders in knowing and fighting their competition (Scott & Kirst, 2017). In
the competition for resources, organizations have to find their ways to balance institutional
rules that lead to homogeneity with the appropriate individual strategy to increase
organizational performance and effectively respond to external challenges.
In addition to strategic action and response literature areas, mentioned above,
management theory suggests tools by adding the notion of the market to support a full
understanding of the environment. Michael Porter introduced the Five Forces model and
developed generic strategies of competition (Peterson et al., 1997). Porter’s Five Forces
Model includes the influence of bargaining power of suppliers and buyers, the threat of
new entrants and substitutes, and the intensity of rivalry with competitors in any industry
(Martinez & Wolverton, 2009). This framework is used in HE studies worldwide (Do,
2019; Martinez & Wolverton, 2009; R. Meyer & Höllerer, 2014). Although some authors
claim this model does not fit HE (Hassanien, 2017), in their work about industry analysis
in HE using Porter’s model, Martinez and Wolverton (2009) add government as the sixth
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force of the model and posit that it does, in this configuration, provide a comprehensive
description of the HE industry (see also Pringle & Huisman, 2011). This means that
Porter’s generic competition strategies can indeed be used in regard to HE. He suggests
that a competitive advantage could be achieved either through cost or differentiation
leadership.
Without significantly redesigning educational programs, it will be almost
impossible for US HEIs to reduce costs and thus offer lower prices, as the first strategy
proposes, given the current environment of changing demography and shrinking state
support. The second strategy requires detailed knowledge of what other HEIs in their
environments are offering, although NI research suggests that HEIs might not be well
aware of the what their peer institutions are doing (Fay & Zavattaro, 2016).
Just as organizational theory research went from seeing environments as a main
source of influence and the organizations having little agency, to the understanding of
environments as responsive to the organizational actions, isomorphism and homogeneity
of the field was complemented by notions of competitive pressures and strategic action,
bringing attention towards the agency and knowledge of HEI leaders (J. W. Meyer &
Rowan, 1977; Peterson, 1997; Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott & Kirst, 2017).
Institutional theory literature helps to understand the constituents in the HE
environment. When combined with literature describing external forces and management
literature, helping to understand competitive relationships within the organizational field,
it provides a powerful guide for HEI presidents to chart their respective environments in
the present and future, and act accordingly. Doing this requires leaders to accumulate and
evaluate substantial data on trends and other environmental participants and competitors.
Having environmental data and using it to make operational choices can prevent strategic
misdirection and help to provide sufficient education locally and nationally. The fact that
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many HEI presidents do not use institutional research to inform decision-making signals
that data-informed approach for understanding external environments is not an
established practice (Gagliardi et al., 2017).
These literature areas show which data presidents need to understand their
environments and act strategically upon them, as well as an overall concern about lack of
data-driven decision-making. However, we need more evidence on how and if presidents
currently engage with their external environments.
We need to understand if presidents are skilled in knowing what is happening
around them, which external factors are present, which are the isomorphic and
competitive pressures extant? From institutional theory research literature we know that
presidents may not be well aware of what their peer institutions are doing (Fay &
Zavattaro, 2016). We also know that HEIs have difficulties even acknowledging
competition, as they have historically enjoyed unchallenged prestige, which is being
endangered by the very notion of rivalry (Rowley & Sherman, 2001).
Therefore, we need to learn more about the processes that are in place in HEIs to
help presidents to engage with their environments. Traditionally, universities use strategic
planning to do this. We need to know if strategic planning delivers the data needed for
strategic decisions and whether presidents have the capacity to engage with said data. To
shed light on presidential knowledge about their environments, literature on their work
structure and the organization of the strategic planning process could be used.
Strategic Planning Process as a Means of Engagement with the External
Environment
By exploring literature areas on the strategic planning model and its
implementation in contemporary HEIs, as well research about work structure of HEI

28

presidents, this section identifies barriers to the delivery of actionable knowledge to
presidents about environments.
Strategic planning is traditionally used to engage with an organization’s
environment. In particular, it is a means of retaining strategic fit between the organization
and its turbulent surroundings (Kotler & Murphy, 1981). It is concerned both with the
internal and external organizational environment. Strategic planning involves
understanding the unfolding trends in the external environment, as well as its participants
and market conditions. One should not to confuse strategic planning with other planning
types, such as long-term or budget planning, as those are sets of prescribed steps to
achieve clear goals within a stable, predictable environment (Kotler & Murphy, 1981).
There is no study that proposes a comprehensive model of strategic planning for HE. The
process’ description slightly varies in different literature on HE, but it always starts with
scrutiny of the organizational surroundings (Hunt et al., 1997; Keller, 1983; Kotler &
Murphy, 1981; Peterson et al., 1997; Sullivan & Richardson, 2011). For instance, the
strategic planning process described by Kotler and Murphy (1981) and Morrison, Renfro,
and Boucher (1984) represent two different logics: linear and circular (see Figures 1,2), but
both have environmental analysis as an initial step.
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Figure 1.
Strategic Planning Process model. Reprinted from “Planning for Higher Education”, by
Kotler P., Murphy, P., 1981, The Journal of Higher Education, 52(5), p.472.

Figure 2.
The Strategic Planning Process. Reprinted from “Future Research and the Strategic
Planning Process: Implications for Higher Education”, by Morrison J.L., Renfro W.L.,
Boucher W.I, 1984, ASHE-ERIC Higher Education Research Report, 9, p. 13.
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History of Strategic Planning in Higher Education
The presence of strategic planning in HE literature started in the 1950s, when
United States HE system underwent significant growth following World War Two. Derived
from military tools, strategic planning was then enough to satisfy campus planners’ needs
for physical expansion (Dooris, 2003). In the 1970s, with the challenges of the declining
“baby-boom” college population and the increase in the cost of education, the “inside-out”
linear long-term planning model (which focused on internal characteristics of HEIs)
became less relevant. Strategic planning shifted towards the creation of more intricate
models that included the external environment (Dooris, 2003; Morrison et al., 1984;
Sullivan & Richardson, 2011). This is when market and business-oriented definitions came
into play within the planning process in HEIs: competitors, market niche, shareholder
values, SWOT analysis and others and started the golden age of strategic planning in
higher education (Dooris, 2003).
The popularity of strategic planning in HE lasted through the 1990s and in some
cases invited criticism regarding the use of business tools in HEI management. It also
engendered the major works of Keller (1983) and Birnbaum (2000). Keller’s work
Academic Strategy: The Management Revolution in American Higher Education (1983)
influenced several generations of HE managers and is still considered to be an important
guide. Conversely, Birnbaum (2000) introduced the term “management fad,” a
“management innovation that … is incompatible with organizational culture … [and] is
eventually rejected” (p. 469). He made the case that business-born tools are not
appropriate for loosely coupled, highly autonomous HEIs (Fife, 2003). Birnbaum’s work
compliments Henry Mintzberg’s thoughts on strategic planning, although the latter, in The
rise and Fall of Strategic Planning, only concentrates on failures and does not discuss
successful examples (Capon, 1996). His criticism is based on the fact that strategic
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planning process ignores the HE organizational context, but nevertheless suggests that
HEIs can benefit from strategic planning, if used wisely (Dooris, 2003).
The need to include the HE organizational context into the strategic planning
model, and to understand the mission of the institution led to the development of
contextual planning, a proactive approach towards the environment, in which the
environment is understood as “complex, but malleable” (Peterson et al., 1997, p. 134). In
contrast with strategic planning, which identifies the priorities and aims to channel
resources into a particular niche product, contextual planning relies on a portfolio of
initiatives that addresses different aspects of the external environment and, by doing so,
can influence and change it (Peterson et al., 1997). This echoes new developments in
institutional theory, which came to recognize environments as influenced by
organizational leaders’ proactive behavior.
Overall, the literature shows that the new developments in strategic planning tend
towards more synthetic, sophisticated forms of social discourse, which need creativity and
flexibility. According to Dooris (2003), strategic planning is being transferred from the
rational (linear step-by-step tools) towards
increasingly about learning and creativity, with the recognition that college and
university leaders need to challenge assumptions and consider radically changing
existing structures and processes. Relatively recent conceptions of strategic
planning center more on dynamism, flexibility, nimbleness, inventiveness, and
imagination. They focus on strategic thinking as opposed to syllogistic [deductive]
analysis (p.8).
Strategic planning remains the most used process of organizational engagement
with the environment, and it is positively correlated with organizational survival and
performance, both for private and public sectors (Camillus, 1986; George et al., 2019;
Kearney & Morris, 2015). Some experts hesitate to attribute institutional success to tools
designed for corporate management. Others are advocates of strategic planning and claim
that not only does strategic planning work in higher education, it may be the only process
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which effectively engages the external environment (Dooris, 2003; Kotler & Murphy,
1981). Overall, researchers agree that some form of strategic planning should exist in HEIs
and should be tailored to the HE field.
Despite general agreement that strategic planning is useful for HEIs, there is no
comprehensive study that is useful for institutions seeking to organize the process (Dooris
et al., 2004). The literature search in the top-tier HE academic journals results in only
approximately 20 studies since 2008 that discuss strategic planning to some extent. For
example, Olszowy and Lee (2017) find that there were no studies on strategic planning in
the Journal of Higher Education Outreach and Engagement for the last decade. What the
literature shows are anecdotes of some successful cases, and expansive evidence that in
many cases strategic planning does not serve the purpose of providing HEI presidents with
sufficient knowledge of the environment due to the organization of the strategic planning
itself or as a result of presidents’ work schedules.
Strategic Planning as a Process and a Tool for Understanding the External
Environment
Literature shows that, in many cases, strategic planning is not implemented in
HEIs to provide presidents with sufficient data about their environments, as its use has
deviated from the theoretical model. While attempting strategic planning, HEIs tend to
prioritize planning over strategy (Eckel & Trower, 2019). This is the result of HEIs’
processual incompatibly with strategic planning; “they are set up for operations” (Kotler &
Murphy, 1981, p. 470). Operations, in turn, use
traditional educational planning processes [which] are weak in facilitating
the identification of critical trends and future events and assessing their
impact on education. At best, most planning models assume there will be a
"surprise-free" future in which present trends continue unabated and the
interrelationship between and among social, economic, political, and
technical forces remains essentially the same (Ziegler,1972). We know that
this is not true; environments are marked by rapid and unanticipated
changes. (Mecca & Morrison, 1988, p. 35)
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When HEIs use an operational approach in strategic planning, it results in a rigid process
with pronounced defects, which “mechanically treats the environment” (Dooris et al.,
2004, p.9), separates planners from operations, and provokes the resistance of
organizational cultures. As a result colleges and universities waste time by trying to use
planning process that they are used to and which prevents them from seeing what is
unfolding in their environments (Eckel & Trower, 2019).
Another issue is that HEIs tend to use strategic planning in the times of crisis. Few
leaders voluntarily focus on change as an everyday practice; strategic planning exercises, to
change “goals, strategies, and organizational systems, usually occur as reactions to crisis
events, rather than as thoughtful adaptations in advance of crises” (Kotler & Murphy, p.
471). One might argue that effective strategic planning can be useful in a crisis, but the
process is more effective if organized on a regular basis towards the overall effect of
predicting and mitigating or avoiding crisis.
In some cases, strategic planning is used to assert power. Instead of being used to
chart the future, it is used as a tool for the present (Ginsberg, 2011). “When [leaders]
organize a planning process and later trumpet their new strategic plan, senior
administrators are signaling to the faculty, to the trustees, and to the general community
that they are in charge” (Ginsberg, 2011, p.2). This practice is a reflection of the growing
power of administrators in US HEIs and leads to the ubiquity of planning (Ginsberg, 2011).
Sometimes, strategic planning serves administrators' interests as a substitute for
action and contributes to a future job search. When new leaders launch a strategic
planning design campaign, it typically results in a process taking longer than a year. In
some cases, it is used “… to impress the corporate headhunters who direct contemporary
administrative searches […] and can create a useful impression of feverish activity and
progress” (Ginsberg, 2011, p.3).
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Another common issue is the lack of transfer from planning to action. While every
HEI is supposed to have a strategic plan, many plans are written for the sake of gaining
legitimacy in the eyes of others. It follows that many HEIs are focusing on creating the
plan, not the mechanisms of execution, monitoring, and assessing the implementation of
the plan (Chance & Williams, 2009). As a result, strategic plans are often bluntly generic.
First, strategic plans are frequently indistinguishable from each other. “Similar
phrases and paragraphs can be found in many plans. … This interchangeability of visions
for the future underscores the fact that the precise content of most colleges' strategic plans
is pretty much irrelevant” (Ginsberg, 2011, p.4). Plans are not tailored to a particular
institution, and articulate similar goals of student diversity, diversification of revenue
streams, and competitiveness, without arguing the reasons for those choices (Seltzer,
2018).
Second, many strategic plans lack concrete objectives, timetables of
implementation, lists of responsible parties, and descriptions of means for achievement
(Ginsberg, 2011). “Their goals tend to be vague and their means undefined. Often there is
no budget based on actual or projected resources. Instead the plan sets out a number of
fund-raising goals. These plans are […] simply expanded "vision statements" (Ginsberg,
2011, p.4).
To make it worse, research shows that strategic plans do not reflect the mission
because they focus on educational programs’ financial security and overall survival
(Choban et al., 2008). For instance, while the institution communicates its focus on
student learning with the public, strategy is in fact dominated by organizational survival
measures (Choban et al., 2008). “There is still a relative economic advantage to focusing
on inputs rather than outputs; impressive facilities and faculty credentials still sell better
than nebulous outcomes [of student learning]” (Choban et al., 2008).
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Since strategic plans are often generic, they lack important data about the external
environment of HEIs. The most pressing external factors—changes in demography and
economy—are overshadowed by internal university problems. Campus and master
planning, capital planning, and space management planning are still the top three realms
of university planning (Moss et al., 2015). An empirical study of 304 strategic plans in
American HEIs shows that diversity and affordability initiatives for sustainable
development are the least present in strategic plans (Semeraro & Boyd, 2017). This could
be the function of those trends being relatively new or that the reality is that strategic
planning is not set up to effectively see and recognize the most pressing issues of the
external environments.
Research in HE does not provide empirical evidence on how often data on other
organizations is present in strategic planning. We know that HEI leaders do not like to
accept that competition exists, as they enjoyed their exclusive position of the only
educational providers for several centuries (Rowley & Sherman, 2001). Knowing that
strategic planning in many cases is not organized to engage with the environment, we can
assume that it does not deliver sufficient data about competitors as well.
Though research explains some of the issues with strategic planning process, HE
lacks comprehensive studies to understand the use of strategic planning in HEIs (Dooris et
al., 2004; Howes, 2018). The field can benefit from more research exploring strategic
planning and the resulting strategic plans in different sectors and locations. Research can
shed light on the presence of external challenges and other organizations in strategic
considerations and better explain HEIs’ understanding of their respective environments.
Environmental Scanning as an Essential Part of Strategic Planning Process
Environmental scanning is the step that differentiates strategic planning from
other planning, such as long-term or budget planning and, therefore deserves to be
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scrutinized separately. It is designed to scan the environment and provide data for
strategic decisions. Literature shows that this step is essential for successful strategic
planning but that it must have the personal commitment of HEI leaders in order to be
effective.
Morrison et al. (1984) suggest the structure, process, and typology of the
environmental scanning process. They claim that “the most popular of the formal systems
by far is through an in-house, interdisciplinary, high-level [scanning] committee of four or
five members (but no more than 12 or so)” and ideally includes a “broad cross-section of
department heads, vice presidents, deans, the provost, faculty members trustees, and so
forth” (Morrison et al., 1984, p. 17). They introduce three types of scanning: passive, active,
and directed, that differ by scope, level of consciousness, attention, and involvement. The
authors also describe the process as searching for information resources, selecting
information resources to scan, identifying criteria by which to scan, scanning, and
determining actions to take on the scanning results (Morrison et al., 1984). Unfortunately,
environmental scanning tool as a separate unit of analysis is almost absent in the HE
studies. One of the rare examples is the quantitative study of environmental factors’ (in
this case, social, economic, and educational) influence on the application and enrollment
numbers in Virginia, developed in order to inform HE strategic planners (Morcol &
McLaughlin, 1990). The authors use path analysis to identify the correlation and introduce
geographical component by looking at the data on the county level, which gives better
understanding on how those factors impacted Virginia HEIs. Their results suggest, for
instance, the negative effect of unemployment and the rurality of the county on enrollment
and application numbers, which can inform the strategic planning process for Virginia
institutions (Morcol & McLaughlin, 1990).
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The only detailed study on environmental scanning implementation explains that it
is essential for organizational performance (Hearn et al., 1993). In a case study of the
University of Minnesota, the authors show that once rigorous environmental scanning
disappeared from the central leadership and moved in to the non-central units outside of
the academic core, it remained absent in the fundamental decisions being made in the
upper management of the university, resulting in poor handling of important campus
issues (Hearn et al., 1993).
From the same study we learn that powerful championship is necessary for
environmental scanning. When university leaders cease to champion scanning, the
practice becomes an interdivisional resource competition tool (Hearn et al., 1993). In order
to succeed, environmental scanning should be “a personal and professional priority of top
administrators” (Hearn et al., 1993, p .30).
In addition, HEI leaders should be involved in environmental scanning because
without their input, the results of the analysis lack validity; further, “not expending the
resources – including the time of senior leaders – to anticipate developments that can
affect the future of organization – is foolhardy” (Peterson et al., 1997, p. 277).
Environmental scanning is time consuming because understanding HEIs environments
requires timely assessment and action.
Yet time is a scarce resource among [HEI leaders] and institutions […] tend to have
preferences for participatory governance. These value systems are deeply held and
can imply a need for environmental intelligence to be widely disseminated prior to
decision making, thus flying in the face of the demands of turbulent environments
(Hearn et al., 1993, p. 424).
A recent study vaguely describes the environmental scanning process provided by
HEI presidents; in the best scenario they mention periodic meetings with their vicepresidents to ask their opinions on important topics in their areas of responsibility (Dunek,
2015). This might signal the absence of formal environmental scanning practice in HEIs,
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which in turn raises the question of the quality of environmental analysis in HEIs (Dunek,
2015).
Although the scarce literature argues the necessity of environmental scanning as a
part of strategic planning, the need for leaders’ personal engagement in the process, and
partially explains the challenges of environmental scanning implementation in HEIs, “the
extent and nature of its use, its successes and its limitations” (p.8) are still poorly
understood (Hearn et al., 1993).
We as a field do not know the current state of environmental scanning in American
HEIs as there are no recent studies. The results of the University of Minnesota study are
insightful, but not generalizable. More research is needed to see the current use of
environmental scanning across sectors, types, and regions of HEIs. If we knew more about
how environmental scanning is organized in HE, we could shed light on the overall
effectiveness of strategic planning and the performance of HEIs.
Strategic Planning Process as One of the President’s Responsibilities
Strategic planning and environmental scanning in many cases are not organized to
provide presidents with actionable knowledge. We know some anecdotal cases of
successful strategic planning. Well or poorly done, we know that the new developments in
strategic planning processes tend to be less linear and more synthetic, and therefore
require more time from presidents. Literature on the work structure of presidents shows
that they do not have sufficient time or training to engage with strategic planning. Their
routines are increasingly standardized through a common set of practices by the growing
pressure for quick wins, organized around fiscal results (Gagliardi et al., 2017; Selingo et
al., 2017). This contributes to a variety of problems, such as “enrollment plans that ignore
demographic shifts among students; […] and strategic plans that are completely rewritten
each time a new president is installed” (Selingo et al., 2017, p.16). Though there are other
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HEI administrators who can execute strategic planning instead of presidents, we know
that powerful championship is essential in strategic planning process and president, as the
ultimate leader, must be the driver for mission and vision fulfillment through strategic
steps, and therefore “own the strategic plan” (Seltzer, 2018, p. 62).
Presidents Focus on Everyday Fiscal Issues. Studies on the work structure
of HEIs leaders, regardless of job description, agree that leaders’ everyday work has
become extremely complex, especially as a result of the pressure on universities to operate
as businesses and under growing financial constraints, most pronounced in public
institutions (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Though the academic debate about the suitability of
business approaches in HEIs is ongoing, the reality is that leaders operate in complex
environments, business-oriented in part, and must be involved with different stakeholders
and markets to be effective. To combine academic and business leadership is an extremely
hard task that has no fully described models or analogues in other fields (Kotler & Murphy,
1981).
HE researchers are in accord on the complexities of the HE presidents’ work. For
instance, Robert Birnbaum and Peter Eckel (2005) write on the college “presidential
dilemma”:
the president is expected to serve simultaneously as the chief administrator of a
large and complex bureaucracy, as the convening colleague of a professional
community, as a symbolic elder in a campus culture of shared values and symbols,
and (in some institutions) as a public official accountable to a public board and
responsive to the demands of other governmental agencies. Balancing the
conflicting expectations of these roles has always been difficult; changing
demographic trends, fiscal constraints, the complexity and diversity of tasks,
university dynamics, and unrealistic public expectations make it virtually
impossible for most presidents to provide the leadership that is expected. (p. 340)
The role of the college president shifted from the “builder of formal administrative
structures” and “business manager who runs the campus” in the 1930-40s, through the
“fiscal manager and fundraiser” in the 1970-2000s, to the contemporary trend of
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“multidisciplinarian”, who can “build and navigate academic disciplines, institutions, and
outside partnerships” (Selingo et al., 2017, p.4). Some research suggests that the
presidential position stopped being a single person job simply because it went beyond
physical capabilities of one person (Bornstein, 2004; Bourgeois, 2016).
Future presidents assume that being a strategist will be a top priority skill when
they are in office; in reality, they spend most of the time on financial management and
fundraising (Gagliardi et al., 2017; Selingo et al., 2017). While Selingo et al. (2017) state
that 20% of presidents rank strategic planning as one on the most important areas of their
work, most “presidents indicated that budget and financial management (65%) and
fundraising (58%) are their two most time-consuming activities” (Gagliardi et al., 2017,
p.X). Not only do we see that the difference between use of time for financial issues and
strategy is significant (65% versus 29%), more importantly, it is discovered that fewer than
20% of presidents indicated the importance of strategic planning for their future work
(Gagliardi et al., 2017). These findings clearly indicate that environmental analysis, as an
essential part of any strategic process is not, by far, a primary activity within presidents’
work structure.
Literature suggests a shift towards president as multidisciplinary leader, an expert
in orchestrating external forces, but the reality is that environmental engagement and
strategic planning is not a priority in their work, and they mostly remain fiscal managers.
One promising fact is that more experienced presidents value collaboration, i.e., contact
with the external environment, over financial management and academic leadership,
which might eventually serve as a predecessor for the shift in presidential practice (Selingo
et al., 2017).
Presidential Tenure is Too Short to Effectively Engage the
Environment. Along with the demands of financial management, presidents are not
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sufficiently engaged in strategic planning because of the increasing expectation for them to
achieve short-term wins (Hinton, 2012; Selingo et al., 2017). “As a result, many are looking
for the proverbial low-hanging fruit on their campuses where they can show fast results,
not only for their own boards but also for search committees for their next job” (Selingo et
al., 2017, p.3). Prioritizing short-term results over strategic long-term planning forces
presidents to avoid starting strategic initiatives, which they will not finish by the end of
their tenure, even if the initiatives are essential to the institution’s performance (Selingo et
al., 2017).
To constrain the strategic planning process more, presidential tenure duration is
shrinking (Gagliardi et al., 2017). The average tenure term is as short as 4.9 years at the
public bachelor’s institutions (Gagliardi et al., 2017). In public doctoral-granting
institutions, which serve most students in the country (43% of all degrees and certificates
awarded in 2018), presidential tenure has decreased to 6.2 years, compared to 7.4 years in
private HEIs of the same type (Gagliardi et al., 2017; IPEDS Data Center, 2019). HEI
presidents expect to lead several institutions before they retire (Selingo et al., 2017).
Decreasing duration of tenure not only limits choices of strategic actions that
presidents are willing to initiate, it also diminishes their chances to see the results of their
work and therefore learn from that work as individuals or as members of the professional
community. In other words, shrinking tenure puts constraints on the development and
tailoring of strategic planning processes in HE.
Presidents Lack Diversity of Professional Perspectives. Another factor
that reduces presidential engagement with strategic planning and, therefore their
environment, is their professional training and background. Presidents’ past experiences
are mostly located within the HE industry, which limits the diversity of perspectives
available to them for environmental analysis (Birnbaum, 1988; Bolman & Deal, 1991).
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The majority of college presidents do not have training in management or strategy.
In 2016, 41.1% of them were graduates of HE programs (Gagliardi et al., 2017). The next
two biggest areas of training are social sciences (14.2%) and humanities (11.3%) (Gagliardi
et al., 2017). This study does not report how many of presidents have business background
as primary or secondary training, but we know it is certainly less that 11,3%. This is one
reason why traditional pathway to presidency - from provost or dean offices - is running
dry, as potential candidates often lack the skills to perform the job and do not want to do it
due to the increasing external turbulence (Selingo et al., 2017). In addition, less that 15% of
presidents have had jobs outside HE, which may have decreased the diversity of
presidents’ perspectives and diminished the extrapolation of management theory or tools
from other fields (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Further, no specialized training exists for HEI
presidents, which could be a much-needed combination of management and higher
educational theories tailored to HEIs reality (Selingo et al., 2017).
Even though most of the presidents are trained within HE and not business,
campus leaders generally do not seek to improve strategic planning skills (Moss et al.,
2015). The study by Society for College and University Planning, an influential professional
group for HEIs strategic planning, finds that many of campus leaders who will be engaged
in strategic planning are not planning to pursue professional development or connect with
the strategic planning professionals for advice (Moss et al., 2015).
The increasing professionalization of the job of president leads to shorter tenure
duration, which diminishes their possibilities to organize a theoretically supported
strategic planning process (including environmental analysis) and witness the results of
this work. Presidents spend most of their time dealing with financial management and
fundraising, which leaves them little time to consider the future or strategies to be
invented and employed for successful response to the environment.
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Although we learn that presidential capacity to engage with strategic planning is
constrained by the time and training, we still might benefit from understanding, for
instance, how exactly differences in presidents’ professional background affect the design
and organization of strategic planning in HEIs, if at all. Does longer tenure mean better
strategic plan and successful implementation? How does their training in HE (knowledge
about organizational theory in HE) help them to tailor strategic planning to their
institution, if at all? In addition, if presidents are mostly dealing with financial issues, who
else is involved in strategic planning; how well are they trained; do they have enough time
for it?
Theoretical developments in strategic planning in HE literature call for more
synthetic, creative approaches to allow HEIs to keep up with dynamic environments. In
reality, in many cases, strategic planning is not used in its original design, i.e., to
understand and engage with the environment. Instead, it has become a mainstream
practice that everyone is supposed to implement. As a model, strategic planning remains a
management-born phenomenon with few known examples of its successful tailoring to
HEIs. Environmental scanning is almost absent from research as a model or in practice.
Therefore, strategic planning is not set up to provide HEI presidents with actionable
knowledge about external factors and other organizations, which diminishes their ability to
engage with their respective environments.
Presidents’ work time is influenced by larger institutional forces of decreasing
tenure duration and the overall dominance of financial issues over everything else in their
everyday practice. Powerful championship is crucial to the installation of strategic
planning, but the professionalization of presidents’ work enforces the pressure of shortterm wins and decreases the capacity of the HEI presidents to engage in properly
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organized strategic planning, as the results can only be seen several presidential terms
later.
We cannot fully rely on strategic planning and environmental scanning literature
in HE to explain what is the best way to tailor strategic planning to the needs of HEIs due
to its nonsystematic anecdotal nature, but it delivers the evidence that in many cases
strategic planning does not usually provide actionable knowledge to presidents. Even when
it does, presidents do not have enough time to engage with this data via strategic planning.
Therefore, we need to explore literature that explains how they interact with their
environments outside of these dedicated processes. Literature on the individual
sensemaking process can shed light on how presidents personally understand their
surroundings.
How Presidents Make Sense of Their Environments
Theories of social constructivism can help us understand the manifestations of the
external environment at the individual level, i.e., how presidents make sense of their
surroundings. In particular, sensemaking (SM) theory is an influential concept that
suggests a set of personal characteristics through which we can understand this process.
Theories of Social Constructivism as Lenses to Understand How Presidents
Make Sense of Their Environments
As strategic planning theoretical model increasingly understands it as a social
process, we can use literature that discuss how HEI presidents relate to their respective
environments in this respect. The extensive literature within the theories of social
constructivism that implies that actors create their environments themselves by acting
upon them can be helpful to understand this relationship (Weick, 1995). These theories
derive from sociology and treat environments as socially constructed realities, which
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makes them a good choice to explore the field of HE as it is also seen by the institutional
theory as a socially constructed entity (Watkiss & Ahn, 2019).
Floyd H. Allport and Erving Goffman contributed the most to the concepts that
resulted in the contemporary understanding of SM process articulated by Weick (1995).
They can help “to understand the everyday life of everywoman and everyman, who … [is]
involved in the activities of organizing” (Czarniawska, 2006, p. 1672).
All three authors saw social life as fabric of temporarily interconnected events and
actions, that consist of SM (Czarniawska, 2006). These authors catalyzed the articulation
of what became the most expansive and influential perspective in organizational and
management studies described by Weick in his work Sensemaking in Organizations
(Brown, Colville, & Pye, 2015; Czarniawska, 2006; Weick, 1995).
Sensemaking Theory in Organizational and Higher Education Studies
Researchers generally define SM as “those processes by which people seek
plausibility to understand ambiguous, equivocal or confusing issues or events” (Brown et
al., 2015, p. 266). By selecting cues from the external environment, people enact the latter
into a comforting order, a social reality of theirs, to which they must respond (Weick,
1995). “By creating order and categories from which future sensemaking processes can
extract meaning, sensemaking processes are thereby also seen as enacting a social order”
(Degn, 2015, p. 905). Therefore, to understand SM we need to discover which order and
categories people include in their constructed environments. This reflects the first of seven
characteristics that Weick introduces – SM is constructed from extracted cues. The theory
implies that sensemaker never acts alone, as there are many others present in the
environment (Degn, 2015; Weick, 1995). Therefore, SM is a social process, a collective
construction of meaning. SM happens within the parameters of individual and
organizational identities; therefore, it is grounded in identity (Weber & Glynn, 2006). SM
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is retrospective as people can only make sense of what has already happened: it helps to
explain
how much of action is informed by highly skillful and complex reasoning, most of
which is tacit. … We act and then discover our preferences, principles, values, and
beliefs … we retrospectively construct the values that make sense of the outcome
[of the act] (Smerek, 2013, p. 374).
SM is ongoing in a way that the environment is in the constant change and people
extract cues from the continuous flow of events (Weick, 1995). It is also enactive as we
choose “pieces” of the environment in a way that makes sense only to a particular actor.
SM is also driven by plausibility rather that by accuracy for those in organization (Eckel
& Kezar, 2003b). Research shows that in HE some characteristics have more influence
over SM than the others: for instance, “the elements of identity and plausibility, its social
nature, and the use of extracted cues were readily observable in most of the strategies. …
strategies were not uniformly retrospective or connected to the environment” (Eckel &
Kezar, 2003, p. 52).
The literature on SM overall and specifically in HE is closely associated with the
topics of leadership, strategy, organizational change, and action, as SM process has direct
influence on strategic planning (Degn, 2015; Weick, 1995). It also is a suitable theory to
look at the construction of strategy (and environment as a part of it), then to study the
strategies themselves (Degn, 2015).
Several HE studies show how institutional forces of professionalization find their
way to the individual SM processes. This research looks at how the identity of leaders
influences their sensemaking process and, consequentially, their relationship with the
environment. For example, college presidents’ identity throughout their tenure was found
to be shaped by their self-description during the hiring process (Smerek, 2013). As the
hiring process is increasingly driven by the same institutional forces which emphasize

47

short-term results, presidents may put themselves in a situation of “self-fulfilling
prophecy” (Selingo et al., 2017). By describing themselves as expected, they shape their
future presidency by the institutional norms, that do not pay enough attention to the longterm strategic oriented leadership. We also know that professional background of HEI
leaders has strong influence on SM and the following action: more business-oriented
strategic initiatives were launched after more college presidents with managerial
background were appointed (Degn, 2015). As this trend might mean an increase of
strategic planning and environmental analysis use across campuses, it concerns a small
number of cases, because presidents who have had a managerial experience outside HE
are rare examples (Gagliardi et al., 2017).
Tensions and Knowledge Gaps in Theoretical Literature on Sensemaking
Based on the critique suggested by several authors, three dichotomies are present
in SM literature (Brown et al., 2015; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015).
Ongoing versus occasional (critical) nature of sensemaking. Most SM literature
discusses the process of understanding “disruption in existing practices, uncertainty and
ambiguity” (Degn, 2015, p. 903) by a crisis that triggers SM (Maitlis & Sonenshein, 2010).
The literature rarely studies unplanned events, such as catastrophe, terrorism, or
economic collapse (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015). The literature primarily explores planned
events which lead to critical changes, such as an appointment of the new president or
implementation of a new policy. For example, we learn that governmental policy to
concentrate research resources pushes presidents to make sense of two different, often
conflicting rationales in their institutional environment: strategic management and
symbolic management (Pietilä, 2014). In another study, new college presidents conducted
research their institutions to better understand them (Smerek, 2013).
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What we do not learn from existing studies is the nature of routine, everyday
process of HEI presidents’ environmental SM. Though HEIs face challenges regularly, for
instance, long-standing financial pressure in public education which will influence ongoing
SM, this argument presents a narrow picture of it about well-known event or episode. Even
though Weick (1995) originally describes the SM as ongoing process, he introduces its
episodic ontology, as Sandberd & Tsoukas (2015) argue. They propose the term of
“immanent sensemaking” that does not carry episodic nature and claim the need for its
future exploration (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015).
Retrospective vs prospective nature of sensemaking. Retrospective
comprehension dominates the theory of SM as Weick’s work originally implied that people
can only make sense about what has already happened, i.e., that action precedes cognition
(Weick, 1995). Most studies in HE included in this section look at the past events of
reforms, transformation, or faculty departure and administrators conducting analysis after
the event (Eckel & Kezar, 2003; Savage, 2013). The researchers, primarily in the realm of
strategy and organizational change, claim that creating tools for prospective SM is possible
through further research (Brown et al., 2015; Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015; Smerek, 2013).
The study on college presidents found that they “had a great desire to think about and plan
for the future … to place cognition before action” (p.395), which proves that there is a need
for research to provide a theoretical foundation for these processes (Smerek, 2013).
Micro Vs Macro foundation of sensemaking constitutes another dichotomy in the
current literature. Traditionally, SM is understood to be rooted in the individual’s
cognition (Weick, 1995). Weber and Glynn (2006) introduced the importance of
organizational context in SM through typified roles, actions, and situations, therefore
claiming the organization to serve as a cognitive constraint. Regardless of their effort, the
SM perspective does not give enough attention to larger social, economic, historical, or
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other macro-issues within and across organizations (Brown et al., 2015; Sandberg &
Tsoukas, 2015). Additionally, there is not enough known about the connection of SM
perspective with the institutional theory and Smerek (2013) suggests a possibility of such a
study in HE field.
Our knowledge of retrospective occasional SM that is rooted in past professional
experiences corresponds with how presidents treat strategic planning in many cases. As
the theoretical model of the latter is designed to be used on a regular basis, providing data
about the external environment and charting the organizational future, we need to know
more about the ongoing contextual SM of presidents to explain current difficulties with
strategic planning and ways it might be organized successfully in and tailored specifically
to HEIs.
Overall, the SM theory is helpful in exploring the ways in which HEI leaders
understand their respective environments. Although this theory and has been popular
among HE researchers over the last two decades, they mostly looked at institutionally
constrained occasional SM following disruptive events (Sandberg & Tsoukas, 2015).
Therefore, we as a field still do not know much how HEI presidents make sense of their
organizational environments in larger contexts to understand the contemporary and future
challenges in HE in the United States.
Conclusion and Potential for future research
In the time of significant changes in demography, the economy, technology, and
global competition it is crucially important for HEI presidents in general, and for RCU
leaders in particular, to have relevant data about their institutions’ external environments.
This knowledge is essential for data-driven decision making, which supports effective
strategic planning and response. Understanding the surroundings of the universities
allows presidents to make timely and effective changes to the operation of their respective
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institutions in order, in some extreme cases, to avoid organizational collapse. At the same
time, presidents’ capacity to fully understand their environments is diminished by
opposing institutional forces.
On one side, collecting and analyzing data about the external environment requires
increasing organizational and individual capacity and resources. Trends in external factors
and their underlying conditions require thorough scanning process. Environments as
organizational fields are becoming more complex, comprised of a larger and more diverse
group of organizations and institutions (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991; Scott et al., 2017).
Balancing between increasing similarity with others and simultaneous competition with
them, requires from presidents extensive knowledge about other HEIs and market
conditions.
On the other side, the increase in the professionalization of the presidents’
occupation provides them with less capacity and resources to engage with the
environment. The initially alien culture of data-driven decision making is gaining
importance in HE, although it’s still not perceived by the majority of presidents as a
necessary practice (Gagliardi et al., 2017). Assuming presidents will make it a priority,
there is a potential lack of processes in place and time to collect and analyze these data.
Strategic planning in its current configuration is not organized in many HEIs to provide
presidents with actionable knowledge. Environmental scanning is hard to sustain in some
cases. Decreasing tenure duration and stakeholder’s expectations for fast results lead to
short-term planning as the foundation for strategic decisions. The organization of work
around financial management results in overwhelming time consumption by fiscal issues
and fundraising in the everyday schedules of presidents (Gagliardi et al., 2017; Selingo et
al., 2017).
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While literature used in this review sheds light on some important problems
regarding presidents’ engagement with their respective environments through strategic
planning process it also reveals possibilities for prospective research.
We can benefit from learning more about presidential understandings of
environments through research that looks at the individual, institutional, and systemic
levels of the sensemaking influence over strategic decision-making and strategic response.
Through understanding presidents’ routine sensemaking about the future of their
organizations placed in particular context, we can learn how the environmental
scanning and strategic planning processes could be changed to better fit RCUs.
To fill the gap in knowledge on presidents individual sensemaking, we must build
on extant social constructivist, organizational and management theory research to develop
our understanding of president’s engagement with the data on their environments. We
need to know which constituents and external pressures presidents include in data about
their environments and whether it is a sufficient dataset for strategic planning. We know
that practitioner’s literature on strategic planning does not incorporate discussion on the
latest theoretical developments in organizational theory, therefore it is important to
identify potential blind spots in the dataset. We need to know if presidents’ perception of
the environment as theoretical construct has evolved to correspond with theoretical
progress.
Existing knowledge gaps on the organizational level of strategic planning and
environmental scanning processes can be addressed by having contemporary examples of
successful strategic response towards external pressures and existing competition. For
instance, we will benefit from seeing how RCUs work with the relevant problems of their
states, cities, or territories. What differentiates strategic planning of those RCUs which
succeed in anticipating future trends, such as demographic change? How are the processes
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that deliver actionable data designed and organized? Do problems appear in the dataset
produced by strategic planning? How do they transfer to the strategic plan? Since we have
few and dated studies on environmental scanning, we need to understand the current use
of this model, and presidential championship of it.
To understand how institutional forces of presidents’ occupation manifest in
strategic organizational processes, we need to bridge what we know about presidential
individual characteristics and contemporary strategic responses towards environments.
For instance, is there a correlation between longer tenure and more effective strategic and
response?
While we know that more presidents with past experiences in management
launched more strategic initiatives, we need to understand if that quantitative result led to
qualitative change and resulted in sufficient strategic response. Therefore, we will benefit
from studies that look at the connection of past experiences or training outside of HE and
the resulting change in strategic planning and environmental scanning processes.
Additionally, although we know that presidential personal commitment is crucial to the
strategic processes operation in universities, we need to understand, how exactly it shapes
the strategic planning model.
While prior research suggests that presidents must own the strategic plan and
lead the SP, this is not always the case and we do not have a clear understanding of who
leads the process instead (Seltzer, 2018). We can benefit from the studies that look at
presidents and other senior leaders at their institutions, who are involved in strategic
planning.
While we know that in many cases SP is dysfunctional and does not lead to the
strategic response we need to extend the inquiry in to looking at other processes that
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presidents and other university leaders consider shaping the strategy of their institutions
and leading to the strategic response.
Learning more about how university leaders routinely engage with the future of
their institutions will enable us, as an academic community, to develop a theoretical
evolution of the management-born strategic planning tools designed specifically for HEIs.
HE leaders might benefit from using these tools for more effective strategic management
of their intuitions. Most importantly, through more effective, environmentally informed
strategic decision-making processes, more institutions will be able to adapt and survive in
the current conditions and, therefore, increase educational attainment and HE will better
contribute to societal development.
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Chapter 3. Research Methodology
The purpose of this study was to learn more about regional comprehensive
universities (RCUs) strategic responses towards their external organizational
environments, strategic decision-making processes leading to those responses, and the
influence of the leadership’s understanding of the organizational external environment
over the RCUs’ strategic responses. To do so, the study had the following primary
research question and five supporting sub-questions:
How do regional comprehensive universities strategically respond to the
economic challenges in their external organizational environment and which decisionmaking processes, if any, have they implemented to do so?
•

Are regional comprehensive universities undertaking environmental scanning
and analysis?

•

How do leaders make routine, prospective, and contextual sense about external
organizational environments?

•

Who leads strategic decision-making processes?

•

What characterizes the decision-making processes that lead to the strategic
response?

•

How do leaders evaluate the success of their institution’s strategic response?

Methodology
The study was designed using qualitative approach as an epistemological
umbrella. There are several reasons for this choice.
Interpretive and constructivist epistemological perspective with in the qualitative
methodology allowed for a design that aimed to fully describe, attempt to understand
and interpret the phenomenon in question (Merriam, 2009).
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By looking at several different institutions, the study used inductive logic, which is
immanent to the qualitative approach (Maxwell, 1996; Ravitch & Carl, 2016). This
helped to reveal existing patterns to understand the phenomenon of organizational
external environment evaluation and its influence on strategic response in RCUs
(Ravitch & Carl, 2016).
This study used primary data; the need for tailoring the data collection and analysis
methods has emerged in the process. The qualitative methodology provided the
possibility for the necessary changes throughout the execution of the study (Creswell,
2013).
In addition, the qualitative study design allowed me to explore the “complexity and
subjectivity” (Ravitch & Carl, 2016, p.155) of the external environment evaluation and its
influence over strategic planning and other long-term decision-making processes that
lead to the strategic response through the experiences of the participants.
To conclude, the study used theoretical lenses of organizational and social
constructivism theories, which are frequently utilized by researchers to study
organizations, HEIs in particular, within the qualitative methodology (Eckel & Kezar,
2003b; Scott & Kirst, 2017; Smerek, 2013).
Method
Under the qualitative approach umbrella, the case study method was the
appropriate choice due to several reasons.
First, the study intended to answer “how” type questions, which indicated a good
fit for the case study method as acknowledged by the prominent scholars within the
tradition (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Merriam, 2009; Yin, 2009). Not only was the study
aimed to understand “how”, but also to achieve an in-depth understanding and
description of leaders’ engagement with external environments and its influence on the
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strategic response of their institutions. The “in-depth” understanding approach is known
as a hallmark of case study method (Creswell, 2013, p.100).
Second, the study addressed a complex social phenomenon of external
organizational environments and decision-making processes, hence the case study
method made possible the detailed investigation via several data sources; this reflects the
Feagin, Orum, and Sjoberg (1991) definition of the case study (as cited in Lincoln &
Denzin, 2016). In addition, the fact that I as the researcher had no control of the
phenomenon studied proved the appropriate use of this method (Yin, 2014).
Finally, the study explored currently operating institutions and their “real-life
contemporary context” (Creswell, 2013, p.94). The study of ongoing, live issues
supported the choice of the case study method.
Research Design
The most appropriate unit of analysis for the case study was identified as an RCU,
as this research explored the phenomenon bounded by place (organizational boundaries
of the institution in which leaders enact strategic response) and time (current
presidential tenure) (Stake, 2005). The multiple-case study was chosen to provide a
variety of RCUs’ institutional behaviors within the shared external environment
(explained in detail in the sampling strategy section).
The study explored RCUs’ strategic response to environmental pressures both
through leaders’ understanding and engagement with the external environment and how
their knowledge about it influenced strategic decision-making. For the study, strategic
response was defined as organizational actions pursued in order to maintain the
strategic fit between organization and its environment and was characterized by at least
one of the following:

57

•

represented a long-term action towards external pressure/s, which shaped the
operation of the HEI for the foreseeable future (Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Peterson et
al., 1997)

•

recorded the allocation of resources, which demonstrated organizational priorities
and effort (Bower & Gilbert, 2006)

•

ratified and therefore enabled by the governing body of the university (M. Hartley,
personal communication, October 28,2020).
Further, within each case, three areas of interest were identified to inform the

mechanisms of data collection. The first selected area was the: formal strategic planning
process and its environmental scanning and analysis. Strategic planning is one process
leaders use for long-term decision-making and it is often misused. Importantly it is the
only long-term decision-making process described in literature which combines
characteristics essential for understanding the role of the external environment in
strategic response (Capon, 1996; Keller, 1983; Kotler & Murphy, 1981). SP is primarily
designed to shape strategy and, therefore strategic response (Kotler & Murphy, 1981;
Morrison et al., 1984). It is geared towards anticipating the future state of the
environment and its potential influence on the organization, instead of planning for the
known present (Kotler & Murphy, 1981). Most importantly, strategic planning has a
dedicated initial step of engaging with the environment: environmental scanning (Kotler
& Murphy, 1981; Morrison et al., 1984). The second area of interest was identified as:
The long-term decision-making processes and environmental scanning and analysis
beyond strategic planning, both formalized and non-formalized, that shape the strategy
and lead to the strategic response of RCUs. This area of attention accommodated for the
misuse of strategic planning in HEIs, as described in literature (Ginsberg, 2011; Seltzer,
2018). The last area of interest was defined as: The environment external to the
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organization as understood by its leaders i.e., how leaders define their environments,
and which actors, factors, and trends they include in it.
Per Stake’s (1995) typology, this is a collective instrumental study, because it
intended to shed light on a specific problem, namely that the external environment may
not be well understood by the HEI leaders, and “to get the story down for the possible
benefit of policymakers, scholars, and other citizens” (Odell, 2001, p. 162 in Denzel &
Lincoln). This problem surfaced during the literature review, which helped to articulate
the study’s theoretical proposition that the institutional forces in US HE increase the
possibility of leaders’ ignorance of the organizational external environment, which, in
turn, invites the possibility of strategic misdirection. This proposition justified designing
this research study as exploratory (Yin, 2009).
To focus the research questions more, the two new theoretical propositions were
defined for the study. The conceptual logic of the study (please see Figure 3) illustrates
how the new propositions were formed.
Prospective, contextual, and ongoing sensemaking, which informs RCUs leaders’
understanding of the external environment, combined with their personal commitment
to environmental analysis as a formal, theoretically supported process, increases the
chances for successful long-term decision-making processes, which shape the strategy
and lead to the strategic response. The possible construct measurements for the success
of these processes are:
•

for formalized processes of strategic planning and other long-term decisionmaking processes, that lead to the strategic response: environmental
scanning within the processes is formal and theoretically supported, results of
the environmental scanning are used in the following stages of the decisionmaking processes, resulting plan of action has connections to the real
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problems in RCU’s external environment as well as timeline, budget, and
responsible parties.
•

for non-formalized processes: they enhance leaders’ understanding of the
external environment, that is further used in the formal processes of strategic
decision-making.

Further, strategic planning as well as other long-term decision-making processes
can lead to the successful strategic response upon implementation of the strategic plan
or the plan of action resulting from other processes. The success of the strategic response
was measured through evaluation of the leaders involved in strategic planning or other
long-term decision-making processes, which lead to the strategic response.
The new theoretical propositions are the following:
1. Environmental scanning and analysis procedures, which allow RCU leaders to
engage with their external environments prospectively, contextually, routinely within
long-term decision-making processes, could positively influence the success of the
strategic response;
2. A successfully implemented strategic plan or the plan of action resulting from other
long-term decision-making processes, which shape the strategy, could contribute to
the overall success of strategic response, i.e., could positively influence organizational
performance and survival.
As this was a qualitative study, it did not intend to produce generalizable results
based on the two new theoretical propositions. This research rather aimed to find the
evidence of these phenomena in a particular institutional sample included in the study.
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Figure 3
Conceptual logic of the study

Sampling Strategy. Participant Selection and Selection Criteria
Sampling strategy in case study research is essentially the choice of the cases
(Stake, 1995). Logically, the definition of the case study, which is the achievement of full,
detailed understanding of the chosen case, asserts the purposeful type of sampling
(Creswell, 2012). I used purposeful typical sampling to identify the cases for this study
(Yin, 2009; Creswell, 2012).
To identify cases, the study held several factors constant. As previously stated, the
purpose of this study was to learn more about RCUs strategic responses towards their
external organizational environments, strategic decision-making processes leading to
those responses, and the influence of the leadership’s understanding of the
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organizational external environment over the RCUs’ strategic responses. Therefore,
organizational external environment for the purposes of the study was limited to the
economic challenges in the external environment towards which the universities’
strategic responses are targeted, namely the decrease in state and federal funding and
the decrease of family income. These two factors significantly affect operation in both
public and private sectors: through state appropriations (in public institutions) and
tuition revenue, which is a function of both federal and state financial aid instruments
and family income.
To look at the HEIs in a shared context, the dissertation committee encouraged
holding the regional factor constant because geographical proximity illustrates how
different HEIs respond to the shared economic context in their external environments.
The state of California (CA) was chosen for several reasons.
One reason lied within pronounced economic challenges that the state is
currently facing. CA’s projected state budget deficit for 2021-22 is $54 billion (Petek,
2020). The state historically has the highest volatility of state support for HE among
states, and that volatility is currently exacerbated by COVID-19 effects on state budget
(Odle & Finney, 2020). Tax income in CA is increasingly and heavily dependent on
personal income tax and, therefore, is now also affected by the decrease of family income
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, which leads to less investment in HE (Odle & Finney,
2020).
Additionally, CA is projected to face a 15% decrease in high school graduates from
the class of 2019 to 2037, which will result in a continuing decrease of state
appropriations for public institutions and tuition revenue for both sectors (Bransberger
et al., 2020). Along with the approaching demographic cliff, the state has experienced
the increase in numbers of students from ethnic minorities with fewer financial means;
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the most sizable ethnic group, Hispanics, will remain the largest for the foreseeable
future and is both more loan averse and the most economically affected by the COVID-19
pandemic (Boatman et al., 2017; Bransberger et al., 2020; Zumeta et al., 2012).
In addition, it is important to explain that the COVID-19 pandemic was treated as
a systemic shock to higher education, in particular a catalyst for increased attention to
the external environment during the study. The COVID-19 factor was only used to
provide additional focus to the RCUs’ strategic response, when participants were sharing
their perspectives on how COVID-19 sharpened or changed the RCUs’ attention and/or
attitude to the pre- and post-pandemic socio-economic conditions. The study was not
concerned with the emergency response (for instance COVID-19 testing organization on
campus or temporary hiring freezes) that happened as a reaction to the fast-evolving
situation.
From the variety of institutional types operating in California, regional
comprehensive universities (RCUs) were chosen as the organizational population for the
study. It is important to concentrate our scholarly attention on the public sector of
contemporary higher education in the US. Public RCUs are significantly dependent on
major stakeholders, such as state governments that regulate and constrain their financial
and operational flexibility, which is crucially important for relevant and timely strategic
response, especially during the unfolding COVID-19 pandemic.
There is no single definition for the RCUs in extant literature and no existing
classification describes these institutions precisely (for details see de Alva, 2019;
Henderson, 2009; Miller, 2020; Orphan, 2015). For the purposes of this study, I defined
RCUs as follows: 4-year public institutions with a broad spectrum of educational
programs, serving predominantly in-state students.
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While researchers use different ways to define and classify the institutions in
question, there is no disagreement on their extreme importance. RCUs that occupy the
middle ground between the research universities and community colleges educate the
majority of first-time undergraduates (de Alva, 2019). In fact, they are essentially the
“workhorse” of US higher education; 70 percent of all undergraduates attending fouryear public institutions and over 40 percent of all undergraduates in the nation attend
these RCUs (de Alva, 2019).
In addition to being the major player in terms of numbers of students served,
RCUs play an important role in solving one of the most persistent problems in the US income inequality - by educating more first-generation, Black, Hispanic, and nontraditionally aged students (age 25 and above) than flagship and research universities
(de Alva, 2019). Prior research provides evidence that RCUs in fact serve as engines of
economic mobility by successfully moving low-income students into the higher
percentiles of income distribution (Chetty et al., 2017; de Alva, 2019).
While being very important to the overall HE productivity and the development
of their regions, these institutions are at bigger risk than public research and private
schools of being impacted by the changes brought by the COVID-19 pandemic and its
economic and social consequences. This is, in part, because most RCUs are less wealthy
than flagships due to limited research funding. Public RCUs depend mostly on state
appropriations and tuition revenue (de Alva,2019). The state appropriations were
steadily declining even before the pandemic (Zumeta et al., 2012). With more stress now
put on all sectors of the economy, such as Medicare and unemployment benefits, we can
expect more budget cuts in higher education in the following years. Tuition revenue will
probably decline on the national level for both sectors of HE; even though people tend to
pursue education in the times of economic downturn, we do not know if this will be true
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during and after the pandemic. In the current context, students are more loan averse and
finding employment after graduation will be less certain as the pandemic evolves. Most
importantly, RCUs will be even more affected because they serve a large share of
students from ethnic minorities with fewer financial means (de Alva, 2019; Zumeta et al.,
2012). At the time of writing this sampling strategy, those groups were becoming more
acutely affected by the economic stall and were less likely to start or continue their
education in the fall semester of 2020 (“The Edge,” 2020).
While it was evident that RCUs, a very important intuitional type, might be
deeply affected by the COVID-19 circumstances, insufficient educational research exists
to understand these institutions (De Alva, 2019). This provided a strong rationale for
choosing RCUs as the population for the study.
To choose from several hundred RCUs, I held two factors constant. First, with the
consideration for the RCU’s institutional mission fulfillment, I chose institutions, which:
-

enroll at least 80% of in-state students, which indicates the fulfillment of the regional
component of the RCU’s mission (Orphan, 2015). These data were obtained from the
IPEDS system (IPEDS Data Center, 2018).

-

have achieved an economic upward mobility rate for low-income students of at least
50%, which indicates both the regional component and the commitment to educating
students from the historically underrepresented groups in HE (Miller, 2020). This
factor was held constant to limit the sample to those institutions which achieved
better results in delivering graduates economic mobility, one of the RCU’s important
characteristics. I calculated this rate using the Equality of Opportunity Project data
(Chetty, 2017), and adjusted mobility rate among low-income students formula
(upward economic mobility of students from families with parental income in two
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bottom quintiles to the top two quintiles of income distribution) developed by de
Alva (2019).
Before the state of California was introduced as a geographical factor to narrow
down the sampling strategy, I contacted two RCUs located on the West and East coasts
through the network of the dissertation committee members and completed two
successful introductory calls. During my conversation with one of the Vice Presidents the
West Coast RCU, they found my study interesting, engaging, and relevant. As this
introductory interview happened half a year into the COVID-19 pandemic, it became
clear that while this institution did engage in a strategic planning process and had a
strategic plan, its leaders were entirely consumed by the emergency response to the
unfolding health crisis. The Vice President expressed concerns that their colleagues
would be able to find time, and even if the interviews would be ultimately possible most
of the discussion about the university decision-making would revolve around the
COVID-19 emergency response. My second introductory call with an East Coast RCU’s
Vice President had the same result. The leader also found the topic important pursuing
and offered help connecting me with their colleagues for the interview scheduling.
Although, similarly to the West coast university, the leader cautioned me that all the
strategic planning and decision-making work in the university was postponed due to the
pandemic and substituted with everyday tactic planning.
After the dissertation committee members advised me to geographically
constrain my sampling strategy and focus on the state of California, I turned my
attention to the 25 public RCUs that fit into the sample. I approached the senior leaders
at nine institutions via email using both the professional network of the members of the
dissertation committee and “cold” emails. I received positive responses from four
institutions and conducted successful introductory calls with each of them. I had an
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introductory call with a faculty member at one institution who advised me to reach out to
the office of a particular Vice President; I did not hear back after doing so. Another of
these conversations did not result in sufficient interest from the colleagues of the leader I
interviewed in spite of several emails expressing my strong intention to include this
university into the study, leaving it out of the final sample. Data collection was fully
conducted in the third institution, but I also excluded this university from the final
sample. The reason to do so was because the institution’s new president had recently
assumed office and had purposefully suspended the creation of strategy for the duration
of the pandemic, focusing on the emergency response to the COVID-19 related issues
instead. The previous strategic plan at this institution was not functional, and the cabinet
members who served in the university under the previous president did not provide
enough data about the past iteration of strategic planning. Therefore, there were no
sufficient data about the processes of strategy creation to be obtained from either the
president or their cabinet. The final sample had one public RCU.
After consulting with the dissertation committee, the decision was made to
include into the final sample a not-for-profit private institution to which I gained access.
This added an important dimension to the study, a possibility to see how institutional
control (public/private) impacted leaders’ understanding of their environments. What
allowed for this addition is that researchers continuously make attempts to advance our
understanding of the RCU as an institutional type (de Alva, 2019; Miller, 2020; Orphan,
2015). For instance, Miller (2020) argues that the existing postsecondary classifications
cannot capture the complexity of the RCUs identities; he finds that they could be more
successfully described by shared features of “relatively high admission rates … lower
prices, higher proportions of students of color, students receiving Pell-grants, and instate students” (p. 70). The private institution included in the final sample shares
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important mission characteristics with the public RCU in the sample, i.e., both are
located in CA, operate on the same student market, and therefore serve the same
demographic groups. The two universities are similar in size (between 7000 and 10000
students), serve more than 80 percent of the in-state students, the majority of their
students are first in their families to get a college degree (according to the institutional
data of the RCUs), educate a majority of Pell-eligible students, and have at least 50%
low-income students adjusted mobility rate. Both universities are Hispanic-serving
institutions.
Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic significantly constrained my study in several
dimensions. The length of both gaining access to the universities and data collection
processes took almost 9 months, from September 2020 to June 2021. I spent several
months of networking, “cold” emailing, introductory conversations, and data collection
in the institutions that were not eventually included into the final sample. Further, while
virtual interviews via Zoom software allowed me to not be physically present on
campuses and still collect the data I needed, I encountered new difficulties during the
process. As the study’s participant sample consisted of senior leaders overloaded with
work (even on a regular year, without a pandemic) it was extremely difficult to hold them
accountable to Zoom meetings. Leaders scheduled interviews up to a month in advance,
and I waited for several weeks in-between the interviews at the same university. Without
a pandemic, I would have been physically present on campuses and completed data
collection in a matter of several days or a week at each research site; instead, my process
was elongated to almost 9 months. RCUs leaders’ increased time constraints were not
the only way in which COVID-19 pandemic limited the access to the institutions in my
sample. Many universities that have engaged in strategic planning and would have been
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great choices for my study suddenly stopped their strategic work due to the pandemic,
and in some cases, had senior leadership changes because of it.
Lastly, I got access to the two interesting cases of institutions that were open to
the participation in my study and have successfully engaged in strategic planning. After
the data were collected and analyzed, it became clear that one of the universities had a
different organizational purpose of engaging in strategic planning. Its leaders were
mostly interested in their internal organizational relationship restoration, which made
the framework of external work with their environment less relevant for them.
Unfortunately, the COVID-19 pandemic affected the resulting sample of institutions, one
of which was not a perfect fit for the main purpose of my study and on a year without a
health crisis, might not have been included into the final sample.
Mechanisms and Research Design
Data collection
In order to achieve data triangulation and, therefore, to increase the validity of
findings, several mechanisms of data collection were used (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018;
Patton, 1987; Yin, 2009). The mechanisms were used simultaneously, which helped to
inform the data collection process, while also keeping track of my observations and
reflections regarding these data (Yin, 2009). The data collection took place from January
to June of 2021.
1) Interviews.
As interviews are “at the center of many qualitative studies since they provide
deep, rich, individualized, and contextualized data” (Ravitch & Carl, 2016, p.146), they
were the dominant method during the study. Interviews were used to understand the
construction of the participants’ realities of the phenomenon or experience (p.146); in
the case of this study, interviews helped to explore the external organizational
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environment as understood by the leaders and the decision-making processes that lead
to the strategic response.
Procedurally, I conducted 50-minute to hour-long, in-person, semi-structured
interviews with open-ended questions (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). The interview protocol
(see Appendix A) featured knowledge type questions (Ravitch & Carl, 2016). Due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, the individual interviews took place using Zoom video
conferencing software. The oral consent for recording was acquired from each
participant at the beginning of the interview. The resulting audio files were saved to the
secure file storage “Penn Box”.
During the data collection, for each of the cases I interviewed 15 participants: two
RCU’s presidents and 13 other senior leaders responsible and/or participating in the
strategic decision-making processes that lead to the strategic response (see Table 1).
Strategic decision-making process was defined for this study as any process (formalized,
non-formalized) that led to the creation of the plan of action, which declares the
measures designed to maintain the strategic fit between the organization and its
environment.
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Table 1
Participants interviewed for the study

Participants’ job titles
RCU1
(public)

-

Total
RCU1
RCU2
(private
)

Notes

President
Provost/Vice President for Academic
Affairs
Vice President or Advancement
Vice President for Business and Finance
Vice President for Strategic Planning
Vice President for Student Affairs
Senior Associate Vice President for
Communications, Marketing, and Public
Relations
Senior Associate Vice President for Human
Resources, Equal Opportunity, and
Compliance
Director of Administrative Operations

Participants fully represent
president’s cabinet (only general
counsel refused to participate in
the study). All the VPs, but one,
have previous long-term
professional experiences within
HE and 5 participants have
experiences outside of the
university’s system. The current
presidential tenure is nearing five
years, the longest VP’s tenure is
eight years, all other participants
spent less than five years at the
RCU 1 and started their tenures
under the acting president.
9 interviews

-

President
Vice President for Finance and Facilities,
Chief Financial Officer
Vice President for Strategic Enrollment
Management
Vice President for University Advancement
Director, Office of the President & Board
Affairs
Member of the Board of Trustees

Total
RCU2
Total

Per president’s advice I talked to
all the cabinet members who were
the key participants of the
strategic planning process. Three
out of six VPs participated in the
study. All the VPs, but one, have
previous long-term professional
experiences within HE and 1
participant has experience outside
of the HE.
The current presidential tenure is
over 10 years, the longest VP
tenure is 8 years, the longest
cabinet member tenure is 10
years; all other participants spent
less than five years at the RCU 2
and started their tenures under
the acting president.
6 interviews
15 interviews
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The conducted interviews provided me with written descriptions of existing
strategic planning and other processes that led to the strategic response according to the
interviewees, and how RCUs’ leaders understood their external environment.
2) Document analysis.
Document analysis was chosen as a mechanism in this study as it provides insight
into the “data-rich environment” of organizations (Ravitch & Carl, 2016, p. 171). I have
scrutinized publicly available documents on the RCUs’ websites: strategic plans,
descriptions of the strategic process, annual operational reports, and financial
statements. I have been provided with internal documents, describing policies of internal
environmental analysis and strategic planning from the RCU2; the latter ones were
requested to remain confidential. The list of obtained documents is presented in the
Table 2.

Table 2
Documents obtained from the RCUs
RCU1
(public)

-

RCU2
(private)

-

University current strategic plan, 2017
Annual report produced by the institutional research unit, 2018-2019,
2019-2020
Campus master plan, 2009
University policy on support units review, 2008
University policy on academic programs review procedures, 2012
Financial statement, 2019-2020
Strategic vision, 2013
Strategic vision, 2020
Master plan, 2017
Institutional surveys (university website, multiple years)
Course evaluation surveys (university website, 2011)
Annual interactive report produced by the institutional research office,
(university website, 2004-2019)
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The data gathered included formal descriptions of strategic planning and
environmental scanning processes, data about the participants and forms of organization
for these processes, as well as the resulting strategic plans.
3) Research Journal.
Research journal as a mechanism of data collection was chosen to provide
structured reflexivity throughout the research process and increase the validity of the
study by “critically engaging with [my] biases, interpretations, processes, and reflections,
[which] can help ... to produce more complex and ethical research” (Ravitch & Carl,
2016, p. 205). I used the journal consistently throughout the study. I wrote a note after
each interview to reflect on my observations and thoughts, which helped me tailor my
interview protocol in the preparation for the following interviews.
Data analysis and theoretical framework
In order to increase the validity of the findings and the robustness of the research
design, as case study method literature suggests, I designed the initial analytic strategy
before the data collection was carried out (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Yin, 2009). The
general analytic strategy of the study relied on the abovementioned theoretical
propositions:
-

Environmental scanning and analysis procedures, which allow RCU leaders to
engage with their external environments prospectively, contextually, routinely within
long-term decision-making processes, increase the success of the strategic response;

-

A successfully implemented strategic plan or the plan of action resulting from other
long-term decision-making processes, which shape the strategy, contributes to the
overall success of strategic response, i.e., increases organizational performance and
survival.
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Generally, the data analysis looked for the evidence of how leaders’ external
environment understanding was reflected in strategic planning and other processes that
lead to the strategic response and how the implementation of the strategic plan affected
the RCU’s strategic response.
The theoretical framework for the data analysis included several theoretical
perspectives.
First, strategic planning and environmental scanning models, taken from
organizational theory research (for details see Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Morrison et al.,
1984), compared with the reality through the interviews and document analysis, helped
to reveal how strategic planning processes were organized regarding the theoretical
models of SP and ES and how the implementation of strategic plan influenced the overall
strategic response of the RCU.
Second, the characteristics developed by sensemaking theory scholars helped to
illustrate how leaders’ understanding of the environment corresponds with what the
theory implies about the sensemaking process (Weick, 1995). The sensemaking theory
helped to shed light on what happens when senior leaders are asked to think about the
environment in the way strategic decision-making requires (contextually, prospectively,
routinely), which contradicts the way people usually make sense (Weick, 1995). While
sensemaking theory revealed the process of mental construction of the external
environment, the institutional theory on organizational fields, used in conjunction,
illustrated the result of the sensemaking process, i.e., the external environment as a
result of conceptualization.
I used two analytic techniques to scrutinize the collected data: pattern matching
between the theoretical framework and the data and the cross-case synthesis (Yin, 2014).
For the initial pattern matching, I used the set of predesigned themes/codes, that were
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slightly modified during the process (see Table 3). For instance, it became clear during
the coding process, that there are data available on tools for both external and internal
organizational environments. To address this, I separated the code “environmental
scanning and analysis” into two: “external environmental scanning and analysis” and
“internal environmental scanning and analysis”. The cross-case synthesis was used as a
technique to shed light on similarities and differences among institutions that led to
successful strategic response.
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Table 3
Sample codes for data analysis
1. Individual level: sensemaking and institutional theories
Future of higher education (prospective sensemaking)
How and when future thinking occurs (formal or informal practices used to
think/work with the content of the future)
FRWD - ways forward
FTR - future of the environment
Context surrounding higher education (contextual sensemaking)
External factors (which socio-economic conditions are considered included in the
current understanding of the external environment)
CHL – Challenges present in the environment
COVID - pandemic-related influences on strategy
Organizational field (how institutional theory is reflected in the understanding of
the current external environment, i.e., actors, relationships, analogies)
ENV_CONC - concept of the environment
ENV_CONSTIT - Environment constituencies
Routine/crises thinking (ongoing sensemaking) Evidence in which circumstances
sensemaking and strategic thinking occurs
CRISES_SM - no time available to engage with the strategy
2. Organizational level: organizational theory
Formalized processes (strategic planning, environmental scanning and/or other formal
long-term decision-making processes, that lead to the strategic response)
RESP – response/actions taken towards the environment
SCS – success/results of the strategic response
SP - strategic planning organization and administration
SP_MONIT - strategic planning monitoring
STR_DEF - definition of strategic
STR_DM_NEG - strategic decision-making hardships, limitations
STR_DM_POS - strategic decision-making successes
STR_DM_UNIT - strategic decision-making in administrative units
STR_DM_UNIV - strategic decision-making university-wide
ENV_SA - environmental scanning and analysis
ENV_SA_EXT - external environmental scanning and analysis
ENV_SA_INT - internal environmental scanning and analysis
Non-formalized processes (attempt to find other “spaces”, where strategic decisionmaking takes place)
NOFORM_DM - informal strategic decision-making
ENV_SA - environmental scanning and analysis in non-formalized
processes
ENV_SA_EXT - external environmental scanning and analysis in nonformalized processes
ENV_SA_INT - internal environmental scanning and analysis in nonformalized processes
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Procedurally, the analysis of the interview data was the following. I transcribed
interviews simultaneously with the data collection using the software Otter.ai and
completed the first read for possible mistakes without coding. Then I shared individual
transcriptions with the participants via a secure link to PennBox file storage, asking for
their feedback on the factual accuracy of the data. I had several iterations of reading,
coding and pattern-matching until data saturation was achieved, i.e., when ”repeated
confirmation and recurrence of themes and codes during data analysis” (p.1) happened
(Morse, Barnett, Mayan, Olson, & Spiers, 2002 as cited in Faulkner & Trotter, 2017).
I engaged in documents analysis simultaneously with the interview data analysis.
My goal was to match the patterns of use derived from theoretical models of strategic
planning and environmental scanning, to find the evidence of strategic planning or other
processes’ use according to the theoretical models, as well as their deviated forms
described in literature. In addition, I intended to find evidence of presence of
perspective, contextual, ongoing sensemaking in the documents.
Positionality/Researcher’s role
The qualitative epistemological approach treats researchers as research tools
themselves because their views can influence the design and execution of the study
(Ravitch & Carl, 2016). To be aware and avoid the influence of my beliefs and tacit
theories on the dissertation research, I addressed their influence in my study by
articulating them and looking at their presence during the process.
My interest in the topic of the study is rooted in my belief in the foundational
power of HE to influence societal development. In the time of increasingly dominant
focus in the US on education as a private good as well as HE leadership’s attention to
financial efficiency, I find it crucial to address the topic of HEIs’ strategic response
capacity towards the changing external environment. The current COVID-19 pandemic
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proved one more time the importance of organizational ability for fast adaptation to
what could be the most significant educational landscape change of our lifetime. The
necessity of having the ongoing processes of external environment evaluation and
transferring their results into strategic action becomes more and more important for
researchers to study and for HE practitioners to execute.
By conducting the study in the US, I intend to understand how the leaders of the
US HEIs operate within the abundance of publicly available data on many socioeconomic, political, environmental, and other issues. Unlike some other countries in the
world, the US benefits form a long-standing tradition of independent research in
universities and a myriad of state or private research organizations; therefore, I think it
is very important to know how these available data are being used by HEI leadership.
This brings me to the biases that I was able to identify regarding the study. I
believe HEI leaders are dedicated to improving their respective institutions and,
therefore, to enhancing the national educational system’s capacity to provide scientific
development and support national wellbeing. I also see HE from the perspective of
systems thinking, i.e., as a complex adaptive system that operates in the situation of
“unbounded ontological complex reality” of its environment (Denzin & Lincoln, 2016, p.
619). Therefore, the change in the external environment will inevitably lead to the
organizational change as both are part of the system. Furthermore, I believe that the
desired organizational future is not an evolutionary continuation of today’s situation. It
is an intentional organizational action through change (Ackoff et al., 2006).
Validity, reliability, and trustworthiness of the findings
In order to ensure the validity of the study, two types of triangulation were
employed (Patton, 2015). The triangulation of data was achieved through the use of
different data sources: the interviews as a subjective source and documents as the
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objective one (Denzin & Lincoln, 2018; Yin, 2014). This provided a combination of
formal perspective from official paperwork and experiential personal perspective from
the participants; both worked as a reality check mechanism in relation to each other.
Furthermore, the use of several data sources improved the construct validity as it
provided a variety of perspectives on the strategic processes and the leaders’
understanding of the external organizational environment (Yin, 2014). In addition, the
data validity was addressed by performing a cross-case analysis in two chosen RCUs.
Secondly, the theoretical framework of the study allows data analysis through two
perspectives, sensemaking and organizational theories, which in turn lead to theory
triangulation (Patton, 2015).
HE senior leaders and strategic planning processes or other processes that lead to
the strategic response do not have, respectively, a formal job description or model
designated to this particular type of institution. Therefore, the findings could be
considered partially representative of the leaders’ and decision-making models’ broader
populations (Denzin & Lincoln, 2016). Also, the study is designed to shed light on the
ways in which understanding of the external environment affect strategic response of the
RCUs, which could be considered an “analytical generalization” (p.610) in which the
cases are not representative of the organizational population, but rather are the
opportunities to acquire knowledge about the theoretical model of strategic decisionmaking in higher education (Denzin & Lincoln, 2016).
Another important issue defined by the qualitative research methodologists is data
validation. To ensure my correct understanding of the collected data, I engaged in the
participant check procedure. I have shared the transcribed interviews via secure Penn
Box link with every participant and asked for their feedback on any factual mistakes or
misunderstandings.
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Limitations of the study
Generalizability is a common concern for the case study method; it follows that it
is also a common limitation. While the findings of the study are possibly generalizable to
some extent to the other HEIs of the same type, for instance regarding the strategic
process organization and the external environment constituencies, the potential users of
this research will need to interpret this research through their own organizational and
leadership contexts. COVID-19 pandemic prevented me from including more cases and
decreased possible generalizability of this study via two avenues. One institution I have
gained access to and collected the data appeared to have put their strategy creation on
hold until the end of the pandemic. There were several institutions where initial contacts
advised that their colleagues would not be able to participate because of the significant
pandemic-related workload.
This study is also limited by the little presence of faculty voices in the data. As it
was already mentioned, one of the study goals was to understand the senior leaders’
sensemaking of the organizational external environment and its influence over the RCUs’
strategic responses. While knowing how faculty members make sense of their
environments is important for the overall understanding of university decision-making,
this matter was out of the scope of my study. In addition, in the case of RCU1, per advice
of one of the senior leaders, I contacted a long-serving faculty member who participated
in the creation of the strategy under the previous president. However, despite my several
attempts, they never responded due to the existing conflict between the administration
and faculty, thus leaving their voice out of the data.
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Chapter 4. Findings, Regional Comprehensive University #1
Regional Comprehensive University #1 (RCU1) is a rurally located, four-year
public comprehensive university, and is part of a CA state higher education system. It
serves approximately 10,000 students; most of them belong to groups historically
underrepresented in HE and are the first in their family to earn a college degree. More
than 55 % of RCU1 students are Pell-eligible. The university is surrounded by a small
town of less than 100,000 residents, located in the agriculturally dominated economic
region of the state. The campus is part of the town’s social fabric, providing an accessible
outdoor public space for the residents. RCU1 mostly serves students from the six
surrounding counties, with the three closest ones dominating the enrollment geography.
RCU1 has several colleges that offer degrees in a wide range of subjects, from physics and
computer science to education and arts. The university’s undergraduate student body is
approximately 90 percent of the total number of students with the most popular
bachelor’s degree in business administration.
RCU1 faced several challenges resulting from external economic conditions. It is
important to mention that during the past year (2020), leaders’ decision-making was
dominated by emergency responses to COVID-19 related challenges. Therefore, the
strategy for post-COVID times was not yet defined in the Spring 2021 semester. While
efforts such as COVID-19 testing setup, or the organization of a call center to reach out to
students who were not willing to start or continue their education were extremely
important actions taken during the pandemic, they were emergency responses and were
not a part of strategic decision-making by definition.
One of RCU1’s long-standing challenges was low return on investment (ROI) on
its degrees. The misalignment of the national structures of higher education and
workforce revealed a disconnect between the expectation for the postsecondary degree to
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serve as a means to increase future income and the economic structure of the region. For
example, a unionized worker in the area has higher income than a graduating bachelor’s
degree holder. As the region served by the university is mostly focused on agriculture,
the lack of highly compensated work opportunities for recent graduates reduces their
ROI should they remain in the area. RCU1's graduation rate within 150% of normal time
was 7% lower than the state average for the same institutional type in 2018 (IPEDS Data
Center, 2018). In addition, RCU1 leaders learned that many students might not be fully
benefiting from their degrees as they lack awareness of the career options available to BA
holders. In response, RCU1 launched a career readiness initiative. Through a series of
events that completed over four years, students were supposed to acquire eight career
readiness competencies, such as critical thinking, leadership, and the use of technology
at the workplace. Although this antidote initiative was launched after the Strategic Plan
of the current President was finalized, “it’s a strategy to still meet the goal number one”
of the plan, according to one of the university’s leaders.
Another pronounced challenge for the university was being overenrolled in a time
of diminishing and unpredictable financial support from the state. Undergraduate
enrollment grew more than 10% during the last decade, and university leaders expected
their institution to remain overenrolled despite the COVID-19-related decrease in the
number of incoming students. Despite this enrollment trend, the state of CA did not
provide additional support to cover the cost of education. In addition, RCU1 historically
experienced high volatility in state appropriations. This uncertainty was exacerbated by
the fact that RCU1 was partially financially dependent on the governing body of the
system, which in turn influenced the board of trustees and, therefore, the distribution of
state funding within the system. Despite these financial constraints, leaders at RCU1
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declined to declare impaction, thereby remaining non-selective to maximize access, in
accordance with the dominant objective in the strategic plan.
Decision-Making Processes Implemented to Strategically Respond to the
Environment
To respond to the above challenges, RCU1’s President envisioned the strategic
decision-making as a university-wide, two-stage process: strategic planning (SP) and
Strategic Plan execution monitoring.
Strategic Planning Process
The strategic planning (SP) process was completed over the period of one and a
half years and was finalized several years ago. It resulted in an anonymous vote in favor
of the new eight-year long Strategic Plan from the university community. According to
one of the Cabinet members, every university should engage in the exercise of SP, but
this process in RCU1 was partially motivated by upcoming accreditation procedures.
The current President initiated SP shortly after assuming office. Until that time,
long-standing antagonism between faculty and senior leadership had prevented strategic
planning for over a decade. The 12 year-long disconnect and disagreement between the
academic community and administrators was partially attributed to the non-collegial
culture existing in the university, which manifested in “raising stakes in unprofessional
way “on both sides, in the words of one of the administrators. To “hit the reset button”,
the President started their tenure with a listening tour of the institution, before initiating
university-wide SP. In addition, the new President hired a brand new Cabinet over the
course of their tenure. To resolve the administrators/faculty conflict and help the
campus to communally engage in the SP, the President introduced an administrative
solution: a large strategic planning council (further Council) co-chaired by two leaders:
the Provost and the Speaker of the Faculty Senate (the body representing the General
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Faculty of RCU1). The Council had almost 30 members including the President and all
Vice Presidents, one student, two deans, two professors, four representatives of the
administrative units, a librarian, several alumni, and community members. There were
six non-voting participants in the Council, two of them were external to the university.
The Council was formed to streamline the SP process by merging the functions of two
previously existing groups: the Strategic Plan Working Group and the committee
responsible for the implementation and prioritization of the SP.
Structurally, the President created a new Vice President position to administer
the SP process. The impetus to search for a new Vice President came from the idea to
create a new administrative unit that would inhouse strategic planning, enrollment
services, Registrar, financial aid, outreach, institutional research, and the practice of
innovation. As a result, in addition to the SP process, the responsibilities of this Vice
President also focused on institutional review, enrollment management, and innovation;
and corresponding administrative units were introduced. Having organized the SP
processes in their career before RCU1, the Vice President for SP played critical role in
organizing the process itself as well as keeping track, documenting, and summarizing the
conversations happened during the strategic planning.
Procedurally, according to the university Strategic Plan, it was a bottom-up
planning process executed through the Council and several working groups within it,
that conducted nearly 50 conversations with the campus community seeking
“consultation, gather feedback and/or data, perform environmental scans, and more …
[and] … internal SWOT analysis, which was used to help inform feedback received
through consultation”. The five strategic goals were articulated through iterative
crowdsourcing and feedback sessions via in-person consultations with campus
representatives and governance committees, open forum, and gathering opinions on the
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website on the “community needs and desires for our institution”. The Council defined
the main question for those consultations as follows: “if you could have anything you
want … what would you like to see?” “We went through a detailed SP process that
involved every constituency, faculty, staff, students, community members, parents,
alumni, you name it”. One of the Vice Presidents commented: “All these people provided
input on what was important to [RCU1]”.
Environmental Scanning and Analysis
As a part of its strategic decision-making, RCU 1 undertook environmental
scanning and analysis through a combination of tools, processes, and non-formalized
methods of engagement. The work of leaders with the university’s organizational
environment was dominated by internal, routine, and retrospective sensemaking. The
only tool that RCU1 used exclusively within SP process was the internal SWOT analysis.
The other tools, processes and contributing forms of engagement with the environment
were used by the leaders withing and beyond SP process.
Tools of Environmental Scanning and Analysis
RCU1 had no dominant tool to scan and analyze the organizational environment
across the university. This type of work was manifested in an unsystematic array of
techniques, both routine and occasional, focusing on the internal environment and
operating on two different organizational levels of RCU 1.
University-wide internal SWOT analysis was performed by the Council during the
SP process. RCU1’s Strategic Plan specified that this analysis was internally oriented to
identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats for the university. At the
same time, the SWOT’s results were not present in the Strategic Plan and were not
believed to exist in a finalized documented form. According to one of the Vice Presidents,
“[SWOT] was a part of the data collection … it was used as part of the conversation
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during the strategic plan, but I have not seen that analysis in several years”. The only
available data point was the Council’s SWOT brainstorming session notes. It contained
high-level observations about RCU1’s strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats.
For instance, the Council admitted as a threat the competition from other types of HEIs,
stating that it came from: “two-year colleges, for profit, online, and private” institutions.
The document did not reveal any other specifics on potential competition. Generally, the
RCU1 strategic documentation did not provide clarity if or to what extent the external
factors were incorporated into the conversation about the future of the university.
Another university-wide tool for working with the environment was the annual
report produced by the Institutional Research unit using internal institutional data. It
existed as both a printed and a digital document and in the form of interactive charts and
graphs on the RCU1’s website.
RCU1’s environmental scanning and analysis tools operating on the
administrative unit level were minimally developed and detailed. Some of the
administrative unit heads performed their own small version of the internal SWOT
analysis to identify the threats and complete the audit of the current affairs in their
jurisdiction.
Processes of Environmental Scanning and Analysis
RCU1 implemented several formalized, predominantly routine comprehensive
processes geared towards learning about internal organizational environment of the
university.
The Support Unit Review (SUR) process was led by the Vice President for SP.
This program, on a five-year cycle, was designed using two other HEIs as benchmarks
and, according to the RCU1 website, allowed leaders to gain comprehensive, periodic
data on the effectiveness of all units, their use of resources, and how well they were
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supporting the mission of the university. The process consisted of three steps. First, a
support unit provided an analysis of its current state. The units’ administrators were free
to decide which employees would perform the self-evaluation, but it had to include the
data on the following areas: roles and functions of the unit itself and as a part of the
university, the planning processes in unit and how they support the achievement of the
Strategic Plan of RCU1, effectiveness of the unit in achieving its goals and resource
allocation. This report was then reviewed by the team, mainly comprised of the experts
from outside the unit. According to RCU1’s policies, this team had to have a faculty
member, a staff member, a student, five Vice Presidents or their designated
representatives, a college dean, a President representative, and an internal unit
representative, who was made a part of the team to ensure the “continuity and
appropriate use of the data”. In addition, an external expert was chosen by each unit and
approved by the corresponding Vice President. The external reviewer was asked to
complete a one-and-half day visit to the unit in question and to evaluate the report
produced by the unit. To conclude the process, the review team reported its major
findings and recommendations to the corresponding Vice President or the President. If
all the parties agreed on the recommendations given to the unit, an implementation
agreement was introduced to guide the unit through the changes. This agreement
featured three areas: goals of the unit for the next five years, the strategies used to
accomplish those goals, and the expected results.
Another tool was implemented to learn about the internal environment within
the academic units of RCU1. Academic program review (APR), led by the provost, was
functionally similar to the SUR. As RCU1’s website declared, it was a cyclical 5-7 year
“self-study and planning within [academic] programs” to “strengthen the connections
among the strategic plans of the program, the college, and the university”. The goal of
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this review was to understand the effectiveness of RCU1’s academic programs and
identify student learning outcomes as a core element of them. The process started with
the self-study report by the academic program faculty. It held the program description
and goals, data on its students, faculty, instructional design, resource usage, and
program’s comparison to peer programs. The self-study was reviewed by the college
committee (college employees trained to conduct the APR), the University Educational
Policies Committee, and the Graduate Council. The report was then accompanied by the
external expert review and returned to the internal reviewers seeking recommendations
and the next 7-year plan for the program. As a result of the APR the college review
committee, college dean, and university committee recommended three possible
outcomes for each program: program approved for continuance and expected to
complete the new 7-year plan, program approved for continuance with specified
modification, and program recommended for suspension or discontinuance.
In addition to these review programs, two major university-wide surveys
provided data on the experience of the community: the biannual “Student Health
Survey” and the triannual climate survey for the faculty, administration, and staff.
Another avenue for the Cabinet members to acquire the internal data about RCU1
was the annual report produced by the Institutional Effectiveness and Analytics unit. It
existed in the form of a publicly available annual summary on the internal institutional
data trends for the past five years. These data predominantly described current students’
characteristics, such as age, gender, and academic program, enrollment data, and
graduation/retention rates.
While most of the work to learn about the internal environment was done
routinely in the RCU1, one Vice President mentioned an accidental approach to it within
their jurisdiction. Environmental analysis existed as a skill of a particular subordinate, in
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this case associate Vice President. Their superior explained that this person was able to
conduct:
research and do these sorts of mini briefs, an elaboration on a problem or ... a
predictive model … [They] work really closely with our institutional research
folks … because we don't have any of the data usually, but we can get the data
from them. So [they are] our translator if you will.
It was evident that the Vice President was lucky to have an employee with a
particular set of analytical skills to conduct institutional research, but it was not a
specifically designed function and/or hiring policy within this administrative unit.
While the processes of data collection about the internal environment and its analysis
were mostly formalized, RCU 1 had no formalized process of scanning and analysis of
the external environment (EE). It was a combination of occasional and routine practices
across the administrative units. Two types of practices were clearly identifiable as
contributing to contextual sensemaking.
“On-demand” scanning and analysis of the EE was used by senior leaders when
data were needed to make a particular decision. According to one Cabinet member,
“there are no formulaic … in making big decisions” and data about the EE were searched
for only when needed. In other words, there was no routine scanning process at RCU1
organized to provide continuous data flow about the external factors and developments.
The “on-demand” data mobilization was used by the university management in cases
such as the annual decision-making process regarding how many students the university
could enroll; at least three types of external data were utilized. First the leaders looked at
the demographic data on the incoming pipeline of students: ethnicity, background,
preparation level, etc. Another dataset of interest was about the financial expectations
for the state appropriations. Finally, the senior leaders paid attention to the economic
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impact, i.e., job/internship openings and the survey of the students and local employers
to inform changes in existing programs or the design of the new ones.
Another example when RCU 1 experienced an occasional need for external data
was when the discussion about opening a new school within a new branch campus
occurred several years ago. To define if that was a good investment, besides looking at
the obvious variable of student demand in the area for education opportunities, Cabinet
members sought the data on the needs of local employers, the political context and
support, and the availability of donor support in the area.
Besides “on-demand” mobilization of data, external environment scanning, and
analysis existed as a fraction of the formalized internal environment scan, specifically the
Academic Programs Review. According to the Review documentation on the RCU1’s
website, during the first step, responsible members of the divisions were performing a
self-study, which had a single question that prompted program leaders to discuss
existing competition and the positions of their programs within it.
Contributing Forms of the Engagement with the Environment
RCU1’s senior leaders developed several ways to learn about the internal
environment outside of specifically designed processes or tools.
Along with attending various administrative meetings around campus and the
town hall meetings, the President and their executive team had two other important
avenues for this learning process. One avenue was the continuous conversation among
the Cabinet members, which came as a benefit from the collaborative culture that the
new President introduced. “As each Vice President is dealing with whatever it is, the
President … bring[s] everybody in, so we're always aware”, one of the Vice Presidents
mentioned. This feature of RCU1’s management culture informed otherwise separate
administrative units about the affairs across campus. In addition to the communication
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within the upper management, the exchange of data about the internal organizational
environment between the Cabinet and faculty and staff was evident. According to the
university website, an internal funding program was created to try “innovation in
individual units that promote the goals of the University's new Strategic Plan”. Faculty
and staff applications for funding shed light on what the university’s academic
community considered important to pursue. For instance, several years ago, a bootcamp
for K-12 students was launched to introduce them to the “career” concept and incentivize
them to consider attending college.
RCU1’s President and their Cabinet members developed and used a broad variety
of forms of engagement with the external environment, which contributed to their
contextual sensemaking.
As formalized processes and tools for the interaction with the external
organizational environment were not readily available at the university, leaders instead
systematically relied on their personal knowledge as experienced long-term HE
professionals. For instance, one of the Vice Presidents served at the university for several
decades, and as a result, was able to provide the rest of the Cabinet and the President
with the data on what was happening in the community outside of RCU1: “I can kind of
get a sense and get us into groups to sense what’s happening”.
The President’s personal skills and knowledge in the field of HE were particularly
important for providing the senior leadership with the data about the outside world. The
President kept abreast with the new and best practices in US HE, keeping track of what
was done in other institutions and what had not yet been implemented at RCU1. For
instance, one of RCU1’s strategic responses, the Career Readiness initiative, was
modelled and adapted from a program in a highly-selective private university in CA. In
addition to learning about the developments in other universities, the President urged
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the Cabinet to transfer what they learned into action instead of putting this knowledge
on the shelf: “We should do this; we should try this”. Lastly, in the words of one of the
leaders, the President encouraged their colleagues to engage with the external
organizational environment in a comprehensive way:
to read daily headlines from … “Inside Higher Ed” or “Chronicle” or keep in touch
with other colleagues across the nation, and look at what’s happening nationally,
federally as it applies to higher ed from a political, economic standpoint;
statewide to look at what other campuses are doing that are similar to us in our
campus demographics, and to constantly keep thinking about what else is new,
what else should we be focusing on.
Another way leaders learned about the world outside of the organization was the
engagement with professional groups. Participation in professional networks provided
them with “a sense of what’s on the horizon, you get a sense of whatever is out there” in
the words of one of the administrators. Along with participation in professional
associations (such as CUPA-HR for human resources Vice President), one professional
community helped RCU1’s senior leaders to stay abreast with the news within their scope
of responsibilities. It was the community of corresponding members of the Presidents’
Cabinets across the system. One of the Vice Presidents described it as a very effective tool
of engaging with the external environment:
all the Vice Presidents for each of the areas come together as a unit …we're
learning from each other in the system, what they are dealing with externally … I
learn a lot about what to think about when I'm looking at our environment, what
is coming your way.
Another distinct professional group, the Community Ambassadors, while created
to serve the purpose of “identifying opportunities to establish and build business and
community partnerships”, provided leaders with a possibility to receive data from the
regional community. These community members are “ the eyes and ears” on the ground,
responding to the President’s request to report any concerns about the university that
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they hear in the community: “They look out for the external stuff, and they bring it to the
table and say: ‘Hey … have you guys thought about this, what are we doing for Hispanics
in the central or this region?’” in the words of one administrative leader.
While most of the non-formalized engagement with the external environment
happened through personal transfer of knowledge among the leaders and community
members, there was another way RCU1 senior leaders learned about it. They did it
through research published in both professional and higher education journals, along
with looking for publications on “best practices”. Many also used internet-based
resources to access public data, such as monitoring county and state web resources (ex:
County Office of Education website data and monitoring social networks within the
community).
Lastly, there was an involuntary way of learning about the external environment
through an instruction from the university system’s office as it responded to challenges it
faced. While RCU1 had strategic freedom it also had to comply with the system’s
management initiatives, such as the initiative aimed to increase the number of students
across the system graduating on time. The system’s management existed as a unique
piece of RCU1’s external organizational environment, forcing the university to shift its
attention and resources in particular ways; as one of the Vice Presidents described it:
when system’s “office says, ‘Now you’re going to be doing this’ – ‘Okay, we’re going to be
doing this, right?’”
Environmental Scanning and Analysis Configuration Limitations
The major limitation of environmental scanning and analysis at RCU1 was their
internal focus. The underlying condition of this phenomenon was simple: it was
generally difficult for senior leaders to pay attention to the outside world, “because most
people … pay attention to what is here and now, in their face”, according to one senior
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leader. Another possible influence was that HEIs are complex organizations with enough
going on to occupy all available attention bandwidth of the leadership. In the words of
one of the Vice Presidents, leaders are “oftentimes ... just stuck in our own little bubbles
on our campus …we're not seeing what’s happening out there”.
This internally-oriented attitude could have been a factor of the limited
knowledge about the external environment and its diminished role in the RCU1’s
strategic decision-making overall. In the opinion of one of the Cabinet members, “when
we do strategic planning or we are doing environmental analysis … we think insular, and
we may minimize the external threats or opportunities, and it may be because sometimes
we don’t have that knowledge”. Therefore, when faced with the long-term decisionmaking the university predominantly looked for the opportunities within the
organization and only then sought confirmation from the outside world. As one of the
Vice Presidents commented:
Internally, we look at where is the growth? What does growth look like? What is
the competition? Can we collaborate with them? What … do the local, state, and
government agencies in our area ... have in mind … expectations for the
university, because sometimes they have different things in mind. They may or
may not be promoting our growth.
Another significant problematic zone regarding the work with the environment at
the university was understanding the future trends of the major external factors.
First, due to the pre-existing conflict between the faculty and prior senior
leadership, the campus was still in the process of resolving those issues. This focus on the
past made it harder for the leadership to discuss the future with the campus community.
On the process side, the Cabinet members were using tools for anticipating the trends in
the environment. Most of the attention in this work was paid to the short/medium-term
(2-5 years) projections of the data concerning the incoming student populations: the
number of students, their level of college readiness, their ability to pay for the education
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at RCU1, etc. While the enrollment short-term data are “the most comfortable and solid”,
according to one of the Vice Presidents, it created limitations for the areas where the
planning lag would be longer, such as physical campus development or hiring a tenured
faculty member.
As the work with the environment was dominated by the internally focused issues
and short-term planning, environmental analysis at the RCU1 in many cases was a result
of the incoming task, not a constant search of the future developments and
opportunities, i.e., it was reactive. Not only was the university potentially missing out on
possibilities, but because the challenges in the external environment at the RCU1 were
addressed as they came in, this contributed to the unfocused strategy of the university:
“you think you’ve got your priorities figured for this year and then … you are … going in a
different direction”.
Time constraints were also a significant limitation preventing senior leaders from
engaging with their respective environments. One senior leader explained that many
people have difficulty to stay abreast with the myriad of factors and actors constituting
their external surroundings, “because they’re just so embroiled in the here and now,
managing, that it's hard to step away and look at what’s bigger.” Overall, the Cabinet
members experienced significant workload and did not have enough time for their
individual learning: “I wish we encouraged more learning and ... and thought time, you
know, individual time to read”.
While RCU1 senior leaders and their subordinates participated in different
professional groups and events, predominantly conferences, there was no organized
feedback procedure after those events to reflect and document the learnings about the
external environment.
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Although RCU 1 had the institutional data gathered in the annual report by the
Institutional Research Unit, this document lacked accessibility due to its size. It did not
allow “the campus to digest that information and keeping it refreshing … if your dataset
is this big, then where do you start?”, one of the Vice Presidents explained. As a result,
while one chapter of this report communicated the progress of the Strategic Plan
implementation, it was not highly utilized as a data point to reflect on the outcome of the
Strategic Plan.
The Resulting Strategic Plan
Simultaneous with the environmental scanning stage, the Council carried out
consultation with the campus community. The leaders were crowdsourcing the
aspirations of the community for the university. After the initial set of in-person
conversations and the SWOT analysis, the second phase started with a university-wide
open forum. During this step the leaders continued to gather feedback of the university
community through in-person conversations and the university website to get the
“clarified and contextualized sense of campus and community needs and desires for our
institution”, according to RCU1’s strategic documentation. After all the consultations
were completed and the Council produced the final draft of the Strategic Plan, it was
presented to the campus community to seek feedback. RCU1’s leaders made the drafting
process transparent. According to the university strategic documentation, “as the
document was revised, changes were posted online, and various specific questions could
be returned to the campus community for feedback via representative consultation and
online feedback”. Lastly, the final review was done by the Academic Senate and other
governance groups, and the Strategic Plan was approved unanimously. After that the
final draft was approved by the President.
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The resulting Strategic Plan was a very complex document: it had five
overarching goals, each with four to six objectives, each of which had from four to 12
strategies. It contained a total of 140 action items to support the goals. While the goals,
objectives, and strategies were different in scope, there was no prioritization among all
the items across all levels in the Strategic Plan.
The five overarching goals were broadly articulated. RCU1 wanted to be a
student-oriented institution, deliver educational products providing transformational
experiences, be innovative, be administratively efficient, and develop the relationships
with their local communities. Under the first, very important in the words of RCU1’s
leaders, goal - to be a student-oriented institution - there were five objectives and almost
40 strategies. For instance, one of the objectives was to increase graduate enrollments.
The strategies to achieve this objective were the following: to identify the existing
programs with the highest potential to grow graduate enrollments, contemplate the
creation of new cutting-edge programs, increase transfer to graduate programs, adjust
workload for faculty in graduate education.
While the Strategic Plan was very comprehensive, some of the objectives and
strategies remained abstract. One of the Strategic Plan goals stated the university’s
innovative approach to its future. For instance, it declared that RCU1 will open several
cutting-edge interdisciplinary programs to promote entrepreneurship and innovation,
although did not provide any details on those educational products.
The resulting strategic plan was a systematization of collective aspirations of the
campus community and confirmed RCU1’s previous commitment to stay non-impacted.
Monitoring Execution of the Strategic Plan
For SP monitoring purposes, the Strategic Plan existed in the form of a digital
spreadsheet, which was difficult to work with. As one university administrator pointed
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out, the document was “a bit clunky … what’s the overarching goal, what’s the objective,
what’s the strategy, when are we working on it?” Another leader highlighted that every
year Vice Presidents had to “work with their divisions to figure out which of these – this
giant list of items – their division wants to prioritize for that year”.
RCU1 had two avenues of monitoring the execution of the strategic plan: routine
weekly President’s Cabinet meetings and Cabinet’s retreats several times per year. The
Council that participated in the strategy creation was not a part of the monitoring. The
Strategic plan declared that the annual progress to be presented to the Council every
year, but there was no evidence of that happening.
The weekly President’ s Cabinet meeting was the main tool for routine discussion
of plan execution. “There’s not a strategic planning committee that meets once a month
or a quarterly … we look at it as a Cabinet”, one of the administrators said.
Discussion of the plan also occurred at retreats held by the President's Cabinet
several times a year. While all the Cabinet members participated in these retreats, the
productivity of retreats varied dramatically, in the opinion of the various leaders. One of
the Vice Presidents described the retreat as follows:
The Strategic Plan was a big chunk of that retreat. For two days we had
significant time to review our progress. So, this is an internal … mechanism for
[the Strategic Plan] monitoring from the President’s point of view, but from a
university point of view … we have a strategic planning committee, and that
committee is kept updated.
This perception contradicts another leader’s take on the retreat as a means to
work on strategy:
[The Strategic Plan is] an agenda item, and one [person] talks about it for an
hour and [we] move on with our day. I don’t think there’s really any substantive
conversation about it internally … we don’t review that together, and we don’t
make decisions about it. It is just sort of there if you will.
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The documented representation of the Strategic Plan monitoring was a chapter in
an annual report produced by the institutional review unit. The report contained campus
data on enrollment, advancement, faculty and staff characteristics, educational
programs, as well as graduation and retention rates for the past five years. One chapter
was dedicated to the selected achievements of different divisions regarding the Strategic
Plan. The chapter described the actions taken under the strategic goal and objective
organized by the responsible party up to the current moment.
Strategic Decision-Making in Administrative Units
Along with the university-wide strategic decision-making, RCU1’s leaders used
two types of within-unit configurations, which fell into two categories.
Mostly, Vice Presidents, as administrative unit leaders, used tactical planning
instead of strategic sessions to monitor and execute the implementation of the strategic
plan, which was similar to the President’s Cabinet retreat practice. Once or twice per year
they reviewed the progress towards the Strategic Plan implementation and set the goals
for the next planning period. These data were reported to the Vice President responsible
for the SP: division heads reported “where [they were] at, and what [they] have
accomplished, what maybe isn’t so much … a priority in light of the Strategic Plan, or
what has really become more in focus”, one of the leaders clarified.
Several Vice Presidents went beyond tactical planning and employed different
types of strategic exercises in their units. For instance, one used a day-long
crowdsourcing exercise to define the values within their jurisdiction, similar to the one
during the university-wide strategic planning several years ago. All employees of the Vice
President’s jurisdiction engaged in a series of discussions and voted on their most
important shared values. This work provided a sense of direction and unity among these
employees. Another leader used once-a-quarter strategic meetings across their units of
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responsibility to pause the tactical planning and to check whether the divisions were on
track to support the university-wide Strategic Plan. The senior leader did so by asking
their subordinate administrators: “let’s reflect, let’s think about what we’re doing, where
we are, is that helping us think about our [strategic] goals?”.
Strategic Decision-Making Configuration Benefits and Limitations
RCU1’s configuration of strategic decision-making was beneficial but also limited
and difficult for the university’s senior leaders.
To overcome existing distrust between faculty and administration, the President
invested substantial energy in an inclusive strategic planning process. This inclusive
approach was unanimously recognized by Cabinet members, one of whom remarked:
I was impressed with the way it was organized because … the new President …
spent a lot of time listening on campus, talking to everybody, visiting with
everybody. … [they] … started getting everybody prepared: ‘There’s going to be a
strategic planning committee, we’re going to engage in strategic planning, there
will be a new provost’.
Further, the President organized the work of their Cabinet based on a culture of
cooperation. As described by one of the senior leaders, the President created:
a collaborative team, where all the members of [the] team understood they must
work with each other, they cannot just manage their own division, they … have to
be collaborative and they have to be involved and understand the variety of issues
of spaces and help to move initiatives together by working together.
The creation of this collaborative approach was echoed and validated by the VicePresidents several years later, as one of them stated: “I think we work very closely as a
Cabinet … we’re not siloed”.
By modeling inclusivity and demanding collaboration, the President was able to
organize strategic discussion that included as much of the university community as
possible and allowed the Cabinet to work collectively towards a shared goal. As a result,
the Strategic Plan passed campus vote by the Academic Senate and other governance
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groups unanimously, achieving buy-in from a wide range of community members and
contributing to resolving the preexisting conflict between the administrators and faculty.
While the success in creating an inclusive strategic planning process and
producing a Strategic Plan was a critical step in moving RCU1 forward, the organization
of strategic decision-making had limitations and problematic elements. Probably the
most prominent were the difficulties with focusing and prioritizing within the strategic
plan. It was difficult for leaders to prioritize their efforts. This led to the situation where
everything and nothing was a priority. One of the Vice Presidents explained the situation
thus:
Number one thing for our campus to do – is prioritize … right now we have
probably 30 priorities, which means we have no priorities. And so, there’s no
strategic momentum toward any one of them, because there are people going in
30 different directions.
One of the possible reasons for this lack of focus was that the new President’s
Cabinet chose not to decline any ideas or desires of the university community on what
should be included into the final Strategic Plan. While senior leaders clearly saw the
possibility of ending up with an overloaded and non-executable Strategic Plan, they did
not want to risk the still fragile communication between the administration and faculty.
Difficulties with prioritizing also resulted in overly broad strategic goals;
therefore, any new initiative occurring in administrative units could be retrofitted into
them. An argument could be made that this was a benefit, as RCU1 had an eight-year
long Strategic Plan and the broadness of the goals allowed for incorporation of ideas
after the plan took action. On the other hand, retrofitting actions back into the Strategic
Plan indicated that goals were formed to incorporate the ideas of the community and did
not provide enough direction for the university leaders. According to one Vice President,
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strategic leaders were “mapping to the existing goals … backwards. We fit whatever it
was we were doing into where it fits in the strategic plan”.
At the same time, the Strategic Plan contained around 140 “tactics” or action
items, which made it “too specific … there was way too much detail in … the plan, it
didn’t give the flexibility to those that executed it”, one of the senior administrators
noted. Another difficulty with having many items which must be monitored was tracking
their progress and checking things off the list. One administrator mentioned that there
was still opportunity for organizational structures to be created, so that all the tactics
could be accessible in one space, instead of being “all over the place … it just needs to be
put back into the appropriate strategic planning goal”.
While the unanimous buy-in of the Strategic Plan was achieved by crowdsourcing
ideas from the community, there were still some perspectives and voices not represented
in that plan, in particular, students and student support administrative units staff. One
of the senior administrators attributed this to the absence of a safe environment for some
people to share their thoughts, due to the conflict between faculty and administration
during the tenures of the two previous Presidents. They further explained: “If it had been
an amazing President, that would have been here for a long time and retired, and this
President followed that President, I think it would have been a totally different story”.
While the parts of the university community felt not heard during the strategic
planning process, simultaneously senior leadership struggled with the capacity of the
campus to engage in strategy creation. The strategic planning skills of mid-level
academic leadership were a particular concern of the President’s Cabinet. Deans and
department chairs not only failed to initiate thinking about RCU1’s opportunities for
development within their units of responsibility, they did not even involve their faculty
into the strategic conversation. They did not see the strategic planning process as an
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opportunity to think about a possible new path for the university by being “visionfocused”, but instead they saw the process of strategy creation as a crisis and wanted to
manage through it with as few changes as possible. The limited skillset of this tier of
management to fully participate in strategic planning could have been the result of an
organizational phenomenon – the “learned helplessness” of the campus community. One
of the President’s Cabinet members described it as follows: the campus “is … frozen in
time … because they had learned to become helpless, they don’t do anything. ‘We have
no money, there’s nothing we can do, so let’s just keep things … as close to the norm as
possible’”. The faculty members’ attitude seemed to somewhat improve over the process
of strategic planning, but the lack of motivation to move the institution forward largely
persisted.
After the strategic planning was completed and once the plan took action, senior
administrators made an important reflection. They recognized a limitation in the nature
of strategic planning: it was reactive, not proactive. Instead of pausing and trying to
understand what the future would bring, how the institution could foresee the changes in
the external environment and proactively lead society into the future, most of the time
Cabinet members reacted to immediate developments in their organizational
surroundings:
we … may create a great program, but it was really a reactionary program, not a
proactive one … we don’t necessarily do a good job of using our mental scans.
Eventually we’ll have a new updated census, right? And using that sort of external
stuff to say: ‘This is how we need to plan as an institution’. And it’s more very
much in-time planning, you’re building the plane as you’re flying it. It’s much
more in-time, much shorter length of looking at things … we see this in seniors,
we see this in juniors. We haven’t done a very good job of saying: ‘This is what’s
coming up … in junior high graph demographics and things like that’.
Significant workload also contributed to the leaders’ limited ability to be futureoriented in establishing strategy. As it is common in US HE, Cabinet members were

103

overloaded with by their responsibilities, which prevented them from having a necessary
pause in their schedules to reevaluate the strategic goals. As one of the Vice Presidents
described their everyday work: “you’re always in ‘go-go-go’ mode, you’re not reflecting
and you’re not taking time to think through, and I think as leadership we need to afford
our people that time. It can’t always be about the next big thing”
Decision-Making Process that Influenced the Strategic Planning
The relationship between RCU 1 and its public four-year system management
influenced the university’s strategic decision-making. While RCU1 had absolute freedom
to create its own strategic plan, which it did, the system’s management implemented
initiatives across campuses that partially affected what senior leaders could accomplish.
It was expected that the Strategic Plan would support the overall course of the university
system. As system-wide initiatives were financially supported by its management, it led
to peer competition for available recourses within the system, and motivated RCU1’s
leaders to include the system’s management agenda into its Strategic Plan. For example,
the system’s office launched an initiative to increase in-time graduation rates across
campuses. While this initiative reinforced RCU1’s leader’s attention on graduation rates
and added an objective under one of the strategic goals, it did not change their strategic
direction of remaining a non-impacted campus.
Leaders’ Sensemaking of Their Organizational Environment
Throughout the SP process, RCU1 leaders mostly associated their external
organizational environment with their geographical region of service. In the words of one
of the Vice Presidents RCU1’s surroundings were very definable as the adjacent
geographical catchment area: “For this institution that is pretty easy. We are a regional
institution … and we have a six county service region, but the majority of our students
come from three of those six counties”. Senior leaders also viewed their region of service
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and the students that come from it as a part of the community of other constituencies in
the area, such as stakeholders and employers. In addition, the leaders saw great
importance in seeing their region in a larger context of the state and the nation.
While the President and the Cabinet wanted to start a future-oriented
conversation during the SP process, the preexisting conflict with the academic
community partially prevented them from employing prospective sensemaking. None of
the tools that senior leaders chose to use during the environmental scanning reinforced
the necessity of work with the future of the environment.
RCU1 leaders routinely made sense of their external environment beyond the SP
process by using contributing forms of the engagement, such as conferences or
participation in professional groups. The tools that were used specifically for SP process
were occasional (non-routine) and allowed them to make sense of their external
environment during the particular period of study. After the Strategic Plan was ratified
by the Academic Senate and the President, the leaders employed neither a routine tool
for evaluation of the Strategic Plan, nor a regular formalized environmental scanning, To
routinely understand their university’s internal environment, they used academic and
administrative unit reviews.
During the SP process, RCU1’s leaders made sense about their environments
from both the micro-and macro-contextual perspective. However, the micro-contextual
approach dominated: the tools leaders used during the environmental scanning process
provided an internally-focused way of seeing the surroundings: internal SWOT analysis
and crowdsourcing of aspirations.
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Working Towards Success
The two major strategic responses, the declaration of non-impaction and the
career readiness initiative were generally successful and beneficial to RCU1’s
performance.
The major strategic decision made during the process of the strategic planning
confirmed university’s commitment to student access by not declaring an impaction,
which subsequently made faculty work harder and overcrowded classrooms. Regardless
of the difficulties, the institution has managed to both stay overenrolled and increase the
retention and graduation rates, which leaders considered a crucial factor of the Strategic
Plan success. In the words of one of the Vice Presidents,
the reason I say we have done well is because we have not only taken in more
students but our retention, graduation rates have gone up, both four years and six
years. I did not know that ... would happen, but that has happened.

Since the Strategic Plan took action the first-time full-time freshmen students
cohort size increased by approximately ten percent, according to the Institutional Review
report published in 2020. Retention rates had also increased during the academic year
2018-19 (the most recent available data point): approximately four percent for the firstyear students, approximately two and three percent for second and third-year students
accordingly. Four-year graduation rates improved by almost six percentage points,
followed by one percent increase for five-years graduation rate. Six-years graduation rate
was on the increasing trend but experienced a decrease of one percent in 2019.
The Career Readiness initiative started its full operation in 2020 and is still in
developing stages. Nonetheless, according to the Institutional Review report, by the end
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of the year, 20 businesses and agencies had signed on to become its founding partners,
which served as a proof of success.
The current Strategic Plan performed significantly better than its predecessor, that
was shelved due to the conflict between faculty and administrators. It triggered the
institutionalizations of several high impact practices across campus and is still being
used as a guiding document in leaders’ work: “it is still very much thought of in many of
our meetings … still has validity that we should still continue to utilize … and in sort of
setting the path of the university”, one of the Vice Presidents underscored.
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Chapter 5. Findings, Regional Comprehensive University #2
Regional comprehensive university #2 (RCU2) is a more than 100 years old, a
suburban four-year private not-for-profit comprehensive university. Its main campus
holds approximately 70% of all RCU2 educational programs, while several regional
campuses make up the rest 30%. It is a Hispanic-serving institution of approximately
10,000 students; most of them come from middle and low-income backgrounds, belong
to groups historically underrepresented in HE, and are the first in their family to earn a
college degree. Half of RCU2 students are Pell-eligible, and more than 90% receive
financial aid at federal, state, or intuitional level. The university is located in southern
California and is surrounded by a small town of approximately 30,000 residents, which
is in turn part of a densely populated metropolitan area of several million people. RCU2
mostly serves students who reside within 50 mile radius from the university. RCU2 has
four colleges which offer degrees in a wide-range of subjects, from chemistry and
information science to education and arts. The university’s undergraduate student body
is approximately 60% of the total number of students; the most popular bachelor’s
degree is in psychology.
RCU2 faced several challenges resulting from external economic conditions, both
on the national and regional level. Following the national trend, California will face a
demographic cliff in the near future. As far as available demographic projections can
foresee, the number of high school graduates is supposed to start a continuous decline in
2024 (Bransberger et al., 2020). By 2036 the decrease is supposed to constitute 15
percent for public and private schools graduates cumulatively (Bransberger et al., 2020).
In addition, the larger US demographic trend showed no promise for any increase in the
number of high school graduates throughout the next century, as the US is on the verge
of “sansdemic – ‘without people’” (Hetrick et al., 2021). Therefore, the existing higher
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educational market for the undergraduate students was disappearing without a viable
possibility of regaining the number of high-school graduates. As RCU2 is a 95%
enrollment dependent institution, the approaching demographic shift is its imminent
economic threat. Changes in demography sharpened RCU2’s need for several issues to be
addressed. First, the already intense competition for the shrinking undergraduate
population of potential students nationally, but especially in the southern California, that
had a large pool of HEIs, was becoming severe. RCU2 had to address the challenge of
serving non-traditional students better, as existing educational programs were not fully
suited for a student population that was becoming older, tended to be married, and
seeking to study part-time. RCU2 had to change to offset the shortfall of undergraduates
by working in the markets of the future: introducing more graduate and professional
programs, as well as flexible programs for working adults.
Another challenge for RCU2 was affordability of higher education in the US. The
annually increasing tuition brought many students, especially from families of modest
economic means, to the breaking point of their ability or willingness to attend college.
The average cost of attendance for a full-time undergraduate student at RCU2 was
comparable with the organizational population of CA four-year private non-for-profit
suburban institutions in the 2019-2020 academic year (IPEDS Data Center, 2019).
RCU2 saw no future in expecting the net tuition growth from regular tuition increase in
the foreseeable future and wanted to respond by understanding their student population
better. “How do you serve them well, how do you fit within this context and how can you
manage and moderate your expenses, such that you can serve them for the net tuition
that you can realistically expect to realize”, as one of the Vice Presidents described the
institutional attitude. As most of the RCU2 students were Pell eligible, the university
provided institutional financial aid to more than 90% of its students. If RCU2 was to
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continue to increase the amount of aid to attract new students as the competition for
them intensified, that would be “a race to the bottom”, in the words of an administrative
leader. That would mean financing the aid from the margin, which would endanger the
financial health of the university, and ultimately its mission to support low-income and
underrepresented in HE students.
At the regional level, both the state of California and the region surrounding
RCU2 were challenged by significant change in its population age structure. In other
words, the California population was aging faster than the national trend; the share of
residents older than 65 was projected to almost double between 2010 and 2030
(Stanford Center on Longevity, 2021, September 22). This was a major factor in the
increasing need for healthcare professionals at all levels. The number of job openings in
this industry was projected to grow by 27% from 2010 to 2030, with most of the need
accounted for by nurses (26%), allied health specialists (25%), and healthcare support
specialists (36%) (Carnevale et al., 2012).
To respond to the above challenges RCU2 took a number of actions. The
university kept diversifying its academic portfolio by adding educational products for
graduate and non-traditionally aged working adults (online undergraduate and graduate
programs, non-degree, and non-credit offerings), decided not to raise tuition rate for the
fall semester of 2021, and expanded on their decade of experience with providing online
programs. These initiatives were important to the institutional mission, but RCU2 put its
major bet on a transformative strategic initiative: the opening of a new College of Health.
The College of Health was an umbrella for a broad range of healthcare-related
educational programs, some of which already existed in RCU2. The new college
responded to the three environmental challenges RCU2 experienced. It was designed to
address the demographic shift by attracting traditional full-time students, as well as
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transferring students with associate degrees. The cost of attendance was targeted
through competitive pricing and very high probability of post-graduation employment
due to the pronounced shortage of healthcare professionals in the local labor market. In
addition, RCU2 aimed to fulfill the regional aspect of its mission by expecting their
future graduates to return to their communities instead of leaving the area and help the
region to turn the corner in the healthcare labor shortage. Importantly, the College of
Health was also designed to address RCU2’s own student health, both physical and
mental.
Decision-Making Process Implemented to Strategically Respond to the
Environment
RCU2’s President envisioned the configuration of its strategic decision-making as
a university-wide, two-stage process: strategic planning (SP) and Strategic Plan
execution monitoring. In addition, the university implemented a Strategic Enrollment
Plan.
Two full SP processes were completed over the course of the President’s more
than 10-year tenure. A major feature of the President’s leadership over strategy in both
SP processes was, from the beginning, the articulation of strategy through three defining
characteristics. The President was confident that the only way for the university to
continue to exist for another 100 years was to be “distinct, competitive, and relevant”, in
the words of one of the leaders. These three-dimensional lenses became “the compass”
for strategy creation at RCU2, according to one administrative leader. By “distinct” the
President meant different. RCU2 could not just state that their strategy was to care for
students; that would not make the university distinct from other HEIs. The university
needed educational products that nobody else offered. At the same time, those programs
needed to be “relevant” to the outside world. As the President explained, a program in
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calligraphy would be very distinct, but likely not relevant. Lastly, RCU2 had to be
competitive in offering the highest value possible for the students’ money.
The President started their tenure over a decade ago and launched the first SP
process almost immediately. It was completed eight years ago, and the resulting strategic
plan was active until last year. The President themself was a big change for the
university; the previous leader served for 25 years and belonged to a different religious
tradition. The new President embraced change by leading the first SP with a tripartite
roadmap, envisioned as a metaphorical “braid” composed by a Strategic Vision, a
fundraising plan to support this vision, and a physical campus master plan to support
both the vision and the fundraising. It was a bold and innovative approach, as RCU2 was
a religious institution in the past and many of its employees did not see fundraising as an
acceptable behavior. The fundraising goal was set to increase the endowment by almost
400%, which was completed a year ahead of schedule.
After the success of the first SP the President started the second one, which
eventually led to the design of the College of Health. Two years before the first strategic
plan was to expire, the President communicated to the campus community that strategy
was an ongoing process, and it was time to think beyond the existing plan.
The second SP process benefited significantly from being led by the same
President, because senior leaders were able to have the continuity of institutional
strategy, sharp focus on the future, and continued differentiation of Strategic Vision
from Plan.
At the early stage of SP, senior leaders wanted to ensure the new iteration
continued the existing strategy, not starting a brand new one and abandoning what was
already done. They analyzed the previous strategic plan’s progressing or completed
initiatives, action items that were no longer relevant, and necessary initiatives that were
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not started yet. Even though some Cabinet members and Board of Trustees’ (furtherBoard) members involved in the SP had changed since the first plan was created, having
the new strategy development in the hands of effectively the same leadership provided a
solid foundation for the second iteration.
The second SP was characterized by the President and their Cabinet’s
understanding and focus on the fact that the strategy is the work with the future. As the
campus was more mature, having engaged in the SP before, this time the leaders were
able to take a bolder look into the future and persuade the campus to follow. The
President wanted to address organizational inertia, that in a nutshell could be described
as: “We have always done it this way” by stressing the importance of paying attention to
the development of competition not only within California but nationally, as HEIs from
across the country started to compete for California high school graduates while their
own markets evaporated. In addition, RCU2 leaders were aware that US society had
reached the point where students effectively must attend college to become employable.
Hence, they were responsible for identifying future jobs for which they must prepare
students. As the diversity of students would keep intensifying in the foreseeable future,
leaders would have to change university operations to meet their shifting needs. One of
the Vice Presidents noted, “if we are not paying attention to who our students are going
to be 5 or 10 years from now, we have got a huge problem”. By stating “if we're going to
survive, just survive, we have got to be future-focused”, the President set the focus on the
future as a leitmotif of the SP.
RCU2 President’s Cabinet and Board employed a clear distinction between the
Strategic Vision and the Strategic Plan. It allowed them to separate future-focused ideas
and strategic goals from tactical execution plans. It helped avoid getting lost in the
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hundreds of tasks in the plan, while keeping the ten thousand feet view of strategy goals
and initiatives in the constant eyesight.
Strategic Planning Process
Structurally, the President created a new Director of the Office of the President
and Board Affairs (further - Director of the President’s Office) position to lead and
administer SP process; and corresponding administrative unit was created. In addition,
this leader was charged with leading several cross-unit initiatives and projects, including
the opening of a new research center. After this position was filled, the President
announced to the campus community that the Director of the President’s office was in
charge of the SP process. This administrative leader of the SP was a position with no
authority over the President’s executive Cabinet, the Board, or wider university
community. The Director of the President’s office had to organize the SP process using
influence and partnership instead.
Procedurally, the SP process took approximately two years; the Board approved
the Strategic Vision in the fall of 2020. The discussion and approval of the Strategic
Vision and Plan was organized in stages of iterative communication of the President’s
Cabinet, the Board, and the wider university community. The Board ratified the vision
statement, strategic themes, and university-wide strategic goals one year into the SP.
Half a year later they approved the transformative initiative to create the College of
Health, and concluded by approving the whole strategy by the end of the second year.
Based on the ratified strategy, RCU2 leaders put together strategic plans (both
university-wide and at the level of administrative units and colleges) to realize the
Strategic Vision.
RCU2 senior leaders wanted the SP process to be comprehensive by including the
opinions of the administrative and academic units as well as to be able to progress
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towards the finalization of strategy in a particular amount of time. To do so, the
President had to trigger a cultural shift by suggesting a recommendatory role to the
academic units. As one of the leaders described, the President encouraged the university
community to participate as much as possible and, at the same time, introduced specific
distribution of the responsibilities across the participants:
‘[The President is] listening to your recommendations.’ And with clarity as much
as possible, saying: ‘While the President and the Board will make all the final
decisions, your job is to make recommendations, and for us - to listen. And then
we will have an informed decision that we will make … You make all the
recommendations, and [the President] makes decisions.
The SP process began with an annual Board retreat. In the brainstorming
exercise with the Board, RCU2 leaders evaluated general external data on state
population, student demographics, degrees, and professions they anticipated covering.
More than 30 members of the board offered their professional experience in a variety of
fields: engineering, real estate, law, public services, food, and chemical industries, with
the majority of the members from the same field of expertise concentrated in healthcare,
high technology, and educational industries. This retreat produced general ideas on
potential foci for RCU2’s future strategy. This was the moment where the interest in
catering to the healthcare industry was reintroduced in a vague sense: “We should really
focus on health, we don't know what that means, but we should make sure that it is a
part of the next strategic plan”, as one of the leaders described it.
The idea to educate students for the healthcare industry was not brand new to the
President or the Board. They were in discussion about it together and with their
respective professional communities for several years prior. During the first SP, RCU2
had articulated a broad goal of assessing community needs and the implementation
process for academic programs in several industries such as media, logistics, sustainable
natural resources, entrepreneurship, and healthcare services. In between strategic
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planning processes, the President’s belief in RCU2’s health-related future grew. Five
years ago, they outsourced a report to consultancy company to answer the question:
“What professions are going to be needed the most in the adjacent to the RCU2
metropolitan area of 6 million people 15 years from now?” A long list of professions
pertinent to two industries came out of this research: technology and healthcare, with
the latter having most of the top 20 occupations. Taking the socio-economic
characteristics of RCU2 students into account, the authors were asked to identify the
degrees obtainable for them. Medical degrees were found unlikely to be in demand due
to their high tuition fees. On the contrary, professionals in nursing, allied health
specialists (such as early childhood development specialists), and healthcare support
(such as physician assistants, health services managers) would be in high demand. The
President took the list to the Board for the initial conversation and over time proposed to
open a new college, which would house the existing health-related programs and offer
new ones.
The decision to choose healthcare over technology was also partially catalyzed by
the Board’s collective professional experiences. In the words of one of the Vice
Presidents,
Our decision was to move towards health … we have a number of health
professionals on the Board, … a lot of donors, and people that were connected to
the university that were in the health profession … So that was a big push for us
to move towards health initiatives.
After the initial Board retreat, the Strategy Advisory Task Force (further – Task
Force) was created. It was charged with the administration of the major steps of the SP:
environmental scanning; organization of communication between the university
community and senior leadership (President’s Cabinet and Board); documentation,
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analysis, and synthesis of the content of the strategic work; drafting and finalizing
strategic documentation; and reporting the results to the senior leadership.
The Task Force had 12 members and was co-chaired by the Director of the
President’s Office and a faculty member from one of RCU2’s colleges. Due to the double
leadership, the faculty influence was the most pronounced during this stage of the SP.
According to the strategic documentation, the members of this group included a staff
representative (Chief Human Resources Officer), library and Faculty Senate staff, faculty
members from all of the colleges, regional and online campuses representative, President
of the student association, a member of the Board, an alumnus, and a strategic planning
consultant. Their main responsibility was to act as liaisons for the populations they were
representing. The liaisons’ based design was chosen over the open forum one because of
what RCU2 learned during its first SP process. While leaders continually held open
forums and invited everyone to participate, there were university community members
who felt unheard and never participated in any meetings by the end of the process.
Process and Tools of Environmental Scanning and Analysis
RCU2 undertook environmental scanning and analysis through a combination of
processes, tools, and non-formalized methods of engagement. The work of the leaders
with the university’s organizational environment was dominated by external, occasional,
and prospective sensemaking.
Having already used a consulting company’s report as a preliminary tool for of
the external environmental scanning, RCU2 leaders embarked on the first stage of the
SP.
To add momentum to the SP process, Task Force members engaged in extensive
scanning of the external environment, predominantly via available research. It was
intentionally a future-focused, externally oriented, non-formalized process, that took
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about a year to complete and contributed to leader’s contextual and prospective
sensemaking.
The Task Force engaged in the search of publications in two major spheres:
general socio-economic conditions in the US (sources like Forbes and Bloomberg) and
research on trends in higher education (such as the Chronicle of Higher Education).
They developed a set of keywords to focus their scanning process, which, in this phase,
was essentially a literature review. RCU2 leaders looked at publications discussing
general higher education landscape in the US, higher education forecasting in terms of
student demographics, finances, and student loan debt. They also paid attention to the
articles on the general population’s perspectives about higher education, and specifically
its value.
Document-wise, the environmental scan was not a formalized process. As the
data set grew bigger, the Task Force members kept their document organized as a shared
file, where they put the summaries of the publications they found and could share with
their corresponding divisions or units for discussion.
The environmental scanning process helped to shape the understanding of the
external context which RCU2’s leaders found crucial for strategy formation; later, they
had it included in the strategic documentation as an overarching framework for the
whole strategy. The external forces they found influential over strategic decision-making
were concentrated in four areas. From the economy perspective, median income
remained flat, which put university under constant pressure to increase tuition to absorb
operational expenses, as well as projected budget deficit in California was a threat to the
availability of student aid. Demographics were represented by the increase of historically
underrepresented in HE groups of students and sharp decrease in high school graduates
approaching to arrive in several years. The decrease of the value of HE in the public’s
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opinion and information revolution as an unpredictable disruptor in the industry were
acknowledge by the leaders as essential trends. Another factor which eventually shaped
the strategic plan was the accreditation process which coincided with the SP process. By
the end of the SP process, all the strategic initiatives were aligned with the
recommendations of the accreditation experts. Lastly, the COVID-19 pandemic was
identified as a novel external challenge, and leaders adopted the mindset of using the
situation to convert it into a strategic opportunity. They understood that a well-designed
and timely strategic response to the pandemic was necessary for future institutional
success.
Connection of the Environmental Scanning and Analysis to the Internal
Organizational Environment via Conversations with the University
Community
Leaders were forced to conclude the environmental scan; in the words of one of
them, it was a “rabbit hole”, and Task Force members kept finding relevant data. To
make a logical transition to the collective analysis phase, simultaneously with the final
stages of the environmental scanning, Task Force members started university-wide
visioning sessions with faculty, staff, and students. For one year, they carried out
iterative conversations with the populations they represented. The Director of the
President’s Office would update the Task Force with any information they had from the
Board and the President; with data from environmental scanning, they would go to their
units and divisions. The overarching question for this work was articulated as: “What do
you think when you hear this information? Knowing your lived experiences at RCU2,
what needs to be in this strategic plan?” The results of these discussions were brought
back to the Task Force meetings and, combined with the research categories that
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surfaced during the environmental scan, resulted in the draft Strategic Vision and
themes.
The RCU2 Strategic Vision highlighted the institution’s dedication to access and
inclusivity, while provided distinct educational programs that led to students’ success. It
underscored the regional mission of the RCU2 by stating that its graduates will bring
their expertise into their community. The four themes resulted from the work of the Task
Force intended to supply high-quality learning experience that provided high return on
student’s investment; to promote inclusivity and diversity; to supply educational
programs that supported value-based education in not only professional, but also social,
emotional, spiritual, physical aspects of students’ lives; and to operate in the culture of
excellence and innovation. Each of the themes had one corresponding goal. The drafts of
the Strategic Vision and themes (and corresponding goals) were brought to the Board’s
attention and were successfully approved.
As the Task Force members drafted the Strategic Vision and themes, the two
Task Force chairs asked them to take the conversations with deans and department
leaders one step forward and ask them to develop college and departmental strategic
plans based on the vision and themes. Those conversations in turn resulted in sets of
tactical actions, and the Task Force members had to aggregate them into broader
university initiatives. Eventually, these contributed to the final list of the strategic
initiatives, such as opening the College of Health and focusing more on non-traditionally
aged student population.
After the approval of the Strategic Vision and themes, the Task Force was
phased out. RCU2’s leaders now had all the data from the environmental scan, the
Strategic Vision and themes, and the broad initiatives ideas. During this stage, the
President’s Cabinet was the main participant of the SP process. Their main goal was to
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prioritize the ideas and choose what RCU2 would actually do. The Cabinet worked
closely with the Faculty Senate and college deans to have their feedback for the Board’s
decision-making.
The President’s Cabinet and college deans came together in a retreat to identify
the ideas that would be transferred into actions. They collectively shortlisted 6 ideas for
further consideration. To make the final decision, leaders employed a matrix with two
axes: high and low impact and high and low investment, with impact having a broad
definition of influence over RCU2 itself and its community. The distribution of the ideas
over four matrix quadrants revealed that the initiatives should be arranged into three
different levels: transformative, bridge, and incremental. The College of Health provided
a high impact on the future of the RCU2 itself and on its region by helping to offset the
need for local healthcare service professionals, but also required high investment.
Therefore, the College for Health became a transformative initiative; leaders decided to
concentrate only on this one major initiative, instead of having several of them. The
bridge initiatives were crucial or “missional” for the university but would not require the
level of attention from the whole institution as the transformative initiative would. For
instance, the actions to improve student retention or faculty curricular innovation
became such initiatives. Lastly, the incremental initiatives were concerned with
effectiveness and efficiency of RCU2, such as staff professional development and data
management.
Environmental Tools to Support the Transformative Initiative
To sufficiently support the design of the transformative initiative two special
groups were created: the President’s Advisory Council on Health (further - Health
Council) with the focus on the external environment and the Special Health Committee
that focused on the RCU2’s internal processes to support the creation of the new college.
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The role of the Health Council was to bring the President’s idea to focus on
health, supported by the Board, into the plan of action to create the new college. The
starting point of this work was the recently completed Strategic Vision, and the
workforce report requested by the President to a consultancy company, stating the
increasing future need for the healthcare professionals, and in the words of one of the
Council members, this group was “really the one who helped flush that out” by answering
the question: “What role did RCU2 need to play in health in its communities?”
The Health Council consisted of 30 members; two of them (including the Chair)
were also members of RCU2’s Board. Most of these professionals occupied CEO or other
upper-level management positions at, as one of the Vice Presidents descried it,
“community-based health providers” - regional public and private hospitals, medical
centers, and insurance companies. The Council met every three to six months and
advised the President that the College of Health should focus on broader areas of
physical and mental health, as well as overall community wellbeing. In addition to the
educational programs that already existed in RCU2, such as such athletics, early
childhood development, and health service management, the Council defined several
priorities for the new college: start preparing physician assistants and nurses to supply
the immediate need of the healthcare support specialists; identify and start programs
that would be needed to support the aging California population; and focus on the wellbeing of RCU2’s own students.
While the external experts on the Health Council identified the role of RCU2 in
the community, the Special Health committee evaluated the creation of the new college
from the internal resources’ perspective. It was chaired by the Vice President for
Advancement and one of the colleges’ deans and consisted exclusively of RCU2’s
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employees. The committee produced an operational expenditures tactical report to
inform the decision-making process.
Lastly, the developing COVID-19 pandemic served as the last push to approve the
transformative initiative as shortages in the healthcare nation and worldwide became
clear. Both the President and the Health Council recommended that the Board move
forward with it. Two years after strategic planning began, the transformative initiative
was approved by the Board.
Another tool RCU2 leaders used to identify which extant programs would be
transferred to the new college was SWOT analysis. The President requested all
departments aspiring to participate to submit it and reason why particular programs
should be a part of the transformative initiative.
It is important to mention that RCU2 used several formalized routine tools to
understand their internal environment during SP processes. For instance, the university
used surveys to track the data on students’ evaluation of the courses offered, climate
surveys of all types of faculty members and administrative and professional staff, and
questionnaires for non-returning students. RCU 2 has also employed a 5-year cycle
academic programs and administrative units review to evaluate the effectiveness of both.
Department chairs and unit heads were responsible for coordination and completion of
the review in six months. First, the draft of the internal report was performed. For the
departments, it contained the description of the program’s capacity, assessment of
learning outcomes based on program goals, and improvement recommendations. For the
administrative units, it included similar indicators: department’s capacity, its
performance effectiveness based on its goals, effectiveness of processes utilized to
accomplish its goals, and improvement recommendations. Then, the external reviewer
was invited to campus to review the report and produce recommendations. After that,
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the Educational Effectiveness Committee received the results of the review and made
suggestions if necessary. Lastly, the academic deans and administrative unit heads in
collaboration with Provost and other senior leaders made resource allocation.
Contributing Forms of the Engagement with the Environment
RCU2’s senior leaders developed a formalized way to expand their knowledge
about the internal environment beyond specifically designed strategic processes or tools.
They implemented a university-wide data governance concept.
RCU2 changed its attitude from data collection to data management and started
to build data infrastructure. For example, senior leaders supplied institutional research
function, which traditionally was concerned with data collection, with data analytics. As
an example, enrollment policy was not “freeze data, externally reported, it's live data and
it's predictive modeling and consistent analysis of our in-cycle. So, it was clear that we
needed to establish an office of enrollment analytics”, in the words of one senior leader.
Having more developed predictive data analytics allowed RCU2 leaders to intensify their
capacity in market research. Leaders were able to make data-informed decisions on any
prospective educational product. As one of the Vice Presidents explained: “we can pull
every program that we might be considering and run it through the derive ratios we have
set and look clearly at: ‘These are the programs that popped up based on demand based
on salaries’”.
RCU2 leaders established a data governance structure, a cross-functional group
of university employees. It contained representatives from informational technology
units, institutional research, financial and budgeting specialists, academic professionals.
Some of the participants were employed at the Vice President level positions. This group
was tasked with producing shared language for institutional data use. They had to define
major operational terms, so that everyone at RCU2 understood the internal data. As one
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of the Vice Presidents explained: “We had to understand that when I say "freshmen", you
know what I mean, and that we all say "freshmen", it means the same thing”. The work of
this group resulted in the production of the Data Cookbook, containing all functional and
technical definitions for the RCU2 internal data.
University senior leaders developed and used a variety of forms of engagement
with the external environment, which contributed to their contextual sensemaking.
An additional way for the President to engage with the external environment was
through the knowledge of their brilliant Cabinet members. In the words of one of the
senior leaders, the President had “a lot of input from each one of the Vice Presidents …
[The President was] constantly scanning the environment through their eyes”.
Another way to understand their surroundings was participation in the
professional group of corresponding members of presidential cabinets from other HEIs.
For example, one of the RCU2 Vice Presidents described their participation in a
particular group of around 30 universities across the region: “We meet once a year and
compare notes … we are open about sharing most of the information that we have with
each other … That helps us to see where we are compared to some of our competitors”.
While the Board was a part of the formalized SP process, it was also a way that
RCU2’s President and their Cabinet were routinely learning about their environment.
Because most of the Board members are highly involved in regional industries and
communities, they contributed knowledge about the local affairs that RCU2 could use as
an opportunity. For instance,
One of our members is very connected with a local city... And they know that
...city is planning a revitalization of their downtown. We have our college … in
that downtown area. So, because of their relationship and knowledge of what the
city is wanting to do, they brought it to our President, and we are in conversation:
‘How can ... the university be a part of this revitalization, which would help the
city by having a local education available to its residents?’
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Another group on campus served as a place where various current issued were
discussed. The University Management Council consisted of approximately 60 people
and held its meetings once a month. This was the place for the university community to
discuss any issues that interested them, share ideas about “what you did, what you have
heard, what you have learned; is that something that we can do at the university or not”,
as one of the Vice Presidents said.
In addition to knowledge transfer among professional groups external and
internal to the university, leaders learned about external environment, specifically their
competitors and the future trends in HE through conferences. One of the senior leaders
developed a technique to both scan the external environment and prepare their units of
responsibility for the upcoming changes:
In my unit, whenever my direct reports attend a conference, I ask them: ‘What
are the three things that you learned? What are one or two things, that other
people are doing that you think, will help our institution?’ So, in that sense that is
the ‘scanning’ that we do, to see what changes we need to implement internally ...
if it comes from within, it is much easier to implement, than if you try to dictate it
to others.
Lastly, available research and data review also contributed to the engagement
with the environment. Even when the SP was concluded, the leaders continued to
routinely study sources like “Chronicle of Higher Education” and “Review in Higher
Education”, reports from EMSI and Clearinghouse, and IPEDS data. One of the Vice
Presidents plainly stated the constant need to scan the external environment: “If you
stop looking outside, then you will not be successful”.
Final Approval of the Strategy
After the decision to create the College of Health, the refinement of the bridge
and incremental initiatives continued and the whole plan was presented to the university
community. The President’s Cabinet continued to work on the plan, determining multi-

126

year budgeting, metrics, and accountability to support the initiatives and the vision. Half
a year later, Board approved the finalized strategy (including vision, themes, goals, and
the actual plan for the first year) for the next 5 years.
Strategy in documented form existed in the publicly available Strategic Vision
and proprietary Strategic Plan. The Strategic Vision was a short deductively organized
clear statement of the strategic framework, mission, vision, themes, and goals. The
Strategic Plan existed as an internal university document used by the President’s Cabinet
to track the execution of the Strategic Vision.
Strategic Enrollment Planning: Decision-Making Process that Influenced
the Strategic Planning
As the demographic cliff was one of the major external environmental challenges
for RCU2, six months into the creation of the strategy, a new Vice President for strategic
enrollment was hired and the creation of a Strategic Enrollment Plan was carried out
roughly at the time of the Strategic Vision approval by the Board. One of the senior
leaders described the supportive purpose of the Enrollment Strategic Plan and its
relationship to the institutional strategy:
In an institution that is 98% tuition revenue funded, the strategic plan success
requires a robust focus on net tuition revenue production ... When you think
about how the work of the enrollment management plan undergirds that strategic
plan, we have to bring in the students and we have to ensure that we are well
positioned to help them succeed. And we have to develop the net revenue
necessary to build all the other elements of the strategy.
The Strategic Enrollment Plan set four goals to achieve: fiscal sustainability by
taking a proactive and systematic approach to enrollments; accountability by sharing the
enrollment goals with the community and being assessed by it; cross-sector engagement
because enrollment influences every person working at the university (not just the
admissions office), and data and system management. The latter was achieved through a
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data governance committee that collaboratively defined the terminology used across
RCU2. This work supported the university in its overarching goal of creating the strategy
as it provided more clarity across the administrative units.
According to one of the Vice Presidents the creation of the Strategic Enrollment
Plan was a crucial part of ensuring the success of the Strategic Vision by understanding
how to attract the students:
The President's Cabinet spends a lot of time reviewing the enrollment trends,
what will be happening in the future. And that is how we have been able … not
only to survive but during this pandemic … we are one of the few institutions that
have thrived … [RCU2] is one of those institutions that from last year to the
pandemic year has seen an increase in our enrollments. And one of the major
reasons for that is because we have created a strategic enrollment plan.
Monitoring of the Strategic Plan Execution
The main university-wide tool for tracking the SP execution was a document
created by the President and their Cabinet, which contained their goals. It was a matrix
that listed all the initiatives RCU2 was acting on, grouped by their levels: transformative,
bridge, and incremental. Further, for each initiative there were corresponding goals set
to achieve, factual progress on those goals, the correlation of the progress achieved
towards the final result of the Strategic Vision, a responsible Vice President and
participating organizational units.
This document was used collectively by the leaders to keep them updated. In the
one of the senior leader’s words: “It is not just in [the President’s] head, it is in front of
the Board, it is in front of the Cabinet every minute, and the teams are part of it”.
The President’s Cabinet prepared the matrix over the summer and presented it to
the Board every September to set the goals for the next year, and every May to
demonstrate progress. During the academic year (between September and May) the
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Board got an update on RCU2’s leaders’ progress towards the goals quarterly, at every
Board meeting.
In addition to being the main document that showed the Board SP execution
progress, they also used it to evaluate the President’s work during the year. In turn, the
President used the goals matrix to examine the performance of their Cabinet.
In the physical form the SP monitoring existed in a series of retreats and
conversations. The starting point for the academic year was the retreat for the Board and
the President’s Cabinet in September to set the goals for the upcoming year by reviewing
the goals matrix. As one of the Vice Presidents said of event:
We spent a lot of time looking at the strategic plan and updated the Board where
we are with the plan, which areas were meeting our expectations, which areas will
be outlined, which areas will exceed it. And then the Board gives us direction in
terms of where to place our focus.
In addition, there was a retreat for the President’s Cabinet twice a year. “During
the years, most of the retreat time is dedicated toward the Strategic Plan and the
achievement of those plans”, the same Vice President explained.
To constantly keep track of the progress the Director of the President’s office had
monthly meetings with the President’s Cabinet members. This was done to track their
progress and to keep them accountable at every step of the Plan’s execution.
Strategic Decision-Making in Administrative Units
At the administrative level, short-terms tactical plans supported the universitywide Strategic Plan and Vision.
Some Vice Presidents and all college deans had corresponding strategic plans for
their units of responsibility. In the words of one Vice President, their divisional strategic
plan was framing any conversation:
I tend to go back recursively to the plan whenever we want to do something. It's
a prominent feature in all of our conversations, and we always try to orient all of
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the … planning against that plan. It became a part of the way we talk about the
work that we do.
A senior leader described the way they support the strategic plan was by creating
tactical quarterly and annual tactical plans for their units of responsibility, which
supported the university-wide plan and, hence, the Strategic Vision. Once the quarterly
plan was created and the actions in it were prioritized, the senior leader held monthly
meetings to track the progress of those plans.
These several layers of planning for the different periods of time were required by
the cross-unit collaboration necessary to the execution of the initiatives in this division.
Strategic Decision-Making Configuration Benefits and Limitations
RCU2’s configuration of strategic decision-making was beneficial and at the same
time difficult for the university’s senior leaders.
The success of the previous SP campaign, led by the same President and most of
the Board and Cabinet members, followed by the completion of the ambitious
fundraising goals, allowed the President to mitigate the resistance from some parts of the
university community towards the transformative initiative. As the university
community had already seen the President finding resources in the past, a major share of
the faculty was supportive of the opening of the College of Health. To persuade those
who remained hesitant, the President repeated at every State of the University Address,
that colleges will not lose external funding. And when the College of health is fully
operational, the university as a whole will benefit from increasing number of incoming
students.
The decisiveness of the President in the distribution of decision-making
responsibilities during the SP process benefited the university because the strategy was
created, agreed upon, and acted on. The President was clear about the recommendatory
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role of the faculty in the process and at the same time the Director of the President’s
Office was tasked with the organization of the communication scheme to source, analyze,
and to deliver those recommendations to the senior leaders for decision-making. This
combination of roles and responsibilities created both inclusive and completed on time
SP process.
The active role of the Board in the articulation of the strategy and the President’s
constant dedication to achieving it significantly benefited strategic decision-making at
RCU2. Board members, as practitioners coming from disparate industries, offered their
different, but externally relevant perspectives. While all the perspectives were invaluable,
the healthcare and educational professionals were crucial for the SP in question. The
former helped to identify the need the College of Health and to ratify its creation. The
latter helped to carry out the SP in a productive way, particularly by dividing Strategic
Vision from Plan. After the approval of the strategy, the Plan served as an evaluation tool
both for the Board and the President.
Lastly, the constant communication of the SP progress to the university’s
academic and administrative community contributed to the success of the SP process.
Materials in progress were published on the website. After the ratification by the Board,
the strategy and the progress on the plan was communicated by the President at every
State of the University Address.
While RCU2 leaders tried to incorporate every voice into the SP process, they
learned that some faculty members thought it was not inclusive enough. The underlying
limitation was the subtle art of including the right and enough people into the strategic
conversations, as described by an administrative leader:
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It is very difficult to get the exact right people at the table, because we want to
hear everyone's voice. However, we used to get these huge groups, it becomes
unmanageable. So, you have to make decisions somewhere. And that is tricky …
keeping the workgroups manageable, but also including everyone’s voice.
Regardless of the various consultations that the Task Force liaisons repeatedly
had with the academic community, and the Board retreats to which every Head of the
Department was invited, some faculty members chose not to participate and remained
excluded from the strategy formation. Their non-participation in the strategic planning
resulted in not being nimble enough to support the RCU2’s dynamic Strategic Plan.
Another limitation lay within institutional relationships with the data at the start
of the SP process. RCU2 addressed that challenge during the SP iteration by creating the
data government structure under the supervision of the Vice President for Enrollment.
The units and committees responsible for this project started to work on creating the
shared language across the university.
Finite resources were a limitation for the SP process as well. As educational
markets were changing, RCU2, as a highly enrollment dependent institution, was
susceptible to possible volatility in their financial stability. In the description of one of
the senior leaders:
It is always about resources. You want everyone to have the resources they need,
so that they can do their job well, whether it is your professor, IT, facilities … The
pie is only as big as it is, and we are bringing in a new college, new programs. ...
The ambiguity of not knowing what is going to happen to the resources is always
hanging over my head, and everybody else's head. So, people say: ‘We don't want
that new college’. What they're really saying is: ‘I am afraid that I am going to
lose, if they gain’.
Lastly, after the ratification of the Strategic Vision and Plan, senior leaders
reflected that that when evaluating the progress, they did not pay enough attention to
evaluation the strategy itself. One of the Board members mentioned that during their
meetings, it would have been beneficial to start with a ten-thousand-feet-view at the
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beginning, when people are “at their freshest”, discuss the developments in the external
environment and then switch to the tactical monitoring of the execution of the Strategic
Plan. That way the leaders would have in mind “the future set of challenges and
opportunities that we will be presented with, [in order to keep] ahead of that, while still
monitoring our current progress”.
Leaders’ sensemaking of their organizational environment
Throughout the SP process, RCU2 leaders mostly associated the external
organizational environment with their geographical region of service. As one of them
explained: “The region [is] the highest priority for me … [Students] come from our
region, they get educated, they go back to the region, and they are part of the "brain
remain"”. The initial identification of the need for regional healthcare professionals
defined the strategy. RCU2 leaders also thought of their region as “local communities”
and “students form the region”, adding a human aspect to their definition of the external
environment. One of the administrative leaders highlighted: “if something would directly
affect our students or influence their behaviors or their decisions, it should be considered
within our external environment”.
Though the second SP process started with retrospective analysis of the first SP
and its results, the sensemaking by most of RCU2’s leaders during the second iteration
was focused on the future of RCU2’s external environment: the region, its communities
and industries, and their workforce needs. The President, with their focus on the
importance of the future-oriented strategy, drove the creation of the tools RCU2 used in
the SP process, such as environmental scanning focused on the future issues in HE,
university-wide visioning sessions, and the consultancy report which identified the
region’s future workforce needs.
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RCU2 leaders routinely made sense of their external organizational environment
within and beyond the SP process by using contributing forms of engagement, such as
conferences or participation in professional groups. The tools that were used specifically
for the SP process were occasional (non-routine) and allowed them to make sense of the
external environment during the particular period of study. After the Strategic Vision
and Plan were ratified, the leaders did not employ neither a routine tool of evaluation of
the Strategic Vision, nor a regular formalized environmental scanning. To routinely
understand their university’s internal environment, they used academic and
administrative unit reviews.
During the SP process, RCU2’s leaders made sense of their environments from
both the micro- and macro-contextual perspective. However, the macro-contextual
approach dominated: leaders identified the future healthcare workforce shortage in their
larger surroundings, to which RCU2 could potentially respond. The major role was also
given to the Health Council, which connected university leadership with the healthcare
industry through the expertise of its members. Micro (organizational) perspective had a
supportive role; for instance, internal Special Health Committee supplied strategy
creation process with university ‘s operational data.
Working towards success
As a general observation of RCU2 senior leaders, having a well-articulated
strategy and staying committed to it was itself a successful strategic response, that would
have ensured the content of the strategy gets realized.
As the decision to create the College of Health was ratified fairly recently, the
senior leaders did not have numeric data to prove that the College was a success or
otherwise. However, they were optimistic that it would be successful in the future.
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One Vice President explained that RCU2 would not have done it if it was not
expected to positively affect organizational performance by increasing enrollment,
bringing more tuition dollars, and providing better value to students: “Absolutely! We
wouldn't do it if didn't have a positive impact on our organization”.
Because the idea of the College of Health was conceived to satisfy the growing
need for healthcare professionals, and was identified as a” high impact” initiative on the
university and its community, RCU2 leaders had no doubts that the new college would
positively affect the institution. One of the Vice Presidents expected the new college to
succeed for two reasons. One, the academic programs offered by the College of Health
would increase local communities’ access to the distinct and relevant educational
experiences; this aligned with RCU2’s mission as an educational institution. The second
was the positive effect on the communities that RCU2 served through providing
workforce for their healthcare needs.
Leadership’s optimism about the future of the new college was catalyzed by the
Strategic Enrollment Plan. This plan was expected to financially sustain RCU2 as well as
to attract relevant demographic of potential students.
As RCU2 leaders started to develop the measurements of potential success of the
College of Health, they focused they attention of several indicators. Leaders were sure
they would need to track the employability of college’s graduates as well as how their
return to the regional communities as professionals would impact the health of the local
populations. Accreditation of the new educational programs would also indicate success.
Last, but not least, the wellbeing of the RCU2’s own students would be a meaningful
measurement of the College of Health positive impact.
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Chapter 6. Analysis of the Findings
The purpose of this study was to learn more about regional comprehensive
universities’ (RCUs) strategic responses towards their external organizational
environments, strategic decision-making processes leading to those responses, and the
influence of the leadership’s understanding of the organizational external environment
over the RCUs’ strategic responses.
The study included two universities: RCU1 – a public university, a part of the state
higher education system, and RCU2 – a private not-for-profit university. As the sampling
strategy outlined in detail in Chapter Three, regardless of the different sectors the
universities represent, they are very similar in their missional characteristics: universities
are of the same size, located in the same state, serve essentially the same demography of
students, focusing on groups underrepresented in higher education, and both are
Hispanic-serving institutions.
The following discussion relies on the theoretical guiding perspectives used to
design this study. The analysis reveals how the organization of the strategic decisionmaking in the two cases corresponds with the theoretical models of SP and
environmental scanning. While SP models prescribe to think about the organizational
environments macro-contextually (seeing the organization included in the larger socioeconomic context), prospectively (working towards the future of the organization), and
routinely (beyond organizational crises), sensemaking theory suggests that in reality
people make sense in the opposite way (for details see Brown et al., 2015; Kotler &
Murphy, 1981; Peterson, 1997; Weick, 1995). The chapter discusses how this
contradiction influenced the strategic responses in the two RCUs (Weick, 1995).
The two cases revealed that the RCUs’ presidents and their cabinets took very
different approaches towards creating their strategies and enacting strategic responses.
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What follows is the comparison of those attitudes. The discussion in this chapter is
organized deductively: it starts with illustrating the differences in the framing of the
strategic responses as a summary of the approaches the two institutions pursued. The
discussion further focuses on the structure and procedure of the SP processes the leaders
implemented. After that, the discussion turns to the environmental scanning and
analysis tools senior leaders used and the influence these techniques had on the leaders
sensemaking of their respective organizational environments. The chapter concludes
with a discussion on the place of this study’s findings in extant knowledge about the SP
in HE phenomenon.
The study’s theoretical framework and, therefore, the following analysis was
based on the guiding perspectives that emphasized the role of the external environment
in senior leaders’ sensemaking for the SP process. In other words, extant literature
suggested the ideal model of strategy creation, describing what institutions “should” do.
The significant restrictions brought by the COVID-19 pandemic on my access to the
institutions, data collection, and final sample (discussed in detail in Chapter Three) led
to the inclusion of one institution (RCU2) that had fully engaged in the work with the
external environment during its SP process, and one institution (RCU1), where leaders
did not do such work due to their internal organizational situation. The following
analysis scrutinizes both cases through the theoretical framework of the study and
reveals that due to RCU1 leaders’ focus on internal issues they produced a strategy
irrelevant to the external environment.
In spite of that, it is important to acknowledge that the RCU1 President made a
wise strategic choice to use SP to start a shared conversation in organizational
circumstances they had. First of all, they were a new President, who had to introduce
themselves to the campus community in order to be able to execute strategy creation in
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the future. In addition, as RCU1 is a public institution funded mostly by state
appropriations, it was not under immediate financial risk even if it did not effectively
respond to the challenges presented by the external environment. Finally, the President
inherited an institution in a challenging situation of a decade long dysfunctional
relationship between the senior administrators and faculty. RCU1’s community was not
ready for the discussion about its inclusive into the larger environment future. The
President made the best choice in the situation to use SP - that was expected from them
as a new leader - to restore relationships with the faculty first.
While from the study’s theoretical framework perspective (please see Figure 3)
RCU1 did not organize an environmental scanning and SP process in a way that would
produce an externally relevant strategic response, it does not mean that the President did
not make an appropriate strategic choice. It is important to highlight that while the
following analysis looks at both cases from the perspective of the ideal SP model
suggested by extant literature, RCU1’s President chose a different path: they decided to
restore the relationship on their campus first, making the focus on externally relevant
strategic response less important at this moment for the university. RCU1’s President
understood that ideally, SP should be concerned with the organizational future within its
external environment and made the effort to make the conversation as prospective and
macro-contextual as possible in these circumstances but allowed the process to be
dominated by the internal organizational focus.
The Framing of the Strategic Responses
The two cases of RCUs included in this study demonstrated different framing of
their strategic responses. In particular, the cases showed how differences in leader’s
sensemaking during the decision-making process led to disparate strategic loci. RCU1’s
senior administrators mostly focused on institutional challenges and aspirations due to
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challenging organizational circumstances and as a result employed a strategy that did
not give enough attention to the outside world. In contrast, RCU2’s leadership employed
a more connected with organization’s external environment strategy.
RCU1’s predominantly internally focused strategic decision-making, informed
by micro-contextual sensemaking (focusing on the internal organizational affairs rather
than on the external context) obscured the connection between the challenges the
university faced, its external organizational environment, and the resulting strategic
response. As the case explains, RCU1’s major challenge was its over-enrollment, as the
campus was historically committed to accepting all applying students, which was more
than it was supposed to enroll. Therefore, the state was only subsidizing the tuition fees,
not the full cost of education for those students over the defined enrollment numbers.
While the challenge of being over-enrolled was a result of broader environmental
conditions, they were not clearly articulated in the strategic documentation or the
conversations. The plan offered no data explaining how far into the future overenrollment was predicted to continue or the reasons for that. The strategy also failed to
acknowledge demographic changes, especially the anticipated decrease in the numbers
of potential enrollees at the state and national levels, as RCU1’s local high-school
graduates pool was not projected to change. There was no discussion on how the
competition from other California HEIs and universities from other states, would affect
the availability of high-school graduates for RCU1.
RCU1 focused its SP process on institutional aspirations rather than on the
external conditions. In other words, the leaders employed micro-contextual sensemaking
due to the limitations discussed above, which made RCU1’s major strategic response less
targeted towards addressing the surrounding reality. While the decision to stay nonimpacted (to prioritize student access over the increase of the admission standards and
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to accept all the students who apply) was, in fact, a strategic choice, it was conditioned by
the internal organizational aspiration of the university community to remain studentcentered, which, as the case explained, was one of the strategic goals. While this was an
altruistic and missional choice, it could potentially make it harder for the university to
remain relevant to the external environment. Having fewer financial resources and more
students simultaneously could potentially strain the university operations and call for
more strategic choices. Similarly, regardless that the low ROI on RCU1 degrees was
externally conditioned by national trends, the university’s strategic response via launch
of the career readiness initiative was still a result of the micro-contextual logic. While the
leaders recognized the deficiencies in students’ skills might compromise opportunities to
succeed in the labor market after graduating, they responded to this challenge tactically,
by launching a set of short courses students were supposed to take. While this tactic
response provided students with additional skills to use alongside the existing degrees, it
did not strategically question the relevance of the degrees themselves and their
alignment with the future external environment. While RCU1’s Strategic Plan mentioned
that the university aspired to create new multi-disciplinary academic programs that
would be relevant to evolving skill sets, the Plan never explained for which emergent
industries or fields these products would be tailored, nor did the document described
how the design of the new degrees would be different from the existing ones. In addition,
the interviews with the RCU1’s leaders did not reveal any strategic bets on degrees in
particular industries or the initiatives that were launched in response to the
developments of the new professions. It is possible that it will happen in the future, as
the Strategic Plan will be in place for several more years.
As the university’s Strategic Plan had many priorities, senior leaders struggled to
identify a dominant challenge, initiative, and strategic focus. There was no evidence on
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their shared opinion to which challenge in RCU’1 external environment their strategy
was predominantly responding.
The connection between challenges RCU2 faced, its external organizational
environment and its strategic response was, in contrast, obvious, representing more
macro-contextual and prospectively focused sensemaking which informed the strategic
decision-making. RCU2’s leaders involved in the SP process clearly identified the
approaching decrease in the numbers of high-school graduates, the cost of HE in the US,
and the future regional workforce needs as three external challenges which framed their
strategic response. They paid attention to the future place of RCU2 in its larger context
when developing strategy which supported the production of a response more targeted
towards the particular issue in their external environment. As the case explains, RCU2
saw a future need of the regional workforce in its larger environment, which led the
leaders of the SP process to conclude that they should create a College of Health in
response. Together with smaller initiatives the College of Health supported the
realization of the RCU2’s mission of providing relevant and distinct educational
experience.
During the interviews, RCU2 leaders readily described the same challenges their
university had, suggesting a mutually developed conversation on difficulties faced by the
institution.
Strategic Decision-Making Configuration
Functionally, the universities used their SP processes in two different ways. RCU1
deviated towards having SP process as a means of starting a shared conversation with
the university community after a long-standing conflict between faculty and
management and agree on the strategic direction (SP process as a buy-in tool). RCU2
utilized the SP process to gain a better fit with external environment, organizing it closer
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to the model that extant literature suggests. Both universities used upcoming
accreditation as catalysts for their SP processes.
Instead of achieving strategic fit with the external environment, in RCU1 strategic
planning was predominantly a means to achieve buy-in from the university community,
which could have been an appropriate choice at the time. A possible reason for this was
the history of dysfunction between administrators and faculty, which had lasted through
the administrations of the past two university presidents. This type of SP usage is
consistent with existing literature on the deviated use of strategic planning as a result of
institutional forces of shorter presidential tenures and corporatization of the academia
(for details see Ginsberg, 2011; Selingo et al., 2017). It is possible to assume RCU1’s new
President saw the limitations of their campus community to engage in the SP process
and decided to use the process to build trust between faculty and administration first.
This conflict and the use of micro-contextual sensemaking led RCU1 to a more internally
focused, reactive, and retrospective strategy. Similar to the framing of strategic
responses, it was evident that RCU1’s strategy focused more on the internal affairs of the
university (faculty aspiration to remain a student-focused institution) and was reacting
to the previously existed condition of being overenrolled, rather than proactively looking
for new opportunities.
In contrast, RCU2 used its SP process to achieve a better fit with the future of its
organizational external environment. In other words, senior leadership employed
contextually focused, proactive, and prospective strategic decision-making processes.
They envisioned their institution within the larger region and proactively sought
opportunities to support local industries and communities. When the potential need for
healthcare professionals was identified, RCU2 leaders acted upon this projected future
environment. In keeping with literature on the subject (for details see Kotler & Murphy,
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1981; Morrison et al., 1984; Peterson, 1997; Seltzer, 2018), RCU2 used its SP process in a
way optimized to increase organizational performance and chances of survival. In
addition, RCU2’s leaders proactive approach towards their external environment is
consistent with the current theoretical developments of the new institutional theory, that
suggests that leaders are the subjects of change and are capable of influencing their
surroundings, not succumbing to them (for details see Peterson, 1997; Scott & Kirst,
2017).
Both universities employed a two-stage process to create their strategies, which
consisted of 1) SP and 2) monitoring the execution of the Strategic Plan. In both cases
the SP processes resulted in successful ratification of the Strategic Plans. The RCUs
differed somewhat in the connection of their respective SP processes with other scopes of
strategic decision-making. In RCU1, a comprehensive description of the strategic
decision-making beyond the SP process was not evident; there was no clarity on how the
Strategic Plan correlated to the previously existing Campus Master Plan. The Academic
Master Plan was not yet developed, so its role in the Strategic Plan was likewise not
established. In contrast, RCU2 included its Strategic Enrollment Plan to work with the
changing demography in support of the SP process. The previously established Campus
Master Plan and Fundraising Plan served as foundational parts for the new Strategic
Plan. However, similarly to the RCU1, RCU2 has not yet developed an Academic Master
Plan.
Strategic Planning Leadership’s Continuity, Organization, and Role
In both universities the SP process was led by the President and their executive
team. The difference was in the relationship of the leadership tenure durations and the
continuity of strategy. The Presidents’ predispositions for the SP process were different
and indicative of the administration and faculty relationship. In RCU1, the President
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started the SP process shortly after assuming office; it was their first iteration of strategy
creation in this institution. While the President was very experienced in leading the SP
process from their previous jobs in HE leadership, they had to do it amidst the existing
conflict between faculty and administration. In addition to the new President, almost all
members of the cabinet were new to RCU1.
On the contrary, the President at RCU2 led the second SP process during their
tenure in this university, after successfully completing the first SP process as well as
delivering results promised by it. In addition, the Cabinet and the Board (which was very
influential in RCU2’s SP process) members remained largely the same. This leadership
team previously gained approval from the campus community by demonstrating its
capability for creating the strategy. It allowed them not to spend time on persuading the
campus to participate in the SP process, but to focus on the development of the strategy.
This discrepancy in tenures defined in part the continuity of RCUs’ strategies.
RCU1’s previous strategy was associated with the existing conflict between the
administration and faculty and was sitting on the shelf. Once the new President arrived,
they had to “hit the reset button” and could not use the previous strategy for political
reasons. Hence, the new SP did not continue the strategic work of previous leaders. In
contrast, the RCU2 leadership started their SP by analyzing its previous iteration and
deciding what must continue or be abandoned. The second SP crystallized RCU2’s
decision to invest in in creating the College of Health. Before becoming a strategic choice,
the conversation about participating in the healthcare industry had existed for many
years, as a vague idea during the first SP process and as a topic of discussion between the
President and the Board. It took RCU2 approximately six years to arrive at this level of
clarity regarding their future. This amount of time is less than the average presidential
tenure duration in universities focusing on bachelor’s degrees production (for details see
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(Gagliardi et al., 2017). Logically, the current average length of the presidential term
might be just long enough to articulate a relevant strategic response, but not to execute it
and see the results.
The Role of the President
Both Presidents were essential drivers for their respective SP processes.
Experienced in strategic leadership processes, they clearly owned the agenda for the
strategy creation. However, the Presidents had very different campuses to operate in,
and were at different points in their tenures at those universities. This partially
conditioned how they distributed their energy during the process.
RCU1’s President spent a significant amount of energy on persuading the campus
community to engage in SP; as the case notes, the university leader received a campus
“frozen in time”, which was a significant obstacle for starting the future-oriented,
envisioning conversation. In RCU2, the President already had the buy-in from the
campus community and could concentrate more on the content of the strategy. It also
allowed the RCU2’s leader to suggest a bolder move – the opening of the new college.
Even with the support of the campus, the President had to work with some faculty
members who were apprehensive that the new college would reroute the financial
resources away from them.
In addition, RCU1’s President had to spend time building the collaborative
strength and shared knowledge of their recently formed Cabinet; most of the members
took Vice Presidents roles for the first time in their careers. This necessity took away the
time that could have been spent developing strategic content. RCU2’s President had
already spent time forming their Cabinet and during the SP process had a more mature
leadership team so the President could fully rely on their strategic expertise.
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Lastly, the role of the personal knowledge of both Presidents played a noticeable
role. RCU1’s President recognized the importance of the shared across-campus
conversation in moving the institution forward and saw that as an essential step in
resolving the existing conflict. The role of the RCU2’s President started from the very
beginning of their tenure by bringing the very definition of strategy to the university:
they were clearly articulating that if only to survive RCU2 should work with the future.
The Role of the Governing Body
While the influence of the universities’ governing bodies was evident, it differed
significantly in its intensity and content. RCU1 had full autonomy over its strategy. The
university’s governing body influenced SP process indirectly. The system’s office
expected RCU1 to participate and succeed in broad system-wide initiatives, such as one
designed to increase the graduation rates across all campuses. The initiative was tactical
in nature, aiming to increase the levels of one of the key operational indicators, therefore
it did not influence the RCU1’s strategic direction in any way. On the other hand, the
scope of these initiatives might have been an influence on the resulting RCU1’s Strategic
Plan to have such broad strategic goals that they were able to incorporate the mentioned
initiatives.
The role of RCU2’s Board of Trustees was direct and manifested in two ways.
First, via its authority, the Board of Trustees assumed a very active role in every step of
creating strategy. Its members advised and eventually ratified every piece of the strategy:
vision, mission, themes, goals, and, finally, the plan. In addition, via the expertise of its
members, healthcare industry professionals, the Board directed the organizational
strategy towards the creation of the College of Health. The strong and direct influence of
the Board was crucial for RCU2’s strategic focus on a particular need in the external
environment. However, it could have directed the senior leaders’ attention away from
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other industries as the healthcare profession was represented by the majority of the
board members.
The Role of Organizational Structure
In both cases, the presidents made changes in their organizational structure to
support the SP process: they hired a new upper-management leader and created
corresponding organizational units. However, their choices assigned different types of
authority and responsibility.
RCU1’s President chose to create a new Vice President for SP position with full
authority over the SP process. In addition to the SP process, the new Vice President was
charged with leading the enrollment management, innovation, and institutional
research. In contrast, RCU2 hired a Director of the President’s office, who’s primary task
was to lead the SP process via collaboration across the senior leaders, the President, the
Board, and the organizational units instead of having authority over the participants.
Later in the SP process, a new Vice President for Enrollment was hired and charged with
the creation of the Strategic Enrollment Plan.
While both SP processes were finished successfully, the concentration of several
crucial to the SP process functions in the hands of a new Vice President in RCU1 could
have produced the workload too big for a single leader, a common problem referenced in
the extant literature (for details see Birnbaum & Eckel, 2005; Montez et al., 2002;
Selingo et al., 2017). In contrast, the fragmentation of leadership functions in RCU2
allowed the creation of a full Strategic Enrollment Plan to support the Strategic Plan.
Functionally separating the Vice President for the Enrollment from the leadership of the
SP process also allowed RCU2 to invest more resources in working with institutional
data. RCU2 leaders created the data governance structure to develop shared data
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language across the university and to take the traditional institutional research function
to the next level of predictive data modelling and analysis and intensive market research.
Strategic Planning Process Inclusivity
The senior leadership’s efforts to make their SP processes as inclusive as possible
were very visible in both cases. The striking difference was in the Presidents’ and,
consequently, the Cabinets’ approaches to the distribution of responsibility, which
influenced the scope of strategic focus. Nevertheless, both campuses received complaints
from faculty about not being heard.
As the case makes clear, RCU1 leaders needed to involve as many university
representatives as possible to start a shared conversation after years of disagreement,
and productively envision a commonly supported organizational future. The new
President and their Cabinet did not want “to rock the boat” and tried to include
everyone’s idea in the new plan. The crowdsourced ideas at the heart of the SP process
were likely one of the reasons RCU1 ended up with an unfocused Strategic Plan, creating
too many strategic priorities, which Vice Presidents were unable to execute.
On the contrary, having already executed the first iteration of the SP process and
built the relationships with the university community, the RCU2’s seasoned President
did not need to focus on starting the strategic conversation and could be more proactive.
The leaders drafted initial strategic ideas that would increase organizational survival and
sought the opinions of the university community about those choices. The President
clearly stated that they and the Board would make decisions and that the campus
community should provide as many recommendations as they could. The trust already
earned from the university community and placing the identification and response to the
external condition at the foundation of the process helped to create a focused strategy.
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Strategic Bets vs. Organizational Aspirations
Another crucial difference that influenced the level of strategic focus lay within
the framing and articulation of the main SP process question, either internal or
contextual. RCU1’s strategic planning leaders started the process with crowdsourcing
and designed the question for their community through internal organizational lenses.
Due to their organizational challenges, leaders possibly meant this question as an
“icebreaker”. Faculty and staff were asked to describe their aspirations for the university,
as if there were no constraints of any sort. As a result, RCU1 leaders received a list of
personal ideas to choose from. In an attempt to carry out an inclusive SP process, they
had to be careful about including all the voices and in turn ended up with a less focused
Strategic Plan.
RCU2 leaders started the SP process with analysis of their previous Strategic Plan
and identification of the external factors that could shape the university’s strategy. The
President hired a consultancy company to articulate potential development for the
university by asking the question: “What will the region’s workforce needs be 30 years
from now?” Collectively with the Board, they strategically bet on the healthcare
industry’s future needs, and only after that the SP Task Force shared the drafts of the
strategic vision and themes with the university community seeking their opinions, after
developing initial concepts. Having identified the potential strategic bet before asking for
recommendations from the university wider community, RCU2 achieved a more targeted
and focused strategy connected to the external environment.
As a result of different approaches that the universities took along the way, the
documents containing their strategies were representative of their levels of strategic foci.
RCU1’s strategic plan is twice as long, listing unprioritized strategic goals, objectives and
more than a hundred strategies (in fact tactical actions), that the university planned to
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execute. RCU2’s document - Strategic Vision - contained strategic goals and some
examples of prioritized initiatives to realize them. The document also had examples of
tactical actions that the university planned to take for each type of the initiative.
Strategy vs. Planning
The cases revealed disparities in the way leaders understood and defined their
strategic work, which was clearly represented in the language they used. In RCU1’s
leaders statements planning dominated over strategy and was conflated with it. Leaders
mostly used planning terminology instead of strategic terms. When talking about the SP
process or the resulting document, the word “strategic” was often skipped, leaving
“planning” and “plan” used the most. The separation of the “strategy” and “plan” in the
speech was not evident. This conflation was partially conditioned by the fact the senior
leaders did not have a clear definition of “strategy”, or at least a shared language about it.
When asked to define “strategic”, RCU1’s leaders offered technical explanations of
internal planning issues, such as of the process of how goals were operationalized and
how targets, baselines, and timelines were assigned. Another way they understood
strategy was by seeing it as a collection of institutionalized organizational policies. The
absence of clear definition of strategy in the leadership team could have been the reason
to opt for the more common practice in HE SP processes. In particular RCU1’s leaders
decided to crowdsource the aspirations from the university community, to choose
strategic goals from the emerging themes, and to focus more on the planning and
execution of the plan instead of creating the targeted strategy that fits the external
environment better.
RCU2 dedicated more attention to the strategy and supported it with planning. In
particular, its senior leaders employed a clear distinction between strategic levels. They
produced a Strategic Vision document, which included strategic vision, high-level
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aggregated themes, goals, and initiatives. Later, the Strategic Plan was placed in a
separate document, assigning tactical actions to responsible parties in order to achieve
the Strategic Vision. While the expertise of the Board was very influential in defining
strategy as a multi-level endeavor, RCU2’s President had a clear idea how to define
“strategic” from the beginning of their tenure. They communicated to the university for
many years that, in order to survive, the university had to be distinctive, relevant, and
competitive. This approach largely defined the leadership team’s understanding of the
strategic work. Over the years, one of the leaders took the conversation on to the next
reflective level. They started to wonder about the distinction between the “strategic” and
the “opportunistic”, which is not only indicative of the ongoing discussion on the subject
among the senior leaders, but importantly its evolution.
The behavior patterns expressed by RCU1 regarding the strategic terminology
and definition are consistent with extant research on HE practices, which describes HEIs
substituting planning for strategy (for details see Eckel & Trower, 2019). RCU2, in turn,
suggests a definition of strategy developed from the theoretical literature on SP models
in HE (for details see Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Morrison et al., 1984; Peterson, 1997).
Strategic Planning Processes and the Conceptual Logic of the Study
When strategic decision-making processes implemented by both universities
were compared with the overall conceptual logic of the study (please see Figure 3), the
differences in how well each case fit into the theoretical framework were clear. RCU2
incorporated most of the features suggested by literature as leading to the successful
strategic response. As discussed in Chapter Five, RCU2 leaders made sense about their
environment macro-contextually and prospectively, and the President was personally
committed to the thorough environmental scanning. This allowed RCU2 to produce a
Strategic Plan that responded to the real problem in the external environment of the
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university and had all the necessary components that literature suggests, such as a clear
timeline and responsible parties.
In contrast, while RCU1’s President had an understanding what an SP process
should ideally deliver, they were constrained by the internal organizational situation at
the university. The long-standing conflict between faculty and senior administration as
well as limited mid-level management skillset of the administration and academic
community to engage in such an exercise, catalyzed the Presidents’ choice to use SP
differently. Instead of implementing the strategic decision-making process that would
conform to the theoretical framework derived from the extant literature and deliver an
externally relevant strategic response, they chose to utilize the SP process to repair
broken relationships on campus first. While RCU1’s President did not do what extant
literature suggests, it could have been a wise strategic choice for RCU1. Without solving a
long-standing conflict, it probably was not possible to have an honest conversation about
building the future together. This finding from RCU1 highlighted an important
disconnect between the institutional forces in higher education and organizational
realities in some cases. Incoming university presidents are expected to own and create a
new strategy for the institution; it is one of the major indicators these leaders are
evaluated upon. The reality of the RCU1 showed that instead of putting the strategy
creation on hold and solving the internal conflict first through means disparate from SP,
the President had to combine the two processes together, which partially helped to
resolve the existing conflict but did not deliver an externally relevant strategy. This, in
turn, raised concerns about how reasonable it is to put pressure on educational leaders to
create a new strategy every time they assume office. As the average presidential tenure
might not be long enough to create, execute, and see the results of the SP, the case of
RCU1 underscores the need of tailoring this process to work in large organizations with
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complex governance structures and often conflicting purposes of faculty and
administrators.
Making Sense of the Organizational Environment During Strategic Planning
Process
While both universities organized two part SP process starting by performing an
environmental scan and then switching to the articulation of strategy via conversations
with the university’s community, they developed different tools to do it.
Concept of the Organizational Environment
On the conceptual level, the leaders in both universities mostly saw their external
environments through geographical lenses. There were differences in details, however.
RCU1’s leaders generally envisioned their geographic region as a catchment area: the
surrounding geography providing the most of their incoming students. Their focus was
on the point where the “region” flows into the “university”. They also saw the university
as a partner to the local community. Leaders desired the exclusion of factors, which
could endanger RCU1’s ability to carry out its mission, to be the student-oriented
university. In addition, some leaders mentioned that the external environment was not a
part of their everyday thinking due to their workload. RCU2’s understanding of their
geographic region was based on the “brain remain” idea. This meant that university
expected its graduates to return to their communities with new knowledge, instead of
leaving the area. RCU2’s leaders’ focal point opposed RCU1’s in direction and was on
how “university” flows to the “region”. RCU2’s leaders similarly wanted to exclude from
their external environment conditions that were not pertinent to the university’s
mission.
While geographic regionality was the dominant component of the universities’
understanding of the external environments, RCU2 leaders demonstrated a more
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proactive agenda towards their surroundings. Their actions were consistent with the
extant New Institutional theory literature suggesting that organizational leaders must
shape their environments through strategic responses in order to be successful (for
details see Doyle, 2018; Oliver, 1991; Peterson, 1997; Scott, 1995).
Tools That Shaped Leaders’ Sensemaking During the Strategic DecisionMaking
The study used two theoretical perspectives to understand how leaders make
sense of their environments to create strategy: strategic planning models (for details see
Kotler & Murphy, 1981; Morrison et al., 1984) and sensemaking theory (Brown et al.,
2015; Smerek, 2013; Weick, 1976). The simultaneous use of the two perspectives
revealed that the approach productive for the strategic decision-making: prospective,
macro-contextual, and routine opposed the way people usually make sense of their
surroundings. The findings from both cases showed that the tools leaders used during
their respective processes of strategy creation partially conditioned their sensemaking
about their organizational environments. In turn, the ways in which leaders thought
about their environments affected the resulting strategies and organizational responses.
RCU1’s leadership employed retrospective micro-contextual sensemaking which led to
an internally oriented reactive Strategic Plan. In contrast, prospective and macrocontextual sensemaking allowed RCU2 leaders to create the strategy, which increased
the fit between the university and its external environment.
Retrospective and prospective sensemaking dichotomy. The two
universities’ senior leaders used different tools that influenced their sensemaking in
terms of relationship to the future (please see Appendix B for the full list of tools
universities used to engage with the environments). RCU1’s leaders leaned towards
retrospective sensemaking, as the university community did not want to engage in
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organizational change due to the existing conflict and preferred to continue as is.
Certainly, leaders experienced difficulties with engaging the employees in a futureoriented conversation. While the leadership team understood the importance of
prospective thinking, they crowdsourced the community aspirations using a very broad
prompt question as a tool to scan their environment. It was a reason that leaders mostly
made sense about their environment retrospectively.
RCU2 leaders leaned more towards prospective sensemaking via the
environmental scanning tools they chose as they operated the campus where they were
already trusted by faculty. They used a report on the future of the regional workforce
needs, conducted the literature review on the future issues in HE, and carried out
visioning sessions with the university community.
Micro-contextual and macro-contextual sensemaking dichotomy.
RCU1 leaders’ consideration of their environment was dominated by micro-contextual
perspective. They used a SWOT analysis, a traditional tool for SP. Even though
opportunities and threats in this analytic tool are supposed to represent the external
(macro-contextual) perspective, it has a strong internal organizational framework. In
other words, people articulate opportunities for the university, relying on the strengths
and weaknesses of the organization, which limits the understanding of the external
conditions. As micro-contextual sensemaking dominated, not surprisingly the share of
tools university had to look at the internal environment constituted a larger share of all
the environmental tools used in strategic decision-making.
In contrast, RCU2’ leaders tried to use tools that allowed them to look outside
first. The consultancy report focused on the future of the region - an object larger and
beyond the university itself. Similarly, the literature review explored issues pertinent to
the nation, not specifically to California or even a smaller scope, highlighting their
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intention to make sense macro-contextually. Even after the decision to create the College
of Health was made, leaders heavily relied on the opinion of the Health Council,
consisting of people external to the university.
Occasional and routine sensemaking dichotomy. This dichotomy was the
only case of both universities making sense in a similar way through the environmental
tools they used. First, both leadership teams used similar routine tools to constantly
make sense of their respective internal organizational conditions, such as academic and
organizational unit review. In addition, both teams employed occasional tools to
understand their external environment at a particular moment of time during the SP
process: the SWOT analysis and literature review. Interestingly, they used routine tools
for the external environment beyond their SP processes, a part of RCU1’s academic
program review on competition from other universities and predictive modelling in
RCU2. Lastly, in both cases leadership teams developed a variety of very similar
occasional tools to contribute to their understanding of the external environments, such
as conferences or participation in professional groups. RCU2 here took a more proactive
approach. For instance, they purchased high-quality data reports and requested
employees returning from conferences to report on their learnings.
While extant literature suggests it is beneficial to have a formalized routine
environmental scanning (for details see Hearn & Heydinger, 1985; Morrison et al., 1984)
neither university did it. The authors stated that having a routine scanning of the
external environment installed into the institutional structure of an HEI is essential for
the SP process. They suggested to carry out this activity through a permanently existing
interdisciplinary group of high-level leaders representing key university’s functions and
delivering actionable datasets to the HEI’s executives (for details see Hearn & Heydinger,
1985; Morrison et al., 1984). Environmental scanning was performed within particular
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SP processes and was not institutionalized into a formal, repeated practice. Nor did the
universities formalize the contributing forms they developed to make sense of the
external environment, which could have served as a foundation for formalized routine
environmental scanning.
Monitoring of the Execution of the Strategic Plan
Both RCUs had a variety of periodic meetings as a form to discuss their progress
on the Strategic Plan in the case of RCU1 and Strategic Vision for the RCU2. In both
cases the Presidents’ Cabinets met regularly to track the progress. The only difference in
format was that RCU2’s Presidential Cabinet had its own regular meetings, and also
participated in quarterly meeting with the Board of Trustees, strengthening the process
through the participation of external experts. In the case of RCU1 the governing body
was not a part of regular monitoring meetings.
While the format for monitoring the strategic plan was similar, the documents to
keep track of the plans differed in their effectiveness. As cases represented, RCU1 had a
somewhat unmanageable “clunky spreadsheet” as a result of having many nonprioritized strategic directions. On the contrary, RCU2 had their initiatives prioritized by
the impact level in the matrix with corresponding actions, responsible parties, progress
made to date, and progress towards the Strategic Vision.
Importantly, although the monitoring of the Strategic Plan or Vision was present
in both cases, the routine evaluation of the strategy itself was missing. After ratifying the
strategy, senior leaders concentrated on its implementation and did not establish
formalized mechanisms for routine scanning for changes in the larger organizational
external environment and evaluation of the current strategy against those factors.
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Working Towards Success
The implementation of the strategic responses was in different stages across the
two cases at the time of the study. RCU1 had already seen positive results from the
decisions they made, while RCU2 was still in process of launching the new College of
Health. While the results were satisfactory for the leaders, the level of confidence they
expressed was different. RCU1’s leaders were less sure that their initiatives would lead to
the results they wanted, possibly because their response was reactive and less focused.
Their decision to remain a student-centered university was a very broad goal, and could
be affected by many unpredictable factors. RCU2 leaders were absolutely sure of future
positive results, as they were responding to a very particular external condition, were
aware of their potential competition, and knew they had enough operational resources to
support the strategic response. This knowledge limited their exposure to unpredictable
influences.
As the two universities had articulated challenges with different foci, logically
their leaders ended up using different indicators to measure success. RCU1’s leaders
looked at internal measurements such as retention and graduation rates as their
strategic response was conditioned by micro-contextual sensemaking. RCU2’s leadership
planned to measure the success of the new college by a combination of indicators,
including macro-contextual ones: for instance, the impact of the graduates to work on
the community health as particular kinds of healthcare professionals.
Was it Enough to Produce an Externally Relevant Strategy That Moves the
University, Higher Education, and the Nation Forward?
While both leadership teams succeeded in producing strategic responses through
executing the SP process, they both had further opportunities to increase the
effectiveness of the strategy creation.

158

RCU1’s leaders did all they could to start the conversation with the university
community in the organizational conditions in which they operated. However, RCU1
might have been in a need for another iteration of the SP process if the leaders wanted
more focused and fitted with the external environment strategy. If the institutional
forces would affect RCU1 in a way that the President would change before the current
one started the second iteration of SP, the leaders would have to find mechanisms to
allow strategic continuity into the future.
RCU2’s strategy might benefit from the leaders evaluating two issues. First, as
healthcare industry will continue to demand labor in the foreseeable future, it was
possible that many other HEIs would have a healthcare-related educational product.
While this factor did not affect RCU2’s strategic relevance or competitiveness in the
short term, it might compromise the institution’s distinctiveness in the future. Therefore,
the leadership might need to describe or develop mechanisms allowing them to
reproduce the “distinct, relevant, competitive” strategy creation process without having
the Board expertise as they did with the healthcare industry. Importantly, as RCU2
leaders had already developed an externally relevant and future-oriented strategy, they
could take it to another level: from responding to a future need to enacting one. To
accomplish that, the university would need to switch from a “service” position of helping
industry, the community, and the region to a position of “leading the regional future”.
This could be done through forecasting new potential industries or cross-industrial
collaborations and trigger their development in the area by creating educational
products for them.
The two cases demonstrated disparate strategic responses and demonstrated how
far into developing an externally relevant strategy each university was. The study showed
that by using an internal SWOT during the SP process and “on-demand” environmental
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scanning as issues arose was not enough to produce a comprehensive yet focused and
externally relevant strategic response. In contrast, this attitude resulted in a reactive
response towards the environment. For instance, the decision to stay non-impacted
came more from the internal aspirations of the university to be a student-focused
institution, than from the reality of the outside world of changing demography, economy,
and industry.
RCU2 benefited significantly from the leadership continuity and President’s focus
on the future, which resulted in more developed environmental scanning set of tools the
leaders used and, therefore, the more externally relevant strategic response they
produced. RCU2 demonstrated that having an externally and future oriented process to
make sense of the organizational environment paid off in having a more focused,
externally relevant strategy. While RCU2 had potential for improving their SP process, it
showcased that making strategy creation a macro-contextual and prospective process
through available environmental scanning and analysis tools was the beneficial way to
think about the organization’s strategy, its future survival, and its role in the regional,
state, and national development.
Study Findings in the Broader Context of Strategic Decision-Making in
Higher Education
The study’s findings revealed that the environmental scanning and analysis tools
and techniques university leaders used during the SP process partially influenced the
way they made sense about their respective organizational environments, which, in turn,
modulated the scope and direction of the strategic responses. RCU1’s choice of internally
oriented environmental tools, such as the SWOT analysis and crowdsourcing from the
university community, which was conditioned by the challenging internal organizational
situation, made micro-contextual sensemaking more influential during the SP process.
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In the same vein, RCU2’s choices to use an industry report, literature review, and a
committee of external experts brought the macro-contextual sensemaking to the fore.
The different scopes of the leaders’ sensemaking explained some of the differences in
how resulting strategic responses were connected to the universities’ external
environment. When micro-contextual sensemaking dominated, the response was more
insular, focusing on the university itself. In the case of RCU2’s macro-contextual
sensemaking, the resulting strategy was targeted towards a particular condition in the
external environment.
The study helped to shed light on the fact that the types of senior leaders’
sensemaking during the SP process, their tenure durations, and relationships with the
university community partially influenced the overall use of the SP process in HE. A
combination of a new leadership team and existing conflict between the administrators
and faculty triggered the use of internally focused environmental tools and allowed RCU1
to partially resolve the conflict by starting a shared strategic conversation. However, the
SP process was not utilized in its original theoretical function to gain organizational fit
with the external environment and deviated to the “buy-in” usage. In contrast, RCU2 had
a leadership team, which had served at the university through two SP processes and
already gained trust from the university community and was able to use the SP process
as recommended by the literature. This finding also demonstrated that organizational
strategy is a “long” endeavor, taking up to 10 years to articulate a single strategic bet.
This study contributes to extant literature by demonstrating the ways in which
shortening university presidential tenures could be the reason why senior leaders avoid
long-term initiatives in favor of the speedy results in the organizational strategies (for
details see Gagliardi et al., 2017; Selingo et al., 2017). While researchers still debate the
negative consequences of longer presidential tenures, this study showed a case in which
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the enduring tenure of the president and their cabinet allowed the university to develop a
strategy relevant to the external environment, potentially increasing the institution’s
chances of survival.
The findings provided partial evidence on the occasional (crisis) use of SP as
described in extant literature (for details see Kotler & Murphy, 1981). While both
Presidents started a new SP process after assuming offices, the study’s finding on the
RCU1’s are not representative on the crisis use of the SP phenomenon. This is because at
the time of the study, the current RCU1’s strategy was still in place and President did not
launch a new iteration, neither RCU1 got a new President to begin their SP process.
RCU2’s President started the second iteration of the SP process outside of the crisis, as a
logical continuation of strategic work.
From the two models discussed in the literature review, both universities
employed SP processes according to the linear model (for details see Kotler & Murphy,
1981), starting from environmental scanning and resulting in the creation of an
operational plan. While similar in general design, the use of different tools during the
environmental scanning step led to significantly different strategies, suggesting that it
does matter how exactly the leaders designed the mentioned tools. The findings did not
reveal the use of the circular (continuous) SP model (for details see Morrison et al.,
1984), which suggests that having a routine formalized monitoring of both external and
internal environments is more effective. While both universities had developed
formalized monitoring of the internal environment, no evidence was found of routine
formalized scanning and analysis of the external surroundings.
As there were no formalized external environment scanning processes in either
case, Presidents’ and senior leaders’ knowledge played a significant role in organizing
them. The study revealed that both leadership teams chose different tools to scan and
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analyze their external environment; they did not follow a particular pattern, suggesting
leaders were using their own understanding of how this process could be done. This, in
turn, suggests that HE as an industry lacks a deeper discussion on which tools are
effective to scan and analyze the external environment. This is also manifested in extant
SP literature, as studies on environmental scanning are dated and rare. While HE
practitioners understand the importance of ES, the extant SP practice-oriented literature
offers a number of well-known tools, such as SWOT analysis, without more detailed
conversation on what environmental scanning can deliver.
In addition, as college presidential tenures are shortening (for details see
(Gagliardi et al., 2017; Selingo et al., 2017) and environmental scanning processes are
not formalized, every new President and their subordinates start designing scanning
tools from scratch. This could result in a loss of productivity, organizational knowledge,
and lack of continuation of strategy. In addition, as the external scanning processes were
not formalized in either case, the study did not provide enough evidence to attribute
championship for those actions and establish possible effect of these processes over the
strategy formation (for details see for details see Morrison et al., 1984).
The study confirmed that the personal commitment of the university President
was crucial to strategy creation, which is consistent with extant literature (for details see
Seltzer, 2018). Both presidents were very experienced in HE strategic management and
defined major characteristics of the SP process at their respective institutions. RCU1’s
President brought a team capable of communicating and creating a strategy and
persuaded the campus to participate. RCU2’s President brought the very definition of
strategy and the focus on the future to the university’s operation. The Presidents were
clearly the drivers of the SP process in these cases, but similarly they relied on a single
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senior leader to administrate the SP process, which in one case acted through authority
and in the other through cooperation.
The study showed that while the Presidents had similar professional experiences
- extensive careers in HE without taking senior management positions outside of it – the
choices they made to organize both ES and of SP were different. While extant literature
implies that the dichotomy of “inside-outside” HE experiences results in different
leadership practices (for details see Gagliardi et al., 2017), important differences might
also lie in leaders’ experiences within HE.
Another finding consistent with extant literature demonstrated that data-driven
decision-making was the priority for both the Presidents and their Cabinets. However,
the sole use of traditional institutional research might not be enough to support
prospective, macro-contextual sensemaking, and hence strategic decision-making.
Universities might benefit from employing a proactive approach to institutional
relationships with data by creating data management systems to supply the institutional
research function, such as shared data language, predictive modelling, intensive market
research, active acquiring, and the use of the external datasets.
The study also revealed the disparate challenges of thinking strategically for
public vs. private institutions. The challenge of being highly tuition-dependent
institution catalyzed the strategy creation in RCU2, a private university. Accepting the
need to be proactive in order to survive made leaders incorporate all the external experts
available and made them work for the university. Once the leaders had the Strategic
Vision, they were faced with the challenge of persuading the campus that while the new
college would be created, this decision would not negatively affect other units. If not for
the very experienced and trustworthy President, this might have been much harder to
do. While private universities are more business oriented in terms of their work with
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students’ markets to stay financially viable, they still have traditional HE governance
structures and academic culture. While challenging, those two worlds need to be
connected through the charismatic leadership for the university to act strategically.
The public university in the study, RCU1, historically relied on state financial
support and its academic community had a common in public HE less proactive attitude
towards organizational future. The new leaders had to persuade their campus to engage
with strategy creation. Another challenge is that public universities usually have more
stakeholders to attend to and have more expectations from the public as providers of the
public good. The pressure to satisfy everyone puts universities’ leaders in a difficult
situation in regard to their strategies. Responding to all the aspirations of the university
community, the local regional communities, the governing body of the university and
city/state governments can be challenging for public institutions' leaders and can
prevent them from creating a focused strategy.

165

Chapter 7. Conclusion
The Summary of the Findings
Environmental scanning and analysis tools partially conditioned leader’s
sensemaking of their organizational environment and, in turn, their universities’
strategic responses. Macro-contextual and prospective sensemaking helped to shape
strategy, which delivered a proactive university plan to fit with the future of the external
environment. Logically, micro-contextual retrospective sensemaking catalyzed a more
insular and reactive strategic response.
Leaders’ work with the internal organizational environment was mostly
formalized, while engagement with the external one was informal and occasional. The
dominant institutionalization of processes looking at the internal organizational
environment might be an underlying factor for HEIs leaders to mostly make sense of
their surroundings micro-contextually.
While the SP processes in the institutions included in this study resemble a
similar linear model, starting from environmental scanning, articulating goals, and
making an operational plan, the crucial difference is in the tools and mechanisms leaders
designed to scan the environment, discuss it with the community, and make decisions.
The university leaders’ tenure durations and the relationships between the faculty
and the administration partially affected the level of strategic focus. RCU1’s President
chose to start their tenure with internally focused SP process first in an attempt to build
the relationship with the campus community. In RCU2, the trust earned by the leaders
during the previous SP process helped to distribute responsibilities across participants,
prioritize strategic goals, and focus the strategy on a particular external issue. Strategic
focus was also affected by the design of the environmental scanning tools.
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Creation of organizational strategy is a “long” endeavor and its continuation is
important for successful strategic response. Diminishing presidential tenures might have
an interrupting effect on an organization’s ability to continue the strategic conversation.
Institutionalization of the tools, methods, and processes utilized in strategic decisionmaking could be useful for retaining and using organizational strategic knowledge.
University leaders’ definition of “strategy” and its separation from “planning” was
a crucial factor in producing an externally relevant organizational strategy. Having the
ten-thousand-foot view of strategic vision, goals, themes and - separate from the
strategic plan - a list of tactical actions, provided clarity and helped prioritize initiatives
in the resulting strategic documentation.
While literature suggests that many HE practitioners use the SP processes in the
times of organizational crises, the study showed that having an opportunity to perform
SP routinely, as a logical continuation of the strategic work, did deliver a strategy that
creates the better fit with the external environment.
Despite the excessive workload and support of the administrative leaders of the
SP process, the presidents’ knowledge, experience, and authority over the process of
creating the definition, prospective and macro-contextual orientation, as well as
distributing the responsibilities during the SP remains crucial.
Implications for Higher Education Practice
Regardless of the general decentralization of authority in the US and the absence
of a national HE system in an organizational sense, it is important to remember that all
the country’s HEIs are interdependent from a systems theory perspective. Changes in
behavior of one institution can affect others. For instance, if there is no direct effect on
an institution from the changing demography in its region of service, it does not mean
that this market will not be affected by other institutions from different administrative
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divisions as their own markets are changing. To create a successful strategy, it is critical
that leaders pay attention to the external organizational environment and treat the HE
industry as a system across institutional and administrative borders.
It is futile to only look within the university to create a relevant strategy that
increases organizational fit with the external environment. Should the internal
organizational conditions allow, university leaders need to scan and analyze a larger
object outside of their own organization, such as region (geographical, industrial,
administrative, demographic, or economy based, whichever way leaders will define it.
HEIs will benefit if senior leaders develop a definition of strategy through macrocontextual, prospective, and ongoing sensemaking. It might help to avoid widespread
substitution of “planning” for “strategy” and prevent from failed SP processes or nonexecutable strategic plans. Doing the hard defining work in the beginning of the SP
process can move the SP from something everyone does to be socially acceptable, to an
honest conversation between the senior leaders and their community members
regarding a way to survive and be relevant to the world.
The macro-contextual, prospective, and ongoing approach could be also useful in
designing tools to scan and analyze the environment within and beyond the SP process.
While traditional SWOT analysis might be useful, adding specific ways of work tailored
to understand the larger organizational context and its potential future, such as foresight
work and scenarios forecasting, could be particularly useful.
A single contemporary presidential tenure of just a few years might not be
enough to carry out the SP process, execute the strategy, and see its results. To mitigate
potential disruption from leadership change, it might be useful to start developing tools,
processes, and policies for transferring strategic decision-making from the current
president and cabinet to the next ones and allow for the continuation of strategy. The
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study provided evidence that there are many tools already available in universities that
could be formalized and could contribute to organizational data management.
Potential for future research
While the study added to our collective knowledge on the strategic responses in
regional comprehensive universities, the organization and leadership of the strategic
decision-making that lead to those responses, and how leaders make sense of their
organizational environment, it also raised questions for future research.
Systemic level of higher education as an industry
The study reiterated findings from previous research that college presidents are
overloaded, and that operating and financial issues take their energy away from strategy.
In both cases presidents relied on their cabinets and/or special committees and both
created a position to lead the SP process administratively. While the study revealed
differences in authority and the responsibilities given to these leaders, we need more
research to study the relationship between the functionalization of responsibilities
among senior leadership and the effectiveness of SP. The HE academic community might
also benefit from learning about SP administrative leaders themselves, their professional
backgrounds, and what enables them to carry out the SP process successfully.
The academic community will also benefit from learning more about the
relationship between leadership continuity and organizational strategy. This study
demonstrated one case where unusually long tenures of president and cabinet catalyzed
an increase in the focus of a previously existing strategic plan and produced and an even
more externally relevant strategy. Future research on the state and national levels is
needed to understand the interruptive effect of the average presidential and cabinet
tenures on the creation and continuation of strategy.
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Importantly, the study’s findings on the influence of leaders’ sensemaking during
the SP process and resulting strategies creates a possibility for further conversation on
how external relevancy of the US universities’ strategies could affect US HE and the
nation altogether.
Organizational level of HEIs
The study demonstrated difficulties leaders faced when carrying out SP processes
amidst conflict between administrators and faculty. More research will benefit higher
education’s academic and practice communities if it delivers studies connecting the
relationships on campus with organizational strategy.
As this qualitative study was limited to two cases and the results are only partially
theoretically generalizable, more research is needed on what conditions help implement
successful SP that produces strategic fit with the environment at other RCUs and other
HEI types.
Organizational strategy is often one of the work aspects on which the president
and other strategic leaders are evaluated, so these questions remain highly sensitive in
the eyes of the leadership, which significantly limits access of researchers to sites. More
research is needed to demystify SP as an evaluation tool and to help HE practitioners
have a relevant definition, process designs, and tools to successfully create relevant to
the world strategies. These studies will increase practitioners’ understanding of strategic
work as necessary for any organization, but not because it is customary in the industry
and professionally beneficial. Creating strategy is difficult, but it delivers a fit with the
external environment which drives the development of the university, the region, and the
country.
In both cases universities did not formalize external environmental scanning or
analysis processes, while extant literature describes its benefits to strategic work.
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Therefore, we need studies of HEIs that employed their version of a formalized
environmental scanning and analysis process to establish its effect on strategic decisionmaking.
The two cases demonstrated a different distribution of administrative
responsibilities among leaders, showing one case where the SP leader was also in charge
of enrollment management and institutional research and another where these functions
were assigned to several people. We would benefit from a more detailed understanding
of the connection between distribution of responsibilities and effectiveness of SP process.
Individual characteristics of HEIs leaders level
The cases in this study presented different definitions of strategy and ways of
communicating it to other senior leaders and campus communities. However, we need
more research looking at a larger number of HEIs to develop a better understanding on a
variety of ways leaders define strategy and which factors influence this work.
This study showed two presidents with long standing careers in HE, and the
different SP approaches they chose. We need to explore in more detail the connection
between previous professional experiences and strategic decision-making models,
processes, and tools in larger populations of senior HE leaders.
While this study focused exclusively on the RCUs as an institutional type, the
questions for strategy creation and making sense of the external environment are
relevant topics across the HE industry. Therefore, extant research could be developed by
adding more studies on strategy creation for other institutional types.

171

APPENDICES
Interview protocol

APPENDIX A

Thank you very much for taking the time to speak with me. I am doing a study
trying to understand how university leaders are making sense of their external
environment in order to make strategic decisions. This is a time of great uncertainty with
shifting demographics and challenges around funding. On top of that, the pandemic is
making the environment even more uncertain. So, I am interested to know how your
institution has found its way during this challenging time.
I am sure that COVID-related issues have very much dominated your thinking
recently and I would like to learn how you made sense of this changing environment—
but, in general, I want to get your perspective on how strategic decision making
typically works (not in a time of crisis.)
With your permission, I would like to record our call. I will be transcribing the
interview and will remove any identifying information but no one other than me will
listen to the voice file. I will not be using any quotes for attribution without getting
people’s permission. Most quotes will be anonymous. Would it be OK if I record this?
You are also welcome to tell me to stop recording at any time.
[I will press “record” button, then say: “Thank you for agreeing to participate and
allowing me to record this interview” to have the consent of the participant on the
record.]
1. Could you begin by telling me a bit about yourself—what is your current role and
how long have you been at the institution?
2. What would you say are the most important challenges your institution is
currently facing?
o Probe – if not mentioned:
§ What are the /are there any other economic challenges present in
the environment, that affect your university?
§ COVID affected much of the operation of course, but to open the
conversation a little: how did you make sense of the wider
environment, challenges presented by economic and demographic
trends before the pandemic?
§ How did the institution come to know this was a challenge?
§ What [strategic] actions are you taking to address financial
concerns?
3. As you think about the challenges you just described, walk me through how your
institution has gone about responding to them. What does the strategic decisionmaking process look like?
o

Probe – if not mentioned:
§ In addition to the emergency response, is university working
strategically, towards the long-term goals?
§ How do you define that the action you are taking is strategic?
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•

§
§
§
§
§
§
§

Is this action characterized by one of the following:
allocation of recourses, ratification by the governing body,
is a long-term initiative?
How is this process organized and what is your and your
organizational unit role in it? Walk me through the steps.
Is this a routine DM process?
Who is involved/ leads the process?
Has the DM process evolved in order to respond to this challenge
(if yes – how)?
Are there differences in the organization and functioning the
process pre/post COVID-19 pandemic?
What do you think are the limitations of the process?
Any other formal or informal decision-making process that you
think was important in producing the action?

4. What information about the external environment does the institution pay
attention to when determining the action to pursue?
o Probe – if not mentioned:
§ How is environmental scanning and analysis organized, if extant?
How frequent is it?
§ How external environment is scanned and analyzed?
§ What forms does it take: is it a tool (a set of KPIs, a dashboard,
SWOT, PEST), a process, an organizational unit, etc.?
§ How far into the future the data about external environment is
looked at?
§ What are the results of environmental scanning/analysis? Is this a
documented dataset?
§ Do you see room for improvement? What would you change?
§ If there is no formal process that could be described, think of the
“space”, where you engage with the knowledge on the external
environment (consultants, though partners, educational
programs, etc.)
5. Once you’ve set in place a plan of action, how is progress monitored?
6. In what way has this initiative influenced organizational performance (success/
legitimacy/survival)? How do you know if you’ve been successful?
7. Are there some challenges that the institution has had a hard time responding to
adequately in your view?
[As we are closing the interview, I have a couple of questions to summarize the way you
conceptualize the external environment for the purposes of decision-making.]
8. When you think of your university’s external environment, how do you envision
or set its boundaries? How do you decide that something is included or not? How
did your thinking about this matter change during your time on the job?
9. If you were to use an analogy (metaphor) describe your external environment,
what would it be? [probing for geography, industry, something else]; what is the
main principle that you use to decide what is external environment for you?
Closure:
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Thank you so much for finding the time for this interview; it was very interesting
and helpful. Is there anything we did not address that you think is important to this
conversation?
Who would you suggest I talk to next?
Are there any documents on the decision-making processes we discussed apart from
those available on the website that I should look at?
Thank you for your time.

174

APPENDIX B
Environmental scanning and analysis tools used for the strategic decisionmaking in both cases

Internal
environment
tools

External
environment
tools

RCU1
- Academic Program
Review
- Administrative
Unit Review
- Surveys (student,
faculty, etc.)

RCU2
- Academic Program
Review
- Administrative
Unit Review
- Surveys (student,
faculty, etc.)

- Crowdsourcing
aspirations for the
institution via
conversations with
the community
aggregated into
strategic goals
- ES as a SWOT by
Council (broad
strokes, no
specificity)

- Continuation of the
first SP iteration
(retrospective)
- Initial consultancy
company report
- ES as literature
review
- University-wide
visioning sessions
- Choice matrix with
focus on
community impact
- Health Advisory
Council
- Predictive
modelling function
within institutional
research

- Institutional
research function
- One question
about competition
in Academic
Program Review
Contributing
forms of
engagement
with the
external
environment

- Personal
knowledge of the
President and the
Cabinet
- Professional
groups
- Public data
- Research
- System’s office
influence

- Personal
knowledge of the
President and the
Cabinet
- Professional
groups
- Public and
purchased data
services
- Research
- Conferences
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Comments
- Internal,
formalized,
retrospective,
routine
- Tools used to
support the
strategic DM,
but not designed
for it specifically
- During the SP
- Non-formalized,
occasional,
internally
focused in RCU1
and externally
focused in RCU2

- Outside of SP
- Formalized
- Retrospectively
focused in RCU1
and more
prospectively
focused in RCU2

- Board of Trustees
as the access to
regional
environment
knowledge
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